☢ test - Í

Green v. State, 240 Ga.App. 377, 523 S.E.2d 581 (October 15, 1999). Defendant was not deprived of due process by juror’s unauthorized visit to crime scene where she “stated that her visit to the scene did not ‘clear anything up’ for her and that she told the other jurors that she ‘went by and it didn't help.’ She was then asked if she could base her decision only on what she had seen and heard in the courtroom, and she responded affirmatively. The juror's conduct was not so prejudicial to deprive Green of due process.” No error allowing juror to remain on the jury. Boler v. State, 240 Ga.App. 901, 522 S.E.2d 676 (September 17, 1999). At defendant’s trial for aggravated battery and other offenses arising from shooting at a party, trial court properly excused juror based on improper conversation with a relative about the case. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by replacing a juror with an alternate juror after the jury began deliberations when it was discovered that the replaced juror met with a relative during a lunch break and that this relative stated her opinion as to defendant's innocence. The replaced juror's relative explained to the trial court: ‘I told her I didn't feel like he was guilty because there was no evidence. No solid evidence.’ The trial court's discharge of the juror in question had a sound basis in that it served the legally relevant purpose of preserving the integrity of the judicial process. Miller v. State, 261 Ga. 679, 680(6), 410 S.E.2d 101 (1991).” Turtle v. State, 271 Ga. 440, 520 S.E.2d 211 (September 13, 1999). Jury foreman’s driving around area where defendant claimed to be at time of crime did not prejudice defendant, since foreman discovered nothing to contradict alibi and he did not sway other jurors. Hubbard v. State, 239 Ga.App. 632, 521 S.E.2d 678 (August 17, 1999). No juror misconduct required removal of juror who “made emotional responses to counsel’s provocative remark and courtroom style.” “It appears from the transcript that counsel was standing extremely close to the jury and arguing in a loud tone, when he dropped a tablet into the jury box. The juror in question picked it up and returned it, whereupon counsel facetiously suggested that the juror might have stolen money from it. This juror and another on the panel took umbrage at counsel's remark, and the juror to whom the comment was directed arose in anger and made inaudible comments. When counsel continued his closing argument in a loud voice while remaining in close proximity to the juror, the juror raised his fist to counsel. Counsel later sought the juror's removal. The court refused to do so, but instructed the jurors that they should not be influenced in their deliberations by comments by either attorney which might have been considered personally offensive. There is nothing inherent in the confrontation between counsel and the juror or, appearing from the record, which demonstrates that the juror became so hostile toward defense counsel that he could not fairly decide the question of Hubbard's guilt or innocence. There is no merit in Hubbard's argument that there arose a presumption of prejudice to the defense because ‘an irregularity in the conduct of a juror’ was shown, thereby placing a burden on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred. McIntyre v. State, 207 Ga.App. 129, 130(3), 427 S.E.2d 99 (1993).” Curative instruction was sufficient. Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (March 15, 1999). Defendant was convicted of armed robbery and kidnapping with bodily injury. He was sentenced to death based on fact that he also raped and murdered the victim after taking her outside the state. Defendant contends that his death penalty should be reversed based on the coercive atmosphere in the jury room which coerced the lone hold-out juror to vote for the death penalty. 1. Jurors’ behavior toward hold-out juror did not create “coercive” environment. “Sears contends the testimony of juror Fisher … demonstrates that the actions of the trial court had a coercive effect upon her verdict. In this regard, Sears points out that Fisher testified she was afraid of being prosecuted for perjury, and she believed the trial court wanted her to change her vote because it singled her out by name and urged the jury to continue deliberating when it knew the nature of the jury’s numerical division. We cannot accept this contention. Fisher, a school teacher, had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and had attended graduate school. She was the lone holdout for a life sentence – until she changed her mind. Although she testified that she felt bullied by the threat of perjury, she knew that she had not lied under oath. She felt intense pressure from the other jurors. (‘I remember being yelled at basically because I was – they were angry at me. They wanted me to change my mind. So they were insulting my character and things like that.’) Ultimately, she gave in to that pressure. (‘I changed my mind because they had – I mean I was ostracized. And I was just – I was basically made to change my mind by the other jury members.’) Viewing Fisher’s testimony as a whole, it is clear that she voted for the death penalty because she felt pressured to do so only as a result of the ‘normal dynamic of jury deliberations. ’ United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11 th Cir., 1990).” Benham, Fletcher and Sears dissent, arguing that hold-out juror’s testimony of threats by foreman and bullying by other jurors, brought to trial court’s attention, made trial court’s insistence on further deliberations coercive. 2. “The fact that juror Makant injected his daughter’s rape into the jury’s deliberations is of no import. Makant testified that he only raised the issue because he believed the holdout juror