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Amis v. State, 277 Ga.App. 223, 626 S.E.2d 192 (January 13, 2006). Jury convicted of three counts of third degree child cruelty despite acquittal for underlying offense of battery. Court of Appeals sustains convictions despite inconsistent verdict. “‘Georgia does not recognize an inconsistent verdict rule, which would permit a defendant to challenge the factual findings underlying a guilty verdict on one count as inconsistent with the findings underlying a not guilty verdict on a different count. A conviction on one count and acquittal on another related count may reflect a compromise or lenity by the jury rather than inconsistent factual conclusions, and Georgia courts generally will not look behind the jury’s decision to convict on certain counts and acquit on other counts.’ (Footnote omitted.) Mullady v. State, 270 Ga.App. 444, 447(2) (606 S.E.2d 645) (2004), citing Hines v. State, 276 Ga. 491, 492(2) (578 S.E.2d 868) (2003). See also Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562(2) (341 S.E.2d 216) (1986) (abolished inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases).” Accord, many cases including Smith v. State , 282 Ga.App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791 (November 8, 2006); Collins v. State , 283 Ga.App. 188, 641 S.E.2d 208 (January 5, 2007); Underwood v. State , 283 Ga.App. 638, 642 S.E.2d 324 (February 20, 2007) (acquittal for aggravated assault, conviction for aggravated battery allowable); Conway v. State , 281 Ga. 685, 642 S.E.2d 673 (March 19, 2007); Ramirez v. State , 288 Ga.App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (November 6, 2007) (convictions for involuntary manslaughter, aggravated assault); Moore v. State , 291 Ga.App. 270, 661 S.E.2d 868 (April 23, 2008) (conviction for enticing a child, acquittal on statutory rape, child molestation); Bethune v. State , 291 Ga.App. 674, 662 S.E.2d 774 (May 23, 2008) (convicted of aggravated assault as to one victim, not guilty of armed robbery of other victim); Stephens v. State , 305 Ga.App. 339, 699 S.E.2d 558 (July 8, 2010) ( affirmed on other grounds, 298 Ga. 758, 716 S.E.2d 154 (October 3, 2011) ) (conviction for incest, acquittal on rape and aggravated child molestation); Fletcher v. State , 307 Ga.App. 131, 704 S.E.2d 222 (November 24, 2010) (conviction for vehicular homicide upheld despite acquittal for underlying reckless driving offense); Reese v. State , 308 Ga.App. 528, 707 S.E.2d 913 (March 17, 2011) (conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute near a public housing project, but acquittal of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute); Harris v. State , 310 Ga.App. 460, 713 S.E.2d 665 (July 1, 2011) (conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery not improper despite acquittal for attempted armed robbery); Murrell v. State , 317 Ga.App. 310, 730 S.E.2d 675 (July 16, 2012) (convictions for terroristic threats and false imprisonment, acquittal of rape – but conviction for terroristic threats reversed on other grounds); Falay v. State , 320 Ga.App. 781, 740 S.E.2d 738 (March 26, 2013) (convicted of aggravated assault, acquitted on felony murder); Salazar v. State , 326 Ga.App. 627, 757 S.E.2d 224 (March 27, 2014) (conviction for cocaine trafficking, acquittal on operating a vehicle with a false compartment). Jones v. State, 276 Ga.App. 66, 622 S.E.2d 425 (October 24, 2005). Verdict of acquittal for felony obstruction is neither mutually exclusive nor inconsistent with conviction of misdemeanor obstruction. State v. Robinson, 275 Ga.App. 117, 619 S.E.2d 806 (August 15, 2005). J ury could convict of possession of firearm during commission of crime, even while acquitting of the other crime (here, aggravated assault). Trial court erred in granting motion in arrest of judgment. “‘[I]nconsistent verdicts – even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense while convicting on the compound offense – should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant’s expense. It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.... The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with the Government’s inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewable.’ Kimble v. State, 236 Ga.App. 391, 393(1) (512 S.E.2d 306) (1999), citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65-66 (105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461) (1984).” See also Fields (August 29, 2003), below, and cases collected there; contrary cases, Solomon (October 28, 2008) and Johnson (February 11, 2010), above. Ray v. State, 273 Ga.App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (June 15, 2005). Convictions for armed robbery not inconsistent with acquittal for related firearms offenses. Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 424, 606 S.E.2d 871 (November 12, 2004). Evidence supported cocaine possession conviction despite failure to tender the cocaine itself into evidence. “‘[A]ppellate courts need not invalidate a conviction on a compound offense (such as the offense of possession of a firearm during commission of a crime in the present case) which is logically inconsistent with an acquittal on the predicate or underlying offense (in this case, [attempted armed robbery]) because the appellate court cannot know and should not speculate why a jury acquitted on the predicate offense and convicted on the compound offense. The reason could be an error by the jury in its consideration or it could be mistake, compromise, or lenity, but as a matter of prudence, the conviction on the compound offense should be upheld so long as the evidence will support it ,” quoting King v. Waters, 278 Ga. 122, 123(1), 598 S.E.2d 476 (June 28, 2004). See also Robinson (August 15, 2005), above; Konecny v. State , 307 Ga.App. 618, 705 S.E.2d 714 (January 25, 2011) (“the