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decision as to the credibility of [the victim] is from a person who goes to the same place where [the victim] was working. And I’m sure we can all hypothesize that this man didn’t tell his family that night, "Hey, I’m going to be late.”’” (Italics in original.) Held, this argument did not “attempt to bring in facts not in evidence,” nor did it improperly comment on defendant’s character. Court of Appeals finds that, in context, the thrust of the argument was to urge the jury not to “disbelieve a rape victim because she is a stripper.” See also Cherry (February 22, 2007), above (argument that jury should not “punish” child molesting victims because they weren’t physically injured was not improper). Brown v. State, 256 Ga.App. 603, 568 S.E.2d 727 (June 12, 2002). RICO and related convictions affirmed. A pro se defendant cannot introduce new evidence by way of closing argument after the evidence is closed. The trial court therefore properly “informed the jurors that they should disregard any statements made during closing arguments purporting to introduce new evidence.” Grant v. State, 245 Ga.App. 652, 538 S.E.2d 540 (August 24, 2000). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from using a “tee-ball” bat, allegedly similar to the bat defendant used in beating victim, as a demonstrative aid during closing argument. “Although the Supreme Court of Georgia has approved the use of props, maps, charts, and other analogous model and illustrative material in closing argument when based on evidence admitted at trial, Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 198(9), 515 S.E.2d 610 (1999), the similar-but- unadmitted bat in this case is not illustrative of anything in evidence except the likely condition of the admitted bat before defendant broke it over Ms. Grant's back. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting any demonstration during argument to that made with the broken bat admitted into evidence rather than defendant's similar bat. Singleton v. State, [231 Ga.App. 694, 696(3), 500 S.E.2d 411 (1998)].” Knowles v. State, 245 Ga.App. 523, 538 S.E.2d 175 (August 10, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly directed jury to disregard demonstration by defense counsel during closing argument, which amounted to new evidence. “During closing argument, defense counsel produced and measured a knife fitting the description of that used by Knowles in his attack on Campbell. In response to an objection by the State after closing argument had concluded, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard this demonstration. Because counsel is not authorized to present new evidence in closing argument, See Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 511(3), 330 S.E.2d 353 (1985), and because it does not appear that the knife and measuring implement utilized by defense counsel had been admitted in evidence, we find no error.” Spivey v. State , 243 Ga.App. 785, 534 S.E.2d 498 (May 3, 2000). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; prosecutor’s argument drew permissible inferences from the evidence. Defendant claimed she didn’t know her companions were going to commit a robbery. Co-defendant “testified on cross-examination that he and several other co-defendants, not including Spivey, were involved in two armed robberies in the weeks prior to the incident here. The co-defendant also testified that he had known Spivey for two or three weeks prior to this armed robbery. In closing, the prosecutor summed up this evidence and argued that it was ‘logical to infer that Addie Mae Spivey knew what kind of people she was dealing with.’ … During closing argument, a prosecutor may draw conclusions or deductions from the evidence. McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383-384(3)(b), 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996); Truitt v. State, 174 Ga.App. 687, 689(3), 331 S.E.2d 64 (1985). The prosecutor's comment regarding Spivey's familiarity with the co-defendants is such an inference drawn from the testimony at trial.” Brown v. State , 242 Ga.App. 858, 531 S.E.2d 409 (March 17, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper where prosecutor attempted to estimate number of female residents in housing project from total number of residents testified to by detective. “The challenged statement was an inference from evidence presented during the trial, and there was no error.” Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 523 S.E.2d 294 (November 1, 1999). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from arguing in closing that “the State had something to hide. When asked what he meant by the State having something to hide, defense counsel responded that the State did not do its job in this case. The trial court replied that the defense could argue that the State did not do its job, but that there was no evidence to support an argument of deliberate misconduct by the prosecution. Terrell was permitted to and did argue that the State did not do an adequate investigation in the case, that others had motives to kill the victim, and that State witnesses were not truthful and may have committed perjury. Terrell now asserts that the trial court improperly limited his closing argument. However, there was no evidence that the State was hiding something, and the trial court has discretion to determine the range of proper closing argument. Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203(1), 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996). After review of the record, we