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of malice murder because the jury found his action in shooting the victim to have been justified. Because the rules regarding inconsistent verdicts are not applicable to the case at bar, we are presented with the question of whether the jury's finding of justification as to the malice murder charge requires vacation of the judgment entered on the guilty verdicts returned on the charges of felony murder and aggravated assault. The jury was instructed that ‘[t]he fact that a person’s conduct is justified is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct.’ OCGA § 16-3-20. The trial court twice instructed the jury it was to consider first whether or not the defendant’s conduct in shooting the victim was justified and, if the jury determined the conduct was justified, the jury should acquit the defendant as to each count. All the crimes for which [defendant] was tried were based on his conduct of shooting the victim and the jury found that conduct to have been justified. As both OCGA § 16-3-20 and the trial court’s repeated instruction to the jury make clear, the jury’s finding of justification as to the malice murder count applies to the felony murder and aggravated assault charges based on the same conduct. In light of the jury’s express finding of justification, it was error for the trial court to enter judgment on the jury verdicts finding [defendant] guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault.” Carley and Thompson dissent, noting that the verdict form provided the jury no options for a finding of not guilty except for justification. Cited with approval, Taylor (January 6, 2009), above. Distinguished, Guajardo v. State , 290 Ga. 172, 718 S.E.2d 292 (November 21, 2011) (jury’s question – whether defendant could be found not guilty due to self-defense on malice murder, but guilty of aggravated assault and felony murder – “does not make the reasoning behind the jury’s verdict transparent” so as to bring this case under Turner ); Taylor v. State , 327 Ga.App. 288, 758 S.E.2d 629 (May 7, 2014) (similar to Guajardo ). Davis v State, 287 Ga.App. 783, 653 S.E.2d 107 (October 10, 2007). No inconsistent verdict where jury acquitted defendant of armed robbery and possession of firearm in commission of felony, but trial court, in bifurcated portion of trial, after defendant waived jury for second part, found defendant guilty of possession of firearm by convicted felon. “Davis essentially argues that the guilty verdict issued by the bench was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal. A similar situation occurred in Tanksley v. State, 281 Ga.App. 61 (635 S.E.2d 353) (2006)” – acquittal of armed robbery, possession of firearm in commission of felony, but conviction of possession of firearm by convicted felon. “In Tanksley, both phases of the bifurcated trial were heard by a jury. Tanksley, supra. In the case at bar, however, the jury heard the first phase and the trial court heard the second phase. See generally Lattimore v. State, 282 Ga.App. 435 (638 S.E.2d 848) (2006) (jury ruled on first phase and court ruled on second phase in bifurcated trial). Because both jury and judge were acting as finders of fact, however, the same standard applies to determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdicts reached. [Cits.]” Kelly v. State, 281 Ga.App. 432, 636 S.E.2d 143 (September 1, 2006). Acquittals for improper turn and failure to maintain lane did not prevent defendant’s conviction for DUI. Accord, Renkiewicz v. State , 283 Ga.App. 692, 642 S.E.2d 384 (February 22, 2007). Villagomez v. State, 279 Ga.App. 686, 632 S.E.2d 400 (May 12, 2006). “‘[I]nconsistent verdicts ... should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant’s expense. It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion ..., and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion.... The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with the Government’s inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewable. We also reject, as imprudent and unworkable, a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of some error that worked against them. Such an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.’ (Citations, footnote, and punctuation omitted.),” quoting Kimble v. State , 236 Ga.App. 391, 392(1), 512 S.E.2d 306 (1999). Sullivan v. State, 277 Ga.App. 738, 627 S.E.2d 437 (February 23, 2006). Reversal not required where defendant convicted of aggravated assault but acquitted of aggravated battery and cruelty to children as to same victim, same incident. Accord, Wilson v. State , 279 Ga.App. 136, 630 S.E.2d 640 (April 27, 2006). Roberts v. State, 277 Ga.App. 730, 627 S.E.2d 446 (February 23, 2006). Reversal not required where defendant convicted of armed robbery but acquitted of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Roberson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 557, 627 S.E.2d 161 (February 9, 2006). Defendant’s “acquittal of the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony charge does not render the evidence that he committed aggravated assault insufficient. See Ridley v. State, 240 Ga.App. 307, 309(4) (523 S.E.2d 383) (1999).”