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verdicts based upon the evidence presented at trial. Even accepting as fact that the alleged exchange occurred, because of the corrective actions by the trial court and the responses of the veniremen at issue, there was no inherent prejudice to the array but, at most, only the ‘gossamer possibility of prejudice.’ Id.; Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 688(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000). Slaughter was not denied a fair and impartial trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the entire panel. Kinder supra at 150–151(2).” State v. Clements, 289 Ga. 640, 715 S.E.2d 59 (September 12, 2011). After convictions for felony murder and related offenses, trial court erred in granting motion for new trial based on failure to excuse juror already seated. After jury selection, juror gave judge a letter saying “my husband is in hopes of returning to Manchester High School next year to teach again and I am afraid some people might have hard feelings toward him due to the outcome of this trial.” Juror reaffirmed her impartiality, and trial judge denied defense motion to dismiss the juror. On motion for new trial, successor judge found that juror’s conversation about the case with her husband necessitated grant of motion. Supreme Court reverses. “‘Where a juror's unauthorized contact with another does not involve discussion about the merits of the case, such an irregularity will not necessarily require a new trial. [Cit.]’ Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 738(7)(a) (462 S.E.2d 737) (1995) (sequestered juror had unauthorized contact with girlfriend but no harm where facts established conversation did not involve discussion about the merits of the case). See also Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100(2) (485 S.E.2d 192) (1997) (the substance of the communication involved in an incidence of juror misconduct, having been established without contradiction, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred); Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 420(3) (467 S.E.2d 574) (1996) (no reversible error arising out of juror misconduct by violating court orders not to discuss the case because the substance of the communication was established without contradiction and the statements ‘did not involve extrajudicial information, or demonstrate that they were deliberating the case prior to the close of evidence, or that one juror was attempting to persuade another on any issue or testimony in the case’). Thus, we hold that the juror's action in discussing her jury service with her husband, while improper, was not so prejudicial as to have contributed to the conviction and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holcomb, supra at 103(2) (in order for juror misconduct to upset a jury verdict, it must have been so prejudicial that the verdict is deemed inherently lacking in due process).” Brown v. State, 309 Ga.App. 511, 710 S.E.2d 674 (May 6, 2011). Conviction for robbery by sudden snatching affirmed; no mistrial required based on juror misconduct. After jury selection, but before opening statements, deputy heard a selected juror expressing the belief that defendant was guilty, in a phone conversation. The juror was dismissed and replaced with an alternate. The remaining jurors were questioned collectively about possible prejudice from the dismissed juror’s comments, but none of them indicated that they heard the comments. Held, trial court’s denial of mistrial was proper: “even though the alleged improper comment involved the ultimate issue in the case, [cit.] the record reflects no evidence that the jury was tainted or that Brown was harmed by [juror’s] misconduct.” Jones v. State, 289 Ga. 111, 709 S.E.2d 773 (April 18, 2011). Felony murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to seek removal of juror seen talking to witness. In one-minute conversation, juror asked witness about health of his stepfather, who had recently had surgery; conversation was not case-related. “A defendant is entitled to trial by a jury untainted by improper influence, and communication between a juror and a witness while a trial is on-going is improper. Clark v. State, 153 Ga.App. 829(1) (266 S.E.2d 577) (1980). ‘When irregular juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred.... “[W]hen the substance of the communication is established without contradiction, the facts themselves may establish the lack of prejudice or harm to the defendant.”’ Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100(2) (485 S.E.2d 192) (1997). Inasmuch as the hearing established the uncontradicted substance of the conversation and that it was not an attempt to discuss the merits of the case or influence the juror, appellant was not harmed by the improper communication and trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to seek the juror's removal. The trial court did not err when it determined appellant had not established ineffective assistance of counsel. See Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275, 278 (663 S.E.2d 164) (2008).” Gresham v. State, 303 Ga.App. 682, 695 S.E.2d 73 (April 13, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation and statutory rape affirmed; juror misconduct did not necessitate mistrial. After jury selection, a venire member notified that court that she had heard another member, who had been chosen as an alternate, “say that the defendant should be hung and that if it were the woman's granddaughter that had been molested, she would beat the defendant with a two-by-four.” The alternate denied the allegation, but was dismissed. Some of the other jurors seated acknowledged hearing the comments, but all denied that it would affect them. Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for mistrial: “the trial judge thoroughly questioned each individual juror under oath about what he or she had heard, and whether he or she had the ability to remain fair and impartial, and found that each juror could remain impartial. Thus,