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for a living, and use peremptory challenges to avoid jurors whose experience would give them excessive influence.’). Having accepted Juror Lemmond as a juror, Martin cannot now complain that her knowledge drawn from her past employment assisted the other jurors in considering the evidence and arguments made by the parties at trial.” Ensley v. State, 294 Ga. 200, 751 S.E.2d 396 (November 18, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. When, during trial, it was reported that one juror had spoken to someone else about the case, defendant waived any claim that the juror should be dismissed by failing to make such a request, or any other remedial action, at the time. O’Donnell v. Smith, 294 Ga. 307, 751 S.E.2d 324 (November 18, 2013). Following defendant’s malice murder conviction, habeas court erred in granting relief; no ineffective assistance based on failing to challenge seating of alternate juror in place of juror who was excused during deliberations. Alternate sat through trial, but then was excused when deliberations began. In support of habeas petition, alternate submitted affidavit that, while excused, he did internet research on the case and on counsel, and discussed his jury service with his wife, children and colleagues. Juror’s affidavit revealed that he “did not recall much that he learned except that the jury had not yet reached a verdict … . The affidavit is silent as to whether Mr. Mahan shared any of his internet research with the other jurors. The remainder of Mr. Mahan's affidavit is a series of impressions about the jury's deliberations, including, for example, what jurors thought about certain witnesses. Upon examining the affidavit carefully, we conclude the internet research Mr. Mahan engaged in is not the kind of conduct that is so prejudicial as to violate appellee's due process rights especially where, as here, there is no showing that Mr. Mahan communicated any of what he discovered on the internet with his fellow jurors and no showing that the information obtained otherwise affected the verdict. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640(3), 398 S.E.2d 179 (1990) (refusal to consider juror affidavit was proper where there was no showing that alleged racial bias of two jurors caused them to vote to convict or impose the death penalty). As such, the affidavit could not be used as evidentiary support of appellee's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Chambers v. State, 321 Ga.App. 512, 739 S.E.2d 513 (March 29, 2013). Physical precedent only. Voluntary manslaughter conviction reversed based on juror’s internet legal research. While waiting for the trial court to provide a written copy of its charge, juror “announced that she had conducted her own legal research and thereupon shared with the jurors various definitions.” The research varied from Georgia law in that it indicated that the defense of habitation only applied to a place “generally used for occupation overnight.” The juror thus erroneously concluded that the defense couldn’t apply to defendant’s vehicle, as he contended. Although the State, on motion for new trial, presented affidavits from the other jurors that the research didn’t influence their verdicts, no such showing was made as to the juror who did the research. “Considering the evidence produced by the state at trial, the affirmative defenses pursued by Chambers, the jury's request for supplemental instructions hours after retiring to deliberate, Juror 38's usurping the province of the trial court by presenting fellow jurors with ‘law’ she found using Google to search the Internet, together with the evidence adduced at the new trial hearing, ‘we find that there is at least a reasonable possibility that the [extra-judicial information] contributed to the conviction and that the verdict must therefore be deemed inherently lacking in due process. This misconduct cannot be ignored and requires a reversal of the judgment based on the jury's verdict in this case.’ Bobo [ v. State, 254 Ga. 146, 148(1), 327 S.E.2d 208 (1985)] (citations omitted); see Hammock [ v. State, 277 Ga. 612, 614(2), 592 S.E.2d 415 (2004)] (finding a reasonable possibility that juror misconduct contributed to the accused's conviction, where juror misconduct affected key issue of affirmative defense and verdict became unanimous only after the introduction of the improper evidence); Steele [ v. State, 216 Ga.App. 276, 454 S.E.2d 590 (1995)]; Moore [ v. State, 172 Ga.App. 844, 324 S.E.2d 760 (1984)].” Tobias v. State, 319 Ga.App. 320, 735 S.E.2d 113 (November 30, 2012). Vehicular homicide and related convictions affirmed; question from juror during trial didn’t require mistrial. After evidence regarding length of skid mark, and demonstration showing how long that was, juror sent trial court a note asking “‘[t]he question was about the 35 feet and 65 feet. [The expert] said there was 34 feet so why did we measure off 65 feet?’ In response, the trial court explained that it could not answer questions of that nature and stated that the attorneys may attempt to clear that up in their closing arguments.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, the question “does not indicate that an improper discussion had taken place among the jurors. See Ellis v. State, 164 Ga.App. 366, 370(9), 296 S.E.2d 726 (1982) (where a juror, prior to the close of evidence, submitted a handwritten note to the trial judge requesting a clarification of the evidence, the contents of the note itself did not indicate that the jury had improperly discussed the case). Furthermore a trial court is not required to question the jurors whenever there is a bare allegation of misconduct. Merritt v. State, 248 Ga.App. 709, 711(1), 548 S.E.2d 427 (2001). … The juror's question was neutral as to the parties involved, and the mere fact that the juror asked this question does not show that any juror had expressed an opinion as to Tobias' guilt or tried to persuade other jurors as to any issue or testimony. Moreover, the trial court reminded the jurors of the proper time to begin