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Gresham's contention that the alternate's comments prejudiced the other jurors was unsupported.” Dixon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 517, 693 S.E.2d 900 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping with injury, rape and aggravated assault affirmed; jury’s experiment to see if cords used to tie victim would leave a mark, as suggested by defense counsel’s closing argument, was not prejudicial. “[W]e find no basis for concluding that the experiment allegedly conducted by the jurors during deliberations influenced the jury in a manner harmful to Dixon's cause. During the trial, Dixon's counsel argued to the jury that if [victim's] wrists had been bound with an electrical cord, as she testified, then the cord would have left marks on her wrists. The experiment showed that a cord tied around the wrists does leave marks, so the experiment would have supported Dixon's arguments. Thus, we conclude that the alleged experiment was not ‘so prejudicial that the verdict must be deemed inherently lacking in due process,’” quoting Gentry (March 8, 1999), below. Tolbert v. State, 300 Ga.App. 51, 684 S.E.2d 120 (September 9, 2009). Armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no juror misconduct required mistrial: “Juror one reported the statements [of another juror, made during trial], was placed under oath and testified that juror two stated “that guy had a partner and they did it together.” Juror one was unsure if everyone heard the statement, but did acknowledge that there were comments in agreement, and she identified two of the other jurors whom she believed had made comments. Juror one stated that nothing she heard would affect her ability to be a fair or impartial juror. Juror two denied making any disparaging remarks about Tolbert but did admit she said she ‘might know him from somewhere’ but that she could not be sure.” Trial court dismissed juror two, but denied motion for mistrial. Held, defendant’s argument that other jurors may have been “subliminally influenced … is purely speculative.” Accord, Keaton v. State , 311 Ga.App. 14, 714 S.E.2d 693 (July 14, 2011) (mistrial not required where court removed juror heard discussing case during trial); Sallee v. State , 329 Ga.App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (November 13, 2014) (no mistrial where juror spoke to a State’s witness about the case and was removed, but other jurors weren’t exposed to the conversation). Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 678 S.E.2d 900 (June 15, 2009). Jury’s verdict couldn’t be impeached by unsworn statements by third parties, alleging that “one or more jurors may have been sleeping during the trial of the case.” Henley v. State, 285 Ga. 500, 678 S.E.2d 884 (June 8, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court denied new trial based on juror’s affidavit. Eleven months after trial, juror alleged in vague affidavit that the verdict was the product of extraneous information produced by “one or more unnamed jurors, whose gender and number were not specified.” Defendant failed to produce the affiant or any other jurors at hearing on motion for new trial. “The trial court recognized its authority to consider the juror affidavit,” given its allegation of extraneous information brought into the jury room, “but declined to do so. At bottom, the trial court did not find the spare two-page affidavit credible. The trial court recited the following reasons: (1) the affidavit provided no contact information to allow the State to contact the juror to confirm or disprove the allegations; (2) despite the explosive nature of the affidavit's claims, the defendant failed to secure Cruz's presence at either of two hearings on the motion for new trial and offered no explanation for failing to do so; (3) it appeared from the affidavit that the juror either never knew or no longer remembered the names, gender, or number of the other jurors who supposedly injected verdict-altering extrinsic information into the jury's deliberations; and (4) the time line reflected in the affidavit does not match up with how the trial actually progressed.” Hubert v. State, 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). No reversal based on juror’s conversation during defendant’s child molestation trial with juror’s family members about schoolteachers’ training on reporting child abuse. “ Georgia law prohibits jurors from impeaching their verdict once it has been rendered. OCGA § 17-9-41 (‘The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.’). The public policy considerations underlying this rule include the need to preserve the sanctity of juror deliberations, promote the finality of jury verdicts, and protect jurors from post-trial harassment. Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 683-684 (229 S.E.2d 465) (1976). A very narrow exception to this rule exists when a juror intentionally gathers extra judicial evidence, highly prejudicial to the accused, and communicates that information to the other jurors in the closed jury room. Id. at 685 (reversing a conviction after two jurors made an unauthorized visit to the crime scene and presented their findings to the other members of the jury so as to explain a time lapse in the evidence). But ‘[t]o set aside a jury verdict solely because of irregular jury conduct, this Court must conclude that the conduct was so prejudicial that the verdict is inherently lacking in due process.’ (Footnote omitted.) Butler v. State, 270 Ga. 441, 444(2) (511 S.E.2d 180) (1999). The circumstances presented here do not meet that test. Not only has Hubert failed to establish that the verdict lacks due process, he has neglected to show that any statement by the juror in question amounted to misconduct. The only juror who arguably alleged improper conduct admitted that he could barely hear the statement in question and could not remember