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We find no error. Although Jefferson had a right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination, OCGA § 24–9–64, the right is not unlimited. ‘[T]he scope of such cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court [ ] [cits.],’ White v. State, 253 Ga. 106, 110(4), 317 S.E.2d 196 (1984), and ‘[i]t is the duty of the court “to allow a searching and skillful test of (the witness's) intelligence, memory, accuracy and veracity.”’ Carroll v. Hill, 80 Ga.App. 576, 581, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949). Here, what Jefferson sought was not related to a legitimate purpose of cross-examination, but to introduce evidence without the burden of cross-examination.” Butler v. State, 277 Ga.App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (December 6, 2005). Having defendant stand before jury and turn in profile, at juror’s request, was not intimation or expression of opinion by trial judge. “As Butler was present at trial, the jurors were able to see him at other times, and merely having him stand at the express request of a juror was likely redundant and simply facilitated the jury’s ability to compare his visage to that contained in the videotape (and, indeed, may have been exculpatory). Just as ‘[a] witness has a right to view the accused, by having him stand up, so that he may be positive in his identification,’ Meriwether v. State, 63 Ga.App. 667, 671(2) (11 S.E.2d 816) (1940), disapproved on other grounds, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 366(2)(a) (314 S.E.2d 621) (1984).so a juror has the same right when comparing defendant’s visage to a videotape image. See Ragland v. State , 238 Ga.App. 664, 667 (519 S.E.2d 757) (1999) (‘the jurors were able to compare the picture on the videotape to their own observation of [defendant] at trial’).” Affirmed on different issue, Butler v. State , 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688 (November 20, 2006). Wilson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 426, 526 S.E.2d 381 (November 30, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation, statutory rape, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffer to show jury an “abdominal tattoo” not mentioned by the victims, absent defendant’s own testimony or other foundation to show that the tattoo had existed at the time of the offenses. “[I]n order to display this type of evidence to the jury, a proper foundation must be laid, i.e., the party seeking to admit the evidence must demonstrate that it truly and accurately depicted the condition of the nontestimonial evidence at the time of the event at issue. See Miller v. State, 158 Ga. 697, 699(5)(b), 124 S.E. 195 (1924); Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. 192, 198(2), 123 S.E. 120 (1924); Chambers v. State, 159 Ga.App. 669, 284 S.E.2d 682 (1981); Curtis v. State, 141 Ga.App. 36, 39, 232 S.E.2d 382 (1977). The trial court has discretion in making the determination of whether a party has laid a sufficient foundation for introduction of the evidence, and such determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Cornell v. State, 265 Ga. 904, 905(2), 463 S.E.2d 702 (1995); Miller v. State, supra at 698(2), 124 S.E. 195.” Note, “the trial court never precluded Wilson from presenting other foundation evidence that would have established that the tattoo was present prior to March 1998. This evidence could have included, inter alia, witness testimony, business records, or photographs.” “Since no foundation evidence was presented in this case, this Court will not consider whether it would have been reversible error for the trial court to refuse to allow Wilson to display his torso unless he subjected himself to cross-examination if other foundation evidence had been presented.” 2. OF SCENE Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 721 S.E.2d 839 (January 9, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a jury view. Sutton v. State, 237 Ga. 418, 419(3), 228 S.E.2d 815 (1976). The evidence introduced at trial, including video, diagrams and photographs, enabled the jury to comprehend fully the scene of the crime and the issues pertaining thereto. A view would have provided ‘fertile ground for irregularity’ and no real benefit. See Esposito v. State, 273 Ga. 183, 187(4), 538 S.E.2d 55 (2000).” Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing jury to view murder scene. “The only objection Ledford raised at trial regarding the scene view was based on the fact that the vegetation at the scene had changed since the murder. However, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the scene view over this objection, because the scene view might have aided the jurors in their understanding of the evidence despite the changes and because the jurors were able to see the original condition of the scene in the photographs that were in evidence . See Gissendaner v. State, [272 Ga. 704, 711- 721(8) (532 S.E.2d 677) (2000)] (noting the trial court's discretion in considering a request to have the jury view the crime scene).” Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 610 S.E.2d 521 (March 14, 2005). “The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the jury’s request for a view of the crime scene. McDaniel v. State , 248 Ga. 494(2), 283 S.E.2d 862 (1981). Whether the jurors requested the view before or after they began deliberating is immaterial . Id. ” Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (July 5, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed. “The trial court,