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armed robbery victim’s testimony. … ‘“‘A trial judge may, in his discretion, on request from the jury, recall a witness and allow him to restate. What he swore when he was previously on the stand, or he may require the official court stenographer to read the testimony of a witness. (Cits.)’” Person v. State , 235 Ga. 814, 816, 221 S.E.2d 587 (1976). The court may also, in its discretion, refuse such a request. Compton v. State , 179 Ga. 560, 176 S.E.2d 764 (1934); Hill v. State , 114 Ga.App. 527, 151 S.E.2d 818 (1966).’ Byrd v. State , 237 Ga. 781, 782(1), 229 S.E.2d 631 (1976). Absent a showing in the cases sub judice that the armed robbery victim’s testimony was contrary or inconsistent with the investigating officer’s reread testimony, we find no abuse in the trial court’s discretion in granting the jury’s request to rehear the officer’s trial testimony and denying the jury’s request to rehear the armed robbery victim’s testimony.” See also Rutledge (March 15, 1999), above. DD. SEQUESTRATION/DISPERSEMENT Williams v. State, 286 Ga. 884, 692 S.E.2d 374 (March 29, 2010). In defendant’s capital murder trial, no abuse of discretion in failing to sequester jurors where defendant waived it. “‘This Court has stated that [OCGA § 15-12- 142(a) ] requires the jurors to be sequestered in death penalty cases.... [However,] the sequestration of death penalty jurors is not mandatory where the defendant gives his or her consent for the jury to be dispersed during trial, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820(3), 256 S.E.2d 907 (1979).’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 155(12), 598 S.E.2d 488 (2004). See also Mason v. State, 239 Ga. 538, 238 S.E.2d 79 (1977). Where, as here, consent is given, the decision ‘falls squarely within the trial court's discretion.’ Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 762(5), 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005).” Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (September 19, 2005). “The trial court did not err by sequestering the jury. Lewis asked that the jury not be sequestered under OCGA § 15-12-142(a), but the decision permitting this request in a capital case falls squarely within the trial court’s discretion. [Cit.] This Court has previously held that the trial court does not violate the statutory or constitutional rights of a capital defendant by refusing his request to not sequester the jury. [Cit.] Lewis also failed to show how he was harmed by the jury’s sequestration.” Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 598 S.E.2d 488 (June 28, 2004). “[A] trial court is clearly authorized by OCGA § 15-12- 142(a) to maintain jury sequestration over a death penalty defendant’s objection.” Accord, Bryant v. State , 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Fox v. State, 266 Ga.App. 307, 596 S.E.2d 773 (March 17, 2004). “Under OCGA § 15-12-142(a), ‘[a]t any time during the trial of a civil or criminal case, except in capital cases, either before or during jury deliberation, the judge may, in his discretion, allow the jury to be separated and the members thereof to be dispersed under appropriate instructions.’” As trial court instructed “the jury not to discuss the case among themselves or with others during trial recesses,” and State was not seeking death penalty, trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing jury to disperse during trial. Bergeson v. State , 272 Ga. 382, 530 S.E.2d 190 (May 8, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error by trial court in declining to sequester jury. “Bergeson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sequester the jury during trial. Bergeson asserts that the trial court erred because this is a capital case and because, in a capital case, a trial court may only disperse the jury during trial with the consent of the defendant or defense counsel. See Mason v. State, 239 Ga. 538, 540, 238 S.E.2d 79 (1977). Contrary to Bergeson's assertion, however, this case is not a capital case for purposes of jury sequestration since the State did not seek the death penalty. Peppers v. State, 261 Ga. 338, 340–341, 404 S.E.2d 788 (1991). For this reason, the decision whether to sequester the jury was within the discretion of the trial court. See OCGA § 15–12–142(a); Peppers, 261 Ga. at 340–341, 404 S.E.2d 788; Colantuno v. State, 262 Ga. 830, 831, 426 S.E.2d 563 (1993). Because the trial court in this case instructed the jury not to discuss the proceedings during recesses in the trial, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sequester the jury. See Peppers, 261 Ga. at 340–341, 404 S.E.2d 788.” EE. SHUFFLING VENIRE Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006). “Thomason contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to shuffle the jury venire, relying on law from other jurisdictions. Nothing under Georgia law, however, requires a shuffling of the jury venire. See OCGA § 15-12-160 et seq. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial court erred by denying Thomason’s request to do so.” FF. STRIKES, NUMBER OF Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, “[t]he trial court did