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Rucker v. State, 270 Ga. 431, 510 S.E.2d 816 (January 19, 1999). “[T]he use of a jury verdict form preprinted with the words ‘Guilty’ and ‘Not Guilty’ does not constitute error unless the form would mislead jurors of reasonable understanding, or the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, the possible verdicts that could be returned, or how the verdict should be entered on the printed form. In and of itself, merely listing the possible guilty verdict option(s) before the ‘Not Guilty’ option does not render the verdict form misleading so as to constitute reversible error.” Accord, Hardy v. State , 240 Ga.App. 115, 522 S.E.2d 704 (September 21, 1999); Sanders v. State, 243 Ga.App. 725, 534 S.E.2d 173 (April 27, 2000); Mitchell v. State , 290 Ga. 490, 722 S.E.2d 705 (February 6, 2012); Van v. State , 294 Ga. 464, 754 S.E.2d 355 (January 27, 2014) (“Merely listing the offenses on the verdict form in the order of malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter did not constitute reversible error.”); Leeks v. State , 296 Ga. 515, 769 S.E.2d 296 (February 16, 2015). 3. FORM OF – CAPITAL SENTENCING PHASE Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). “Stinski correctly argues that OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2) sets forth only one statutory aggravating circumstance and, therefore, that the trial court erred by using a verdict form that suggested otherwise . King [ v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 276-277(37)(d) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000)]. However, as we have held previously, the error ‘was harmless because the death penalty would still have been authorized if the [several] overlapping findings had been merged and because the jury was not instructed to weigh the number of statutory aggravating circumstances but, instead, was properly charged that it could impose a sentence less than death for any or no reason.’ Id. at 276(37)(d).” Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (March 15, 1999). Verdict form was not defective where it “set forth the (b)(7) factors [“outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim”] in the form of a checklist.” 4. INCONSISTENT VERDICT/REPUGNANT VERDICT Seminal cases: United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984); Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560(2), 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986). Carter v. State, S16G0147, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1290781 (April 4, 2016). Affirming 331 Ga.App. 212, 770 S.E.2d 295 (2015). Conviction for voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense of felony murder was neither inconsistent with, repugnant to, nor mutually exclusive of acquittal of voluntary manslaughter as lesser offense to malice murder. 1. “[A] defendant must have an intent to kill in order for voluntary manslaughter to serve as a potential lesser included offense of malice murder, but need not have any intent to kill for voluntary manslaughter to mitigate the circumstances that would otherwise constitute felony murder. Because of this fundamental difference between felony murder and malice murder, voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder cannot be seen as the same crime as voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder.” 2. “Repugnant verdict” doctrine stems from Wiley v. State, 124 Ga.App. 654, 185 S.E.2d 582 (1971) (where defendant was found both guilty and not guilty of identical charges in an accusation, the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment to challenge the guilty verdict should have been granted, because ‘[v]erdicts which are repugnant and self-contradictory cannot be allowed to stand’) (citation omitted),” but has never been adopted by the Supreme Court or analyzed in light of the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule in Milam . “Carter claims that the difference between repugnant verdicts and inconsistent verdicts is the fact that inconsistent verdicts involve a finding of guilt and an acquittal on entirely separate offenses, whereas repugnant verdicts involve a finding of guilt and an acquittal on the same offense. However, under the facts of this case, voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder is not the same offense as voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder, and the two voluntary manslaughter verdicts can be logically reconciled.” Thus, the viability of the repugnant verdict doctrine awaits consideration in a future case. Muttalib v. State, 335 Ga.App. 514, 782 S.E.2d 300 (January 25, 2016). Following bench trial, conviction for possession of tools for commission of a crime reversed. Having found defendant not guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, based on lack of intent, trial court couldn’t then convict him of the related charge of possessing tools for commission of that crime. “We have discovered no case law establishing that bench trials are excepted from the general rule allowing inconsistent verdicts. Nevertheless, as indicted here and based on the trial court’s explicit statements in the record, the guilty verdict for possession of tools with the intent to distribute methamphetamine cannot stand. ‘An exception to the inconsistent verdict rule exists when the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the charges.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Smith