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discretionary, and denial of that right when timely requested is reversible error.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80, 88(6) (214 S.E.2d 645) (1975), overruled on other grounds by Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798 (493 S.E.2d 136) (1997). ‘The proper time to request a poll of the jury is when the jury has rendered its verdict, that is, right after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 108(9) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996). A request to have the jury polled ‘is not timely made after ... sentence is passed [because] a juror may be affected by the announcement of the sentence.’ (Citations omitted.) Favors, 234 Ga. at 88-89(6). As noted by our Supreme Court, ‘[c]ertainly nothing would be more likely to have such an effect than a sentence of which a juror did not approve.’ Robinson v. State, 109 Ga. 506, 508 (34 S.E. 1017) (1900). Here, Laing waived his right to poll the jury by failing to make a request after the trial court asked whether there were any exceptions to the form of the verdict and whether there was ‘anything else’ they needed to address. Instead, despite knowing that the jury had written a note expressing concern about sentencing, Laing waited until after the trial court indicated that its ‘hands were tied’ regarding sentencing and the State presented its sentencing recommendation in the presence of the jury before requesting to poll the jurors. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly concluded that Laing waived his right to poll the jury by failing to make a timely request. See Ellison v. State, 296 Ga.App. 752, 757(3) (675 S.E.2d 613) (2009) (defendant waived his right to poll the jury by not requesting the poll immediately after the verdict when the trial court asked for exceptions to the form of the verdict and before the trial court noted, in the presence of the jury, that the State had filed a notice of intent to seek recidivist sentencing). Compare Rinker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 767(1) (492 S.E.2d 746) (1997) (reversing conviction because the defendant made a timely request to poll the jury after the verdict was read and after the trial court began the sentencing phase, in the presence of the jurors, and heard evidence regarding medical expenses incurred by the victim, but before sentence was pronounced).” Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga.App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (March 3, 2006). “‘The indication of “reservations” does not prevent the verdict from being unanimous. The requirement is that a juror agree to a verdict.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Rouse v. State, 265 Ga. 32, 33(3) (453 S.E.2d 30) (1995). See also Scruggs v. State, 181 Ga.App. 55, 56(1) (351 S.E.2d 256) (1986) ( even ‘reluctant agreement’ in a jury verdict is sufficient ).” “Our Supreme Court has held that the minimum requirements of a jury poll are met by asking the questions, ‘Was that your verdict?’ and ‘Is it now your verdict?’” citing Benefield v. State , 278 Ga. 464, 465, 602 S.E.2d 631 (2004). “Here, the trial court went beyond these minimum requirements in order to determine whether the verdict was unanimous. During this poll, [juror] affirmed on two separate occasions that the verdict was hers in the jury room. She also stated that the verdict was still hers and that it was freely and voluntarily given. Thus, the record shows that the verdict in this case was unanimous, and Blackwood’s motion for a mistrial was properly denied. See Hudson v. State, 157 Ga.App. 71, 72-73(3) (276 S.E.2d 122) (1981).” Accord, Daugherty v. State , 283 Ga.App. 664, 642 S.E.2d 345 (February 21, 2007); Cartwright (September 10, 2012), above (reluctant agreement is sufficient). Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 602 S.E.2d 631 (September 13, 2004). Reversing 264 Ga.App. 511, 591 S.E.2d 404 (2003), and defendant’s aggravated child molestation convictions. Defendant’s “right to a poll of the jurors was violated when the trial court received a negative response to a poll question posed to a juror, and no further deliberation occurred.” During the trial court’s poll of the jury subsequent to Benefield’s conviction for child molestation, one juror gave a negative response to the first of two questions asked regarding “whether the published verdict was [her] verdict in the jury room and whether it was still [her] verdict.” “‘We have held that the questions, ‘Was that your verdict?’ and ‘Is it now your verdict?’ meet the minimum requirements of the defendant’s right to a poll of the jurors. [Cit.]’ Tucker v. State , 252 Ga. 263 (349 S.E.2d 172) (1984).” “[A] negative response to a poll question ‘is enough to raise the inference that the finding of the jury was not concurred in by each of the jurors, and, this being true, there was no legal verdict.’” “To the extent that Hanson v. State , [258 Ga. 564 (4), 372 S.E.2d 436) (1988)], Jackson v. State , 184 Ga. App. 123 (361 S.E.2d 14) (1987), and Person v. State , 235 Ga. 814 (4) (221 S.E.2d 587) (1976), are inconsistent with this ruling, they are expressly overruled.” See also Cartwright (September 10, 2012), above. BB. QUESTIONING WITNESSES Hoehn v. State, 293 Ga. 127, 744 S.E.2d 46 (June 3, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in overruling objection when juror asked question directly of witness. “At trial, as an officer testifying for the State was identifying photographs of the crime scene, a juror, without seeking permission from the court, asked, ‘Is that the weapon?’ The officer said that it was. The court overruled Appellant's objection to the juror's asking a question. The officer then testified that the gun was visible in the photograph, but he did not testify further about the gun. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his objection. He is correct. While ‘a trial court may receive written questions from the jury and ask those questions which the court finds proper, or allow counsel for either party to ask a testifying witness the questions found to be proper,’ jurors may not directly question a witness. Allen