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cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.” Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 515 S.E.2d 610 (May 17, 1999). 1. Prosecutor’s demonstration during closing argument didn’t amount to introduction of new evidence: “During closing argument, the prosecutor used a five-pound bag of sugar to illustrate how much pressure it took to pull the trigger of the shotgun which Laney used to kill the victim.” Distinguishing Williams v. State , 254 Ga. 508, 511(3), 330 S.E.2d 353 (1985), where “‘[t]he prosecutor's actions introduced new evidence during closing argument: the fact that a small person could easily pull the trigger of the gun in question. This fact was specifically used to respond to [defendant's] evidence that the trigger was extremely difficult to pull. [Defendant] had no chance to rebut the prosecutor's demonstration, a demonstration that could have easily been performed during trial when both sides could have fleshed out its implications thoroughly. This demonstration should have taken place during trial or not at all.’ Id. at 511, 330 S.E.2d 353. In this case, unlike Williams, the prosecutor did not introduce new evidence during closing argument. The bag of sugar was merely a visual illustration of a fact (it took 7.5 pounds of pressure to pull the trigger of the murder weapon) which had been put in evidence. Wade v. State, 197 Ga.App. 464, 465(2), 398 S.E.2d 728 (1990). It was a ‘prop’ and, as such, was ‘analogous to any other model or illustrative material, such as a skeleton in a medically related case or charts or maps in other sorts of cases.’ Id.” Fletcher and Hines dissent: “The state presented no evidence that lifting a bag of sugar was scientifically equivalent to the spring gauge test performed on the gun.” Accord, Ellington v. State , 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012) (not improper for “the prosecutor to display a hammer during his closing arguments, while informing the jury that the hammer was not the actual murder weapon, because the evidence strongly suggested that a hammer had been used as the murder weapon.”). 2. “The prosecutor did not go outside the boundaries of permissible argument when she told the jury that ‘this is your community,’ nor when she said that defense counsel did ‘an excellent job’ and was ‘a very, very good attorney,’ that rap music ‘refers to women in derogatory terms,’ or that Laney had a ‘smirk’ on his face during the trial. See Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 204, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996) (counsel are allowed considerable latitude of speech). See also McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 385, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996) (prosecutor may urge jury to convict for safety of community); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 447, 469 S.E.2d 129 (1996) (not improper to comment on defendant's courtroom demeanor), reversed on other grounds, Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145, 117 S.Ct. 578, 136 L.Ed.2d 507 (1996).” Accord, Smith v. State , 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (January 23, 2012) (not improper for prosecutor to comment on defendant’s “lack of emotion at trial during the display of autopsy photos of her child.”). Rodriguez v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 518 S.E.2d 131 (May 3, 1999). No harmful error in allowing State’s argument that murder defendant/car salesman “was ‘going to soak every red cent out of [his customer].... That is how Emilliano Rodriguez made a living. This is a guy that is capable of manipulating people.’” Argument apparently was in response to defendant’s insanity defense. “The evidence showed that Rodriguez was a used car salesman and one of his expert witnesses testified that Rodriguez varied his story to please different doctors. Even if the remark that Rodriguez was ‘going to soak every red cent out of [his customers]’ was found to be objectionable, there is no reasonable probability that the comment altered the outcome of the trial.” Leon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 99, 513 S.E.2d 227 (February 24, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, prosecutor’s reference to defendant as a “wife-beater” during closing argument was supported by evidence. “Prosecutors are given wide latitude during argument in the use of illustrations and figurative speech when such rhetoric is based on reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. Davis v. State, 178 Ga.App. 357, 359-360, 343 S.E.2d 140 (1986); see also OCGA § 17-8-75; Ortiz v. State, 222 Ga.App. 432, 474 S.E.2d 300 (1996); Green v. State, 209 Ga.App. 274, 275(4), 433 S.E.2d 383 (1993).” 6. CONTENT – BIBLICAL/RELIGIOUS REFERENCES Taylor v. State, 296 Ga.App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (February 19, 2009). Biblical reference in prosecutor’s closing argument (Isaiah 1:18, “Come and let us reason together”) didn’t require mistrial. “The biblical reference at issue here did not invite jurors to base their verdict on extraneous matters. And nothing in the quoted passage urged jurors to reach a verdict on religious grounds. Instead, the prosecutor merely used the passage to encourage jurors to ‘reason’ with him during his closing argument. Although biblical references generally should be avoided, we find no basis for reversal in this case. See Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 778(9) (653 S.E.2d 439) (2007) (biblical references in closing argument of death- penalty trial not improper where passages ‘simply urged the jury to accept its legal duty to pass judgment rather than abdicating that role’); Hill [ v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 427 S.E.2d 770 (1993)].” Walker v State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (October 9, 2007). 1. At defendant’s capital murder trial, “Walker argues that the prosecutor argued improperly by stating in his closing argument in the guilt/innocence phase that a Bible verse