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required where, post-verdict, during polling, one juror indicated that the verdict was not her verdict. Trial court properly directed the jury to resume deliberations, Benefield v. State , 278 Ga. 464, 465, 602 S.E.2d 631 (2004). Contrary to defendant’s argument, nothing about this procedure was coercive. “Jones argues that two coercive elements in particular were present: the identity of the dissenting juror was known, and the trial court ordered the jury to continue deliberating after the dissenting juror indicated she disagreed with the verdict. However, a careful consideration of the record does not make it clear that the juror was in fact dissenting. Instead, when asked whether she agreed with the verdict of guilty on any of the counts, Juror 6 replied that she had ‘agreed to about two of the charges.’ At no time did Juror 6 ever state that further deliberations would be futile, or that her opinion was unlikely to change. The trial court, instead of inquiring into the reasoning of the juror, appropriately returned the jury to the jury room for further deliberations. Jones’s counsel did not object to this procedure, nor did she renew the motion for a mistrial when the verdict was eventually read. Most tellingly, when polled for the second time, Juror 6 affirmed that the verdict was hers as given in the jury room, was freely and voluntarily given, and was still her verdict. Secondly, the identity of a dissenting juror will presumably always be known to the rest of the jury. In this case, the fact that the judge and counsel for both the State and Jones that Juror 6 was the juror who had disagreed with the verdict does not add any coercive element.” Moton v. State, 332 Ga.App. 303, 772 S.E.2d 396 (May 5, 2015). Physical precedent only. Convictions for indecent exposure affirmed; juror’s equivocal response during polling didn’t require trial court to order jury to resume deliberations. When asked if the verdicts of guilty on both counts were her verdict in the jury room, juror initially answered, “The first one was, yes, but not the second one,” but then acknowledged that she voted to convict on both counts and that it was still her verdict. “[G]iven her subsequent affirmations of the verdict, the juror's initial equivocation regarding the second count does not support an inference that the verdict was less than unanimous.” Ruffin v. State, 296 Ga. 262, 765 S.E.2d 913 (November 17, 2014). Murder conviction affirmed; trial court didn’t err “by not polling the jury to verify the verdict was unanimous, even though his counsel did not request the court to do so.” “‘A poll of the jury as to a guilty verdict is not mandated unless requested....’ Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 306, 307(2) (348 S.E.2d 632) (1986). A defendant waives his right to have the jury polled if it is not asserted right after the jury has rendered the verdict or sentence. Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102(9) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996). The trial court twice instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. ‘A jury's initial failure to reach a verdict does not indicate that the ultimate verdict is automatically suspect.’ Wynn v. State, 228 Ga.App. 124, 129(3)(d) (491 S.E.2d 149) (1997). Here, as in Wynn, there was no indication that the verdict was anything less than unanimous after the jury returned a verdict following the Allen charge.” Cartwright v. State, 291 Ga. 498, 731 S.E.2d 353 (September 10, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; juror’s expressed reservations about the verdict didn’t implicate its validity. “The trial court polled the members of the jury when the jury returned its initial verdict. When the judge asked Juror Hardaway if the verdict arrived at was her verdict, she answered in the affirmative. When the judge asked whether it was ‘[f]reely and voluntarily arrived at,’ the juror answered ‘no.’ When the judge sought clarification, the juror explained that she was not forced into the verdict, but said, ‘It's just everybody agreed and I went along with it.’ The trial court properly sent the jury back to deliberate further and they returned later with the same verdict. This time, the judge asked Juror Hardaway if the guilty verdict was her verdict in the jury room and if it was still her verdict ‘out here.’ Juror Hardaway answered ‘yes’ to both questions. Nevertheless, Cartwright now complains that trial counsel's failure to move the court to ask Juror Hardaway whether the second verdict was freely and voluntarily entered constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The purpose of polling the jury ‘is to insure that each member of the jury assents to the verdict, and for the court to discern possible coercion.’ Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602 S.E.2d 631) (2004). This Court has ‘held that the questions, “Was that your verdict?” and “Is it now your verdict?” meet the minimum requirements of the defendant's right to a poll of the jurors.’ Id. at 465. Voiced reservations do not prevent a verdict from being free and voluntary and unanimous. Rouse v. State, 265 Ga. 32(3) (453 S.E.2d 30) (1995). Juror Hardaway's response to the initial polling questions did not indicate that she was coerced into assenting to the verdict. Her response merely revealed that she had some reservations. Additionally, the trial court's questions to Juror Hardaway after the jury returned the second time met the minimum requirements to satisfy Cartwright's right to poll the jury.” Laing v. State, 304 Ga.App. 15, 695 S.E.2d 363 (May 11, 2010). Defendant’s armed robbery conviction affirmed; no error in refusing defendant’s request to poll the jury after sentencing hearing had begun. “‘The right to a poll of the jury is a material right derived from the common law. Upon such poll, each juror may be asked whether the verdict reached in the jury room is, after looking upon the accused, still his verdict. In criminal cases the right to poll the jury is not