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after hearing testimony from law enforcement officers that road conditions leading to the scene were unsafe, did not abuse its discretion in denying Gissendaner's motion to have the jury view the crime scene. Sutton v. State, 237 Ga. 418, 419(3), 228 S.E.2d 815 (1976). Gissendaner was allowed to introduce numerous photographs of the crime scene that she was able to use in support of her theory of defense. See Williams v. State, 202 Ga.App. 728, 729(3), 415 S.E.2d 327 (1992).” Abney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 280, 523 S.E.2d 362 (October 6, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for burglary affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court denied defendant’s “motion for a jury view of the crime scene. According to Abney, a visit to the scene would have shown the jury that eyewitness Bailey could not, as he claimed, have seen Abney exit the window of the residence from the building where he called 911 to report the burglary. ‘ The decision to allow the jury to view a scene is discretionary with the trial court, and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Wingate v. State, 188 Ga.App. 730, 731(2), 374 S.E.2d 224 (1988). We find no abuse of discretion here. As Bailey testified that he saw Abney climb into the window before Bailey went to the nearby building to call 911, the jury could have concluded that Abney entered the building even if Bailey did not see him exit. Moreover, at the hearing on Abney's motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that when he visited the crime scene, he found that the back yard of the residence was not visible from Bailey's vantage point, but the window, which was ‘elevated somewhat,’ was visible. Thus, it appears that the jury view would have bolstered Bailey's testimony rather than undermined it.” X. NULLIFICATION West v. State, 270 Ga.App. 71, 606 S.E.2d 100 (October 14, 2004). “‘While the jury does possess a de facto power of nullification, i.e., a power to acquit the defendant regardless of the strength of the evidence against him, it nonetheless is true that if the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt it is the jury’s duty to convict.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Nel v. State, 252 Ga.App. 761, 766(7) (557 S.E.2d 44) (2001).” Y. NUMBER OF JURORS See subheading EXCUSAL/STRIKE FOR CAUSE – PROCEEDING WITH LESS THAN FULL PANEL, above Z. OATHS Seminal case: Adams v. State , 286 Ga. 496, 690 S.E.2d 171 (February 8, 2010) (timing of oath). Adams v. State, 286 Ga. 496, 690 S.E.2d 171 (February 8, 2010). Swearing jury after close of State’s case was not untimely. “[I]n the absence of a showing of actual prejudice (see Marshall v. State, [266 Ga. 304 (466 S.E.2d 567) (1996)]), there is no reversible error if a belated oath is given prior to the jury's deliberations. [fn: Obviously, the best practice is to give the oath as soon as the jury is empaneled. Gamble v. State, [141 Ga.App. 304 (233 S.E.2d 264) (1977)]. ] We decline, however, to follow cases which hold that a failure to object constitutes waiver. To do so would necessarily dilute the purpose of the oath and solemnity of jury service. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the oath was given after the trial commenced and after the presentation of the State's evidence, but prior to the jury's deliberations. Under such circumstances, appellant must show actual prejudice stemming from the timing of the oath . Here, there is no evidence that the jurors failed to conduct their duties in a manner consistent with the oath and, accordingly, there is no showing of prejudice requiring the reversal of appellant's conviction.” Fedd v. State, 298 Ga.App. 508, 680 S.E.2d 453 (June 11, 2009). Administration of jury oath following the close of evidence but before deliberations “does not constitute reversible error” absent showing of prejudice, not made here. “The statute does not provide a specific requirement concerning when this jury oath must be administered. Georgia case law provides broad parameters for the timing of the jury oath.” “[W]e have held that ‘[o]nly [the verdict of] a totally unsworn jury is a nullity.’ (Citation omitted.) Colbert [ v. State, 178 Ga.App. 657, 658(1) (344 S.E.2d 479) (1986)]; Smith v. State, 122 Ga.App. 98(1) (176 S.E.2d 284) (1970). Here, there was no total failure to administer the required jury oath. The trial jury had in fact been sworn before they deliberated and rendered their verdict, and therefore, automatic reversal is not required. See e.g., Marshall [ v. State, 266 Ga. 304, 306(5) (466 S.E.2d 567) (1996)]; Colbert, 178 Ga.App. at 658(1).” Delay in administering oath here was harmless error. See also Adams (February 8, 2010), above. Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 674 S.E.2d 261 (January 26, 2009). Deficient performance but no ineffective assistance from failure to object to incorrect voir dire oath. “[D]efense counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the improper oath. [fn] However, appellants must show that they were prejudiced by the trial court's failure to give the proper voir dire oath. [fn: Contrary to [defendants'] argument, the voir dire oath is not on the same standing as the juror oath. Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, n. 2 (278 S.E.2d 386) (1981). Moreover, while a criminal defendant may not