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deliberations before addressing the question in open court. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Mickens v. State, 318 Ga.App. 601, 734 S.E.2d 438 (November 16, 2012). Aggravated assault and rape convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defense motion to excuse juror who, during trial, wrote a note to the court saying ““There is no question about she was raped, but the matter of who? What percentage of error the DNA could be? Is it 100% correct?” “Here, the trial court's questioning revealed that the juror had not spoken to any other jurors about his question to the court, and the juror explained that, consistent with his note, he had not decided whether Mickens was guilty of the rape. The trial court cautioned the juror not to speak to the other jurors about the case until deliberations began. Further, the State's case was essentially focused on identity, which was the very issue that the juror stated he had not resolved. Under these facts, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by keeping the juror or denying the motion for mistrial.” Alatise v. State, 291 Ga. 428, 728 S.E.2d 592 (June 18, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no mistrial required where jurors, during deliberations, “watched a portion of his videotaped statement which they were not supposed to view,” wherein defendant asked his co-defendant “what he had done with the ‘what-cha-ma-call-it?’” On questioning by the court, “all jurors stated that they could disregard the extraneous information without problem. Thereafter, the trial court gave a curative instruction, and the jury continued its deliberation.” Analogizing to cases where a witness unexpectedly injects prejudicial matter, the court concludes that, in light of the jurors’ statements that they hadn’t been prejudiced, the curative instruction was sufficient, and no mistrial was required, citing Crawford v. State, 256 Ga. 585, 587(2) (351 S.E.2d 199) (1987). Kerdpoka v. State, 314 Ga.App. 400, 724 S.E.2d 419 (February 28, 2012). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no mistrial required based on statements by two jurors expressing opinions about defendant’s guilt or innocence. Trial court questioned each juror. “Here, the jurors' responses supported the trial court's findings completely: that no remaining juror had been influenced regarding the substance of the case by [Juror]'s comments. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that comments about the pace or tediousness of the proceedings is not so inherently prejudicial as to result in a lack of due process.” Fuller v. State, 313 Ga.App. 759, 722 S.E.2d 453 (January 27, 2012). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses reversed based on improper contact between juror and victim. At lunch break after State rested, juror approached victim and said something to her. Juror later told court she told the victim “keep your head up, I’m so proud of you.” “Even accepting the juror's account as well as the trial court's conclusion that she intended only to express sympathy for the victim, the juror's unauthorized contact with a witness was intentional rather than accidental (like the jurors' attendance of the prayer meeting [led by prosecutor] in Shaw [ v. State, 83 Ga. 92 (9 S.E. 768) (1889)]; established a personal relationship with that witness (like that between the widow and juror in Golden [ v. State, 63 Ga.App. 765, 12 S.E.2d 108 (1940)] and between the police officer and juror in Jones [ v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 644 S.E.2d 853 (2007)]); and included statements reasonably construed as expressing a judgment concerning the events at issue (like the jurors' expressions of agreement with the acquaintance's opinion in Mullins [ v. State, 241 Ga.App. 553 (525 S.E.2d 770) (1999)]). … Under these circumstances, no rehabilitation of the juror was possible, and the State has failed to show that Fuller was not harmed by the misconduct. The trial court thus abused its discretion when it denied Fuller's motion for mistrial.” Slaughter v. State, 289 Ga. 790, 716 S.E.2d 180 (October 3, 2011). Felony murder and firearms convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to excuse entire jury panel based on alleged improper comment by one member prior to voir dire. One member admitted participating in the conversation, stated his belief that defendant was guilty, and was excused. “There was no indication that any other member of the venire could possibly have been involved in the reported exchange. Defense counsel moved orally to dismiss the entire jury panel, and the motion was denied. In assessing whether the trial court should have excused all members of the jury panel who might have been privy to any unauthorized comments or discussions, the appropriate inquiry is ‘whether the remarks were inherently prejudicial and deprived [appellant] of [his] right to begin [his] trial with a jury free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.’ (Internal citations and punctuation omitted.) Kinder v. State, 284 Ga. 148, 150(2) (663 S.E.2d 711) (2008). Here, the trial court took appropriate corrective action by questioning individually all prospective jurors who fit the description of those involved in the alleged unauthorized comments to ascertain whether they had been prejudiced thereby, and there was no indication of any such prejudice. Furthermore, the seated jurors [fn] were instructed not to discuss the case in any way, and they affirmed that they would honor their oaths and render fair and impartial