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resentencing.” Accord, Solomon (October 28, 2008), below. Appears to directly contradict Coleman v. State , 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009) (conviction for firearm possession in commission of crime upheld despite acquittal for underlying aggravated assault). See also Bellamy (November 29, 2011), above. Jamale v. State, 302 Ga.App. 140, 690 S.E.2d 420 (January 6, 2010). Charged with armed robbery, defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of robbery by intimidation. Trial court aggravated the sentence based on defendant’s possession of a firearm at the time. Defendant contends that aggravation of the sentence based on weapon possession is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict acquitting him of armed robbery. Held, sentence is affirmed. “Given the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule, we need not reach such claim of error.” Taylor v. State, 295 Ga.App. 689, 673 S.E.2d 7 (January 6, 2009). Where defendant was charged with identical offense (vehicular homicide) in two separate counts of same indictment (not alternative methods of committing offense), and acquitted on one but convicted on the other, defendant was entitled to be acquitted. Defendant was indicted for vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter as alternative counts regarding same victim’s death. Jury acquitted on vehicular homicide but convicted of involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, State concedes that a defendant can’t be convicted of involuntary manslaughter “for a death resulting from reckless driving. The State contends, however, that the involuntary manslaughter count was simply mislabeled and was, in fact, a second charge of homicide by vehicle in the first degree. See State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 107 (222 S.E.2d 385) (1976) (‘[T]he offense characterized in an indictment is determined, not by the name given therein, but by the criminal acts therein alleged to have been committed.’) (citations omitted). Thus, under the State's argument, the indictment charged Taylor with two counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree based upon the same act of reckless driving and involving the same victim. As shown above, though, the jury acquitted Taylor of one charge while also finding her guilty in another count of the same (but allegedly mislabeled) offense. Then, even though the jury had specifically acquitted Taylor of homicide by vehicle in the first degree, the trial court imposed a sentence for that crime. We conclude that the court erred in entering judgment and imposing a sentence on Count 6 under the guise that the jury had found Taylor guilty of homicide by vehicle in the first degree instead of involuntary manslaughter, when the jury had specifically acquitted her on a charge of homicide by vehicle in the first degree based upon the same act and against the same victim. Thus, Taylor's conviction and sentence for homicide by vehicle in the first degree must be reversed.” Citing Turner (January 8, 2008), below. Affirmed, Taylor v State , 286 Ga. 328, 687 S.E.2d 409 (November 2, 2009). Soloman v. State, 294 Ga.App. 520, 669 S.E.2d 430 (October 28, 2008). No error in trial court’s jury instruction that jury could not convict defendant on possession of firearm during commission of felony while acquitting him on the related felony (armed robbery). “‘[A] proper instruction on the charge of possession of a firearm during [the] commission of a crime ... required the jury ... to find the defendant committed [the underlying felony]. This is so because it is clear from the language of OCGA § 16-11-106(b) that the commission of the felony named in the indictment is an essential element of possession of a firearm during [the] commission of a crime, and the failure to inform the jury of an essential element of the crime charged is reversible error because the jury is left without appropriate guidelines for reaching its verdict.’ (Punctuation, footnote, and citation omitted.) King v. Waters, 278 Ga. 122, 123-124(2) (598 S.E.2d 476) (2004).” Holds that it’s not error to charge the jury not to return an inconsistent verdict, even though the inconsistent verdict rule has been abolished: “[T]he legal sufficiency of the jury charge and the insulation from review of inconsistent verdicts are separate considerations,” citing United States v. Powell¸ 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Accord, Johnson (February 11, 2010), above. But see Coleman v. State , 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009) (conviction for firearm possession in commission of crime upheld despite acquittal for underlying aggravated assault). Note, Johnson and Coleman deal with the verdict itself, not the jury charge. Turner v. State, 283 Ga. 17, 655 S.E.2d 589 (January 8, 2008). Inconsistent verdicts required reversal where verdict form made it clear that jury found defendant’s shooting of victim justified on malice murder count, but not justified on the felony murder count. “In our cases endorsing the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule, we have determined it is not generally within the court’s power to make inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about the reasons for any inconsistency between guilty and not guilty verdicts. Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797(2) (471 S.E.2d 508) (1996). … We have … recognized an exception to the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule: when instead of being left to speculate about the unknown motivations of the jury the appellate record makes transparent the jury’s reasoning why it found the defendant not guilty of one of the charges, ‘there is ... no speculation, and the policy explained in Powell and adopted in Milam, supra,... does not apply.’ King v. Waters, [278 Ga. 122, 123, 598 S.E.2d 476 (2004)]. As was the case in King v. Waters, we are faced with the anomalous situation in which we need not speculate whether the jury verdict is the product of lenity or of legal error. The jury verdict form makes it clear the jury determined [defendant] was not guilty