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renders a verdict on counts with which a defendant was not charged, a trial court has a duty to intervene even where defense counsel fails to object). See also Robinson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 214, 214–215 (638 S.E.2d 370) (2006) (trial court correctly refused to accept jury's verdict finding defendant ‘guilty with reasonable doubt,’ and required the jury to resume deliberations to cure the defect).” White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 727 S.E.2d 109 (April 24, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; where jury returned guilty verdict as to felony murder, trial court wasn’t required to inquire into the jury’s findings as to the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. “ Edge [ v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992), prohibiting jury charges that require the jury to consider the greater and lesser offenses in a certain order] does not require a jury to make a finding concerning the existence or non-existence of sudden and violent passion resulting from serious provocation before returning a guilty verdict on malice or felony murder; Edge requires only that a jury be instructed that it must consider whether there existed such passion and provocation prior to returning a guilty verdict on malice or felony murder. Where, as here, the jury was instructed properly, we presume, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, that qualified jurors followed the trial court's instructions to consider voluntary manslaughter before finding a defendant guilty of felony murder. Herring v. State, 277 Ga. 317(6c) (588 S.E.2d 711) (2003). There being no evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the trial court did not err by accepting the jury's verdict.” Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 724 S.E.2d 366 (February 27, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions reversed based on “plain error” in preprinted verdict form. 1. Verdict form was erroneous. Each count of the verdict form cited the charge in question, then read “‘we the Jury unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt find the Defendant _______.’ Under the blank space were, in smaller type, the words: ‘Guilty or Not Guilty.’ … [T]he wording the verdict form required that for the jury to complete the form by filling in ‘Not Guilty,’ it would have to complete a sentence stating that it found ‘unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt’ the Cheddersingh was not guilty. Of course, to acquit, a jury is not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is not guilty; rather, the defendant comes to trial presumed to be innocent, and the jury is to acquit the defendant if the State does not do so. See Tillman v. Massey, 281 Ga. 291, 292- 294(1), 637 S.E.2d 720 (2006); Bruce v. Smith , 274 Ga. 432, 436 (3), 553 S.E.2d 808 (2001); Eckman v. State , 274 Ga. 63, 67-68(3)(a), 548 S.E.2d 310 (2001); Stansell v. State , 270 Ga. 150-151(4), 510 S.E.2d 292 (1998). Specifying that a jury find that a defendant is not guilty ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ violates these fundamental principles.” 2. Preprinted verdict form is part of jury instructions. “A preprinted verdict form is treated as part of the jury instructions which ‘are read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is error.’ Brown v. State , 283 Ga. 327, 330(2), 658 S.E.2d 740 (2008) (Citations omitted.).” Despite other proper instructions on burden of proof and presumption of innocence, however, “[w]e conclude that the verdict form would mislead jurors of reasonable understanding as to the presumption of innocence and the proper burden of proof for the jury’s consideration, Rucker [ v. State , 270, Ga. 431, 435(5), 510 S.E.2d 816 (1999)], and that this constituted error.” 3. Verdict form was plain error. OCGA § 17-8-58(b), regarding objections to jury charges, “applies not only to instructions given orally to the jury, but necessarily must apply to any written instructions given to the jury. See generally Finley v. State , 286 Ga. 47, 50-51(6), (7), 685 S.E.2d 258 (2009). All four prongs of the plain error test are met here: counsel’s failure to object appears to have been negligent, not intentional/strategic; the error was plain; it affected defendant’s substantial rights; and reversal is required to protect “‘the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’” quoting State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 33(2)(a), 718 S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011). See note under subheading Charge – Objections/Exceptions, Waiver and Preservation, above. Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 722 S.E.2d 714 (February 6, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; “the trial court properly refused to accept the initial verdict finding Appellant guilty of both felony murder and [the lesser included offense of] voluntary manslaughter.” “‘[W]hen an ambiguous ... verdict is returned by a jury, the trial court “may refuse to accept the verdict and require the jury to continue its deliberations.” [Cits.]’ Kennedy v. State, 274 Ga. 396, 398(5), 554 S.E.2d 178 (2001). See also State v. Freeman, 272 Ga. 813, 815(2), 537 S.E.2d 92 (2000); Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 800(2), 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996).” Defendant argues, based on State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276, 278, 444 S.E.2d 80 (1994), that the trial court erred by not allowing counsel to review the verdict before returning it to the jury for further deliberations. “Assuming that the trial court should have shown the first verdict to counsel, this assumed error does not demand a reversal as ultimately the defense has no right to insist that the court accept a return of ambiguous verdicts or to insist on a particular instruction. … Consequently, Appellant has failed to show that he has sustained any legal prejudice because the trial court at all times had the discretion to return the jury to the jury room for additional deliberations to clarify their verdict.” Brooks v. State, 311 Ga.App. 857, 717 S.E.2d 490 (October 4, 2011). Rape and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by accepting verdict finding Brooks guilty on counts charged only against co-defendant Johnson. “At the time