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75 (trial court has affirmative duty to correct misconstructions of the evidence made by counsel in the presence of the jury); Lancette v. State, 151 Ga.App. 740(2), 261 S.E.2d 405 (1979) (trial court’s warning to limit defense counsel’s comments in closing argument strictly to what is in evidence was not improperly restrictive).” Mathis v. State, 276 Ga.App. 587, 623 S.E.2d 674 (November 4, 2005). “During closing argument, the prosecutor contended that Mathis was the president of a nationally renowned company and was a ‘wealthy man that’s trying to buy his way out of a DUI.’ Mathis objected and moved for mistrial contending that the prosecutor’s comments were based on facts not introduced into evidence and were improper and inflammatory. [fn] The trial court granted Mathis’ motion for a mistrial, but denied his subsequent plea in bar based on double jeopardy. ‘In general[,] when a defendant makes a motion for a mistrial he waives any claim of double jeopardy. But, where the prosecutor has goaded the defense into making a motion for a mistrial in order for the prosecution to avoid reversal of the conviction because of prosecutorial or judicial error or to otherwise obtain a more favorable chance for a guilty verdict on retrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause will stand as a bar to retrial. The Supreme Court of Georgia has adopted the test set out in Oregon [ v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416) (1982)]. The inquiry is whether the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial and thus terminate the trial. What is critical is the objective of the prosecutor’s conduct.’ (Citations omitted.) Spradley v. State, 242 Ga.App. 340, 341, (1) (529 S.E.2d 647) (2000). See also Oregon, 456 U.S. at 676.” Here, trial court’s factual determination that prosecutor had not intentionally goaded mistrial was not clearly erroneous: defendant’s financial status had been discussed at length, but outside the presence of the jury; and, as prosecutor noted, “he was ‘extremely confident that [Mathis] was going to be convicted’” and thus had no motive to subvert the trial. Lassic v. State, 278 Ga. 701, 606 S.E.2d 266 (November 22, 2004). “During closing statements, defense counsel misstated the evidence by saying that no blood had been found on [defendant’s] clothing. Acting sua sponte, the trial judge dismissed the jury and rebuked counsel. The court then brought the jury back into the courtroom and informed it that proceedings had been interrupted so that counsel could be rebuked privately. The trial court also instructed the jury that counsel may not misstate the evidence and that the jury is obligated to recall evidence from the witness stand, rather than as presented by either attorney during closing statements. Defendant urges that by these actions, the trial court improperly injected its opinion into the proceedings. [Cit.] We disagree. As stated in OCGA § 17-8-75: ‘Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.’ When counsel makes prejudicial misstatements to the jury concerning matters not in evidence, the trial court has an affirmative duty to follow the dictates of section 17-8-75. [Cit.] As for the trial court’s explanation to the jury about why closing statements had been interrupted and the jury excused, ‘[the] trial judge’s remarks assigning a reason for a ruling are neither an improper expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence.’ [Cit.] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s actions in this case were appropriate and that it did not erroneously comment on the evidence.” Accord, Buttram v. State , 280 Ga. 595, 631 S.E.2d 642 (June 12, 2006). Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). “During her closing argument, the prosecutor said to the jury: ‘For you to go back in that jury room and return a verdict of not guilty means you must be prepared to come out and look those boys in the eye and call them liars; because that’s what it does.’” This was inappropriate argument: “The statement could be construed as improperly suggesting to the jurors that they go beyond their role of reaching a verdict based solely on the law and the evidence, [cit.] and that they instead consider a matter not in evidence – i.e, a consequence of a particular verdict that would be personal to the members of the jury. ” Deemed harmless error, but note that two judges concur in judgment only, and three dissent from harmless error finding. Accord, Hunt (February 14, 2013), above (argument on effect a ‘not guilty’ verdict would have on State’s witness was improper as outside the evidence) . Rust v. State, 264 Ga.App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (December 19, 2003). “Rust asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing certain demonstrative evidence during closing argument. Rust complains that during closing argument, the trial court prevented him from trying on the camouflage jacket seized as evidence. We disagree. During closing, it is permissible to make any argument which can reasonably be supported by evidence adduced at trial. ( Cit.). But Rust did not present any evidence at trial and so could not conduct a demonstration for the jury during closing argument about facts not in evidence. This demonstration should have taken place during trial or not at all.” Savage v. State, 264 Ga.App. 709, 592 S.E.2d 188 (December 15, 2003). At trial, defense counsel called sexual battery victim’s credibility into question by pointing out her work as a stripper and suggesting she might also be a prostitute. In closing argument, prosecutor responded by pointing out that “‘ the person that’s asking you to go ahead and make a