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it published its verdict, the jury confirmed that it had found Brooks guilty on counts with which he was not charged. At this point, and even though Brooks did not object, the trial court had a responsibility to intervene.” “‘A trial court has a duty to insist on a legal verdict, that is, a verdict responsive to the issues as framed by the indictment or accusation and the evidence, and specified in the trial court's charge to the jury.’ [ State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276, 277 (444 S.E.2d 80) (1994)]. When a jury returns an illegal verdict, ‘the trial court should return the jury for further deliberations with direction to return a verdict within the range of the instructions originally given to it.’ Id. at 278.” Manning v. State, 296 Ga.App. 376, 674 S.E.2d 408 (March 3, 2009). Where jury returned verdicts of guilty on both the indicted offense of kidnapping and the unindicted, lesser-included offense of false imprisonment, trial court properly sentenced on the kidnapping charge. “Conviction of both offenses absent the intervention of the trial court foreclosed any ambiguity as to the jury's intent to convict Manning beyond a reasonable doubt of kidnapping.” Distinguishing Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 414(6) (529 S.E.2d 121) (2000) (“a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense operates as an acquittal of the greater offense” where “the jury fails to reach a unanimous verdict on the indicted greater offense but finds the defendant guilty on the unindicted lesser offense.”) Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 658 S.E.2d 740 (March 17, 2008). Verdict form was not misleading where it offered options of guilty/not guilty to malice murder, guilty to felony murder, and guilty to voluntary manslaughter on count one. “Brown contends that it was not clear to the jury that marking ‘not guilty’ next to ‘malice murder’ would also apply as findings of ‘not guilty’ to the crimes of ‘felony murder’ and ‘voluntary manslaughter.’ However, the trial court’s instruction was clear that a verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ was to be entered on each Count, and that felony murder and voluntary manslaughter, as ‘homicide forms,’ were to be considered in relation to Count I, and that, if guilt was found, only one crime under Count I should be indicated. Compare Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 649-650(5) (581 S.E.2d 522) (2003). The jury had ample guidance for its consideration of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter.” Thus, verdict form was not required to offer jury the option of specifically finding the defendant “not guilty” on lesser-included offenses in this circumstance. Hunstein dissents. Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 213, 641 S.E.2d 189 (December 20, 2006). “Wilkinson contends that the trial court erred in ‘changing its verdict after the verdict had been published.’ Initially, the judge found that Wilkinson violated the drug contract by ‘liv[ing] in a house that she knew had drugs in it.’ After Wilkinson’s attorney argued that termination on this basis violated due process as the petition was based upon the allegation that Wilkinson possessed drugs, the Court found that the marijuana in the lingerie drawer belonged to Wilkinson. According to Wilkinson, this constituted an improper alteration of a verdict. We disagree. … [W]e are not persuaded that the trial court’s oral finding of fact is tantamount to a verdict. Although a trial court’s ruling in a bench trial is analogous to a verdict, it is not, in fact, a verdict. See Godinger Silver Art Co., v. Olde Atlanta Marketing, Inc., 269 Ga.App. 386, 387 (604 S.E.2d 212) (2004); Zhou v. LaGrange Academy, Inc., 266 Ga.App. 445, 449(1) (597 S.E.2d 522) (2004); see also Fluellen v. State, 264 Ga.App. 19, 22 n. 1 (589 S.E.2d 847) (2003) (no verdict in bench trial). Under these circumstances, it is impossible for the trial court to have improperly altered a verdict. See OCGA § 9-12-7 (‘A verdict may be amended in mere matter of form after the jury has dispersed. However, after a verdict has been received and recorded and the jury has dispersed, it may not be amended in matter of substance either by what the jurors say they intended to find or otherwise.’).” Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791 (November 8, 2006). “ A defendant waives any argument that the verdict contains mutually exclusive findings or is otherwise inconsistent, confusing, or irregular if he fails to object to the form of the verdict. Webb v. State, 270 Ga.App. 817, 818(2) (608 S.E.2d 241) (2004). … Smith’s failure to object to the form of the verdict here waived his argument that the jury’s acquittal of him on the first rape count precluded the jury from finding him guilty on the second rape count,” an argument which fails, anyway, as Georgia no longer recognizes the inconsistent verdict rule. Robinson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 214, 638 S.E.2d 370 (November 1, 2006). Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty with reasonable doubt of possession.” Trial court rejected the verdict and directed the jury to continue to deliberating, instructing them: “If you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendant as to either the original charge of possession with intent to distribute, then you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense, and if you have considered the offense of possession, the lesser offense of possession, and have a reasonable doubt about that, then you must find the defendant not guilty of that also. Now, I don’t know if that’s what your verdict is or not, but you’ve said guilty but with reasonable doubt, and that’s inconsistent. I cannot accept a verdict to that effect.” The jury later returned a verdict of guilty as to possession. Held, the trial court did not err in rejecting the initial verdict. “The first guilty verdict was conditioned by the jury’s additional statement in the