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was not taking the deliberations seriously. Besides, the circumstances of the rape of Makant’s daughter differed markedly from the kidnapping, rape and murder in this case. It cannot be said that Makant’s behavior in the jury room rose to the level of juror misconduct. See Hilburn v. Hilburn, 163 Ga. 23, 24, 135 S.E. 427 (1926) ( jurors must bring their life experiences to the jury room ). See also Oliver v. State, 265 Ga. 653, 654(3), 461 S.E.2d 222 (1995) (jurors’ limited discussion of news story about murder of state's witness did not provide basis for new trial).” 3. “ As the deliberations became more heated, the foreman stated that juror Fisher must have been lying when she responded to voir dire questions concerning her willingness to impose the death penalty, and that she should be prosecuted for perjury. These statements do not amount to juror misconduct. Compare People v. Redd, 164 A.D.2d 34, 561 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (1990) (threats and belligerent exchanges in the course of deliberations often accompany the heightened atmosphere in the jury room and are insufficient to upset the verdict) with People v. Lavender, 117 A.D.2d 253, 502 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1986) (new trial warranted where court takes no action after it is apprised that juror was trying to physically attack co- juror).” Gentry v. State, 236 Ga.App. 820, 513 S.E.2d 528 (March 8, 1999). “Gentry contends that a member of the jury engaged in misconduct during deliberations that prejudiced his right to a fair trial and requires reversal of his convictions. After the conclusion of the trial, one of the jurors revealed to the prosecutor that he used a toy ‘matchbox’ car he had brought from home, along with a Styrofoam coffee cup which was in the jury room, to briefly illustrate to the other jurors the collision between Gentry’s vehicle and the vehicle driven by Bennett. Since a defendant has a right to be confronted with all the evidence against him, it is improper for the jury to conduct tests or experiments during deliberations which have the effect of producing evidence not introduced at trial. Williams v. State, 252 Ga. 7, 8-9, 310 S.E.2d 528 (1984); Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 683-685, 229 S.E.2d 465 (1976); Smith v. State, 122 Ga. 154, 50 S.E. 62 (1905). Any such test or experiment which has the effect of exposing the jury to new evidence is improper and will require the grant of a new trial if the new evidence is so prejudicial that the verdict must be deemed inherently lacking in due process. Williams, 252 Ga. at 8-9, 310 S.E.2d 528. On the other hand, it is not improper for the jury to use its common experience to conduct illustrations or experiments which merely examine or verify evidence admitted during the trial. An object, not itself admitted into evidence, used by a juror as a model to illustrate trial evidence during jury deliberations does not necessarily expose the jury to new evidence, although it could conceivably have that effect depending on the object and its use under the circumstances. The use of an object by the jury may constitute no more than a common sense illustration of the evidence admitted at trial. See Annotation, Propriety of Juror’s Tests or Experiments in Jury Room, 31 A.L.R.4th 566 (1984). In the present case, we find no basis for concluding that the brief use of the toy car and the coffee cup to illustrate the collision improperly exposed the jury to new evidence. Moreover, the State produced affidavits from nine of the twelve jurors stating that their verdicts were based solely on the evidence produced at the trial and not on the illustration of the collision.” See also Dixon (April 7, 2010) above (jury experiment not prejudicial). Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780, 514 S.E.2d 205 (March 8, 1999). “[A] juror’s personal use of the Bible or other religious book outside the jury room is not automatically prohibited. See Jones v. Kemp, 706 F.Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D.Ga., 1989).” S. JUROR NOTES Owens v. State, 324 Ga.App. 198, 749 S.E.2d 783 (October 9, 2013). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to ensure that jurors were provided with note pads and pencils. Trial court noted the omission as the State’s fifth witness was called, and offered note pads to the jurors, but they declined. “Owens argues that notepads would have been helpful to the jury in light of conflicts in the evidence already presented. … We know of no provision entitling a defendant to demand that jurors be furnished with the means for taking notes in every case, nor has Owens pointed us to any such law. To the contrary, absent special or unusual circumstances, the decision whether to allow the jury to take notes lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. See Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 96, 104(21), 376 S.E.2d 851 (1989) (trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing jurors to take notes); Miller v. State, 307 Ga.App. 598, 598–599, 705 S.E.2d 697 (2011) (within trial court's discretion to allow jurors to take notes); Williamson v. State, 142 Ga.App. 177, 178(3), 235 S.E.2d 643 (1977) (trial court did not abuse discretion in instructing juror not to take notes because the case was not complicated); White v. State, 137 Ga.App. 9, 10(1), 223 S.E.2d 24 (1975) (in absence of special or unusual circumstances, note-taking left to judge's discretion). We find no special or unusual circumstances in this case sufficient to remove the issue of note-taking from the trial court's discretion. Therefore, Owens has failed to establish that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to move for a mistrial or to demand that writing materials be furnished to the jury.” Miller v. State, 307 Ga.App. 598, 705 S.E.2d 697 (January 21, 2011). Robbery conviction affirmed; no continuing witness violation where jurors shared notes before deliberations began. “[I]t is well established that a trial court has discretion to