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assistant district attorney cut the juror off, informing her that he could not talk to her and that she would have to address any questions to the trial judge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the juror.” Herrington v. State , 243 Ga.App. 265, 533 S.E.2d 133 (March 29, 2000). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; defendant waived any objection to bailiff’s interaction with jury by raising it “neither at the time it occurred nor in Herrington's motion for new trial. ‘[O]bjections to irregularities must ordinarily be made at a time when they may be remedied, or they are waived.’ State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685, 686, 279 S.E.2d 203 (1981). Consequently, Herrington has waived any error by failing to timely raise it.” Bailiff here told jury their note to the court was unclear. Arnold v. State , 243 Ga.App. 118, 532 S.E.2d 458 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault affirmed; no mistrial required despite improper conversation about case between jurors during trial. Defendant overheard jurors discussing case at a break, but heard no one express an opinion about guilt or innocence. On questioning by the court, “jurors admitted to hearing such discussions but said that they had not reached any conclusions about appellant's guilt or innocence and could listen to the evidence with an open mind. Based on these responses, the judge denied the motion for mistrial but further admonished the jury to keep an open mind and refrain from deliberating until all the evidence had been presented. … The conduct of the jurors in this case was clearly improper, but we cannot conclude that it was so prejudicial as to deny due process to appellant. Although the jurors prematurely discussed the testimony of the witnesses, no juror expressed an opinion that appellant was guilty, [fn: Compare Mullins v. State, 241 Ga.App. 553, 525 S.E.2d 770 (1999) (reversing conviction where, during a recess, one juror agreed with statement of acquaintance that ‘the defendants would not be [here] if they were not guilty’). ] and there was no evidence that any juror presented extrajudicial information to other jurors or tried to persuade other jurors as to any issue or testimony. [fn: Compare Bobo v. State, 254 Ga. 146-148(1), 327 S.E.2d 208 (1985) (reversing conviction where two jurors went to crime scene to determine whether lighting conditions were adequate – a key issue in the case – and reported their conclusions to other jurors). ] ” Fugarino v. State , 242 Ga.App. 268, 531 S.E.2d 187 (March 14, 2000). Computer trespass conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for mistrial after investigating report of juror misconduct. One juror reported that another juror had stated how he intended to vote before the evidence began, but that juror denied it and no other juror claimed to have heard it. All jurors indicated they could be fair and impartial. “The trial court thoroughly investigated the alleged juror misconduct in this case and determined that the jurors were capable of making a fair and impartial assessment of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Bobo v. State, 254 Ga. 146, 327 S.E.2d 208 (1985).” Scott v. State, 242 Ga.App. 553, 530 S.E.2d 257 (March 1, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown where defendant claims counsel failed to take action after being notified that a juror was seen conversing with victim during trial. “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Scott's sister testified that she saw Patterson and a juror in a ‘friendly conversation,’ but testified that the only words she heard were the juror's statement to Patterson, ‘I'll talk to you later.’ Scott produced no other evidence concerning the conversation. This statement, without more, fails the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Because Patterson failed to show that the allegedly improper communication prejudiced him, the trial court did not clearly err in finding Scott received effective assistance of counsel.” Mullins v. State, 241 Ga.App. 553, 525 S.E.2d 770 (November 19, 1999). In defendants’ prosecution for possession of amphetamines with intent to distribute, 4-3 decision finds error in failing to grant mistrial upon hearing evidence that two jurors were overheard having a conversation with an acquaintance in the courthouse during a break at trial. The acquaintance was heard to comment that the defendants wouldn’t be there if they weren’t guilty, and one juror was heard to agree. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, then on motion of defense counsel, dismissed the two jurors and allowed the case to proceed with just 10 jurors. “When irregular juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred. To upset a jury verdict, the misconduct must have been ‘so prejudicial that the verdict is deemed inherently lacking in due process.’… The decision whether any unauthorized statement, communicated to the jury either individually or as a group, is so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial is in the discretion of the trial court. Some of the factors and circumstances to be reviewed in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial include the nature of the statement, the other evidence in the case, and the action taken by the court and counsel concerning the impropriety.” Given that the extra-judicial statements here were related to the defendants’ guilt or innocence, the state failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred to defendant.