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Dupree v. State, 267 Ga.App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (May 24, 2004). On defendant’s charges of aggravated assault against a police officer, trial court charged the jury that if they found defendant guilty, they should specify whether it was aggravated assault, or aggravated assault against a police officer. Jury found defendant guilty, without being more specific. Held, trial court properly accepted the verdict as guilty of aggravated assault against a police officer. “[A] ‘general verdict of guilty is by intendment of the law a verdict that the defendant is guilty of the highest offense charged in the indictment. [Cit.]’ Bissell v. State, 153 Ga.App. 564, 566(2) (266 S.E.2d 238) (1980).” Saxon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 547, 597 S.E.2d 608 (March 25, 2004). “‘Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity. Accordingly, a verdict may be construed in the light of the issues actually submitted to the jury under the charge of the court; and if, when so construed, it expresses with reasonable certainty a finding supported by the evidence, it is to be upheld as legal.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Henson v. Scoggins, 203 Ga. 540, 541(2) (47 S.E.2d 643) (1948).” Thus, verdict was in proper form and was not required to specify which of numerous underlying offenses the jury unanimously found defendant to have committed, since evidence of pattern of conduct was overwhelming. Ellison v. State, 265 Ga.App. 446, 594 S.E.2d 675 (February 5, 2004). Jury’s verdict finding “‘the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana and guilty of intent to distribute marijuana.’… simply broke down the verdict into the two primary findings necessary to find Ellison guilty of the offense of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute.” Prather v. State, 259 Ga.App. 441, 576 S.E.2d 904 (February 5, 2003). Defendant was charged with murder and possession of firearm during commission of murder. He was convicted of the firearm possession charge and voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to murder. Held, defendant’s firearm conviction must be reversed where jury was not instructed that manslaughter was also a felony which would support a firearm possession charge. Does not decide whether defendant could have been convicted if such instruction had been given. Accord, Carter v. State , 265 Ga.App. 44, 593 S.E.2d 69 (January 7, 2004). Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga.App. 755, 577 S.E.2d 825 (February 3, 2003). “[T]he failure to have the trial court inquire of the jury while still in the box and to object to the form of the verdict, while the jury could still again reform the verdict, constituted a waiver of any defect.” Defendant thus could not complain that verdict failed to specify which form of DUI he had been found guilty of. McGuire v. State , 243 Ga.App. 899, 534 S.E.2d 549 (May 11, 2000). Voluntary manslaughter and firearms convictions affirmed; no error shown in trial court’s “providing the jury a verdict form which was misleading because it required the jury ‘to find the [defendant] guilty or not guilty of every offense and lesser included offenses[ ]’ and employed the words ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ on its face. … While it is conceivable that the verdict form might have been misleading as defendant contends, there is no indication that it was in fact, as the jury followed the superior court's instruction to the letter, finding the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, crossing out all other options as to Counts 1 and 2. There was no request for recharge on this issue. Neither is there any indication that the jury perceived a preference in the superior court for a finding of guilty in that the verdict form consistently set out the word ‘guilty’ before the words ‘not guilty.’ Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228, 232(5), 290 S.E.2d 43 (1982) (better practice is to omit the words ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ from court-submitted verdict form to foreclose potential that jury might infer predisposition in trial judge).” Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 522 S.E.2d 225 (October 18, 1999). At defendant’s capital murder trial, no mistrial though verdict form “erroneously provided the option of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ instead of ‘guilty but mentally retarded.’” Error was discovered when jury returned guilty verdict. “The court immediately explained the error to the jury, repeated the charge under OCGA § 17-7-131, and instructed the jury to reconsider their verdict in light of the corrected verdict form. After further deliberations, the verdict was reissued with the same results. A poll of the jury revealed that each member agreed with the verdict. We find that the court's curative actions were sufficient to render the error harmless. Accordingly, a new trial is not demanded. Warren v. State, 232 Ga.App. 488(7), 502 S.E.2d 336 (1998).” Huynh v. State, 239 Ga.App. 62, 518 S.E.2d 920 (June 4, 1999). “Huynh asserts the jury verdict form was impermissibly suggestive in that the ‘guilty’ option was listed before the ‘not guilty’ option. This claim is without merit. Because the trial court instructed the jury on how to use the verdict form and the ‘not guilty’ option was clearly indicated, ‘no reasonable juror could have been misled into believing that option was not available.’ Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 217(4), 367 S.E.2d 541 (1988).”