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not err by denying Stinski's request for more peremptory strikes than were provided for by Georgia law at the time of his trial. See OCGA § 15-12-165; Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 695(10) (362 S.E.2d 351) (1987).” Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. 312, 677 S.E.2d 76 (April 28, 2009). No equal protection violation where co-defendants forced to share jury strikes. “Both defendants argue that OCGA § 17-8-4(b) unconstitutionally violates their rights to equal protection under the law. … More specifically, the defendants argue that there is no rational basis for each co- defendant in a joint trial to receive fewer peremptory strikes than a defendant in a solo trial. … In this case, the defendants contend that codefendants as a class must be treated the same as the separate class of defendants tried individually. However, equal protection does not require identical treatment of different classes. ‘[T]he equal protection clause [does not] exact uniformity of procedure. The legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of procedure for one class and a different type for another.’ Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904) (1930). Therefore, the codefendants argument fails on this basis. Moreover, ‘[t]here are ... valid reasons for discriminating between the peremptory challenges of single defendants and codefendants ... [T]he reason is based upon the different problems involved in obtaining jurors. To allow each codefendant the full number of peremptory challenges would frequently cause undue delay and needless burden upon the public. As pointed out in State v. Reed, 47 N.H. 466 (1867): 'If ten or twenty men were indicted for a misdemeanor, like a riot, and each had his two peremptory challenges, a larger attendance of jurors would be required than in a capital trial.' Other courts also have recognized that if codefendants were given the full number of personal challenges, it would not only be inconvenient, but difficult to obtain juries. In fact, it would require the presence of an impractical number of jurors. State v. Sutton, 10 R.I. 159 (1872); State v. Cady, 80 Me. 413 (14 A. 940) (1888); Schwartzberg v. United States, 241 F. 348 (1917). The same reasons apply here.’ State v. Persinger, 62 Wash.2d 362, 369 (382 P.2d 497) (1963).” Madison v. State, 281 Ga. 640, 641 S.E.2d 789 (February 26, 2007). No ex post facto violation in retroactive application of provisions of Criminal Justice Act of 2005 regarding number of peremptory strikes per side. “‘ The exercise of peremptory strikes has long been recognized as a procedure created to assist litigants in obtaining a fair and impartial jury and not an independent substantive right .’ Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367(4) (434 S.E.2d 484) (1993) (upholding against an ex post facto challenge a statute reducing the number of peremptory strikes given criminal defendants from 20 to twelve). ‘Because strikes are procedural and not substantive in nature, [defendant] was not deprived of any protected right by the application of the amended version of OCGA § 15-12-165, regardless of whether such application was retroactive.’ Id.” Accord, Chandler v. State , 281 Ga. 712, 642 S.E.2d 646 (March 19, 2007); Newman v. State , 286 Ga.App. 353, 649 S.E.2d 349 (July 6, 2007). Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (October 16, 2006). Trial court did not err in refusing to give co-defendants additional jury strikes under former OCGA § 17-8-4, which “provided in pertinent part: ‘In the event two or more defendants are tried jointly, the court, upon request of the defendants, acting in its sole discretion, may allow an equal number of additional strikes to the defendants, not to exceed five each, as the court shall deem necessary, to the ends that justice may prevail.’” The section “made the decision of whether to grant additional strikes to defendants to be within the sole discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of such discretion will be disturbed only where an abuse of discretion can be demonstrated. Adams v. State, 264 Ga. 71, 74(5) (440 S.E.2d 639) (1994). Denny asserts that he and his co- defendant might have struck prospective jurors for different reasons, but he has not alleged any harm arising from the selection of the jury. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of additional jury strikes. Id.” See also Dixon (April 28, 2009), above. GG. STRIKES, EXERCISE OF McIntyre v. State, 311 Ga.App. 173, 715 S.E.2d 431 (July 1, 2011), affirmed on other grounds sub nom Disharoon v. State , 291 Ga. 45, 727 S.E.2d 465 (May 7, 2012). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying defendants additional strikes. “The Defendants did not utilize their allotted number of strikes, and pursuant to Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 117(3) (636 S.E.2d 500) (2006), because the Defendants have failed to show any harm from the trial court's denial, they have failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for additional strikes.” O’Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (November 3, 2008). “We remind trial courts that the Unified Appeal Procedure requires that in all death penalty trials ‘a complete transcript of all phases of the case’ be filed in the record and that ‘the term “complete transcript”’ includes ‘a complete transcription’ of ‘the striking’ of the jurors. (Emphasis in original.) U.A.P. IV(A)(1).” Such was not done here, but Supreme Court finds that no error occurred during jury selection.