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v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 396–397, 687 S.E.2d 799 (2010). See also Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 786, 364 S.E.2d 565 (1988) (‘[D]irect questions from a juror to a witness are generally not permitted in this state.’). Here, the juror improperly questioned the State's witness, and the trial court should have sustained Appellant's objection and struck the officer's answer.” Harmless, however, as “[t]he point about which the juror asked was undisputed,” and the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 687 S.E.2d 799 (January 25, 2010). Trial court properly allowed juror to write down question for witness, then allowed prosecutor to ask the question. “While jurors in Georgia courts may not ask questions of witnesses directly, a trial court may receive written questions from the jury and ask those questions which the court finds proper, or allow counsel for either party to ask a testifying witness the questions found to be proper. Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785(2) (364 S.E.2d 565) (1978) (‘The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the appropriate form of asking questions’ which was ‘to submit any questions they might wish to have answered to the trial court in writing at the conclusion of the witness'[s] testimony’); Story v. State, 157 Ga.App. 490 (278 S.E.2d 97) (1981) (‘Upon approval by the court, the question may be asked of the witness by the judge or, if counsel so desires, the question may be asked by counsel for either party.’). [fn] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in following this procedure.” Accord, Hoehn (June 3, 2013), above. Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, P.C., 271 Ga.App. 622, 610 S.E.2d 546 (January 24, 2005). In this civil case, trial court erred in authorizing jurors to discuss the case at breaks in the presentation of the evidence. See Sims v. State , 266 Ga. 417, 467 S.E.2d 574 (1996). Further, the court’s procedure allowing the jury to propound written questions for witnesses as the testimony of each was concluded “modified the traditional roles of the jury, the trial judge, and the lawyers. These procedures encouraged the jury to take an active, inquisitorial role, made the trial judge to some extent the jury’s mouthpiece in pursuing its own version of the facts, and correspondingly reduced counsels’ control over the presentation of the evidence… Although the trial court cited many sources in support of its opinion that the nationwide trend is to allow juries to discuss the evidence before final deliberations and to submit questions for witnesses, [cit.] we are not persuaded that Georgia has embraced that trend…. Although these reforms may well be worthwhile [cits.] – and may ultimately be formally adopted in Georgia – we think it more prudent at present to refrain from imposing them on unwilling litigants.” Court of Appeals “acknowledge[s] that the trial court attempted to minimize any negative impact of these procedure by carefully instructing the jury to remain neutral and open-minded throughout the trial, to avoid prematurely fixing opinions, to give answers to the jury’s questions no greater weight than questions posed by counsel, to draw no inferences from the court’s failure to pose any particular question the jury submitted, etc.” Watson v. State, 264 Ga.App. 41, 589 S.E.2d 867 (November 10, 2003). Error for trial court to allow juror to ask witness question directly, but defendant waived by failing to object, and in any event defendant failed to show harm. CC. RE-VIEW/RE-HEARING OF EVIDENCE Traylor v. State, 332 Ga.App. 441, 773 S.E.2d 403 (June 9, 2015). Rape and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in counsel’s handling of question from jury during deliberations. “During its deliberations, the jury requested (1) to view the trial transcript of M. B.'s testimony related to her having seen Traylor at the corner store, (2) to read the police report from the day of the crime, and (3) to view a calendar from August and September 2008. The judge, the prosecutor, and Traylor's counsel were all in agreement that each request should be denied, and that the jury should be instructed to use their collective memories and notes to remember the evidence.” Defendant now contends that counsel should have asked the trial court to “direct the jury's attention to the stipulated exhibits tendered during the trial,” despite the trial court’s express statement at the motion for new trial hearing that “‘[t]here is nothing [counsel] could have said to me to get me to do anything else in response to [the jury's] questions.’ And ‘[i]t has long been the law in Georgia that a judgment will not be reversed because the trial court declines to aid the jury in recalling the evidence[.]’ Young v. State, 246 Ga.App. 651, 653(2), 541 S.E.2d 670 (2000). See Byrd v. State, 237 Ga. 781, 783(1), 229 S.E.2d 631 (1976) (A trial court may, in its discretion, refuse a jury's request to rehear certain parts of the evidence.). It follows that counsel's failure request that the judge direct the jury as suggested by Traylor does not constitute ineffective assistance, because it affirmatively appears from the record that the trial court in its discretion would have denied such a request.” McNear v. State, 326 Ga.App. 32, 755 S.E.2d 844 (March 9, 2014). Conviction for voluntary manslaughter affirmed; no continuing witness violation in allowing jury to re-view video of defendant’s statement to police in courtroom during deliberations. “The continuing witness rule is violated when the jury is allowed to bring recorded statements into the jury room during deliberations. In this case, the trial court followed ‘the standard practice, [which] is to bring the jury back into open court to rehear recorded evidence.’ Bridges v. State, 279 Ga. 351, 353(2), 613 S.E.2d 621 (2005). ‘The trial