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trial court did not err when it convicted Konecny of possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault even though Konecny was acquitted of the aggravated assault.”). Smith v. State, 265 Ga.App. 756, 596 S.E.2d 13 (February 6, 2004). Verdict convicting of per se DUI but acquitting of less safe DUI not improper, even if inconsistent. Fields v State, 263 Ga.App. 11, 587 S.E.2d 171 (August 29, 2003). Conviction for possession of firearm during commission of felony stands even though acquitted of underlying felony due to abolition of inconsistent verdict rule in Milam v. State , 255 Ga. 560, 562, 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986). Accord, Lawrence v. State , 274 Ga. 794 (2), 560 S.E.2d 17 (2002). See also Moreland v. State , 263 Ga.App. 585, 588 S.E.2d 785 (October 8, 2003) (burglary – entering for purposes of felony – conviction stands despite inability to reach verdict on underlying felony); Robles v. State , 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (November 26, 2003) (felony murder conviction upheld despite acquittal on underlying felony – child cruelty); Artis v. State , 299 Ga.App. 287, 682 S.E.2d 375 (July 21, 2009) (okay to acquit of armed robbery while convicting of aggravated assault with deadly weapon); Coleman v. State , 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009) (same as Fields ); Ursulita v. State , 307 Ga.App. 735, 706 S.E.2d 123 (February 8, 2011) (okay to convict of burglary, acquit of criminal damage to property). Easley v. State, 262 Ga.App. 144, 584 S.E.2d 629 (June 24, 2003). A verdict may be inconsistent, but it may not be mutually exclusive. Jury may, inconsistently, convict on one count and not another; this “may reflect a compromise or lenity by the jury rather than inconsistent factual conclusions, and Georgia courts generally will not look behind the jury’s decision to convict on certain counts and acquit on other counts.” But jury may not render two convictions which are mutually exclusive – here, finding the same act to be both negligent and intentional. After reading and publishing a mutually exclusive verdict, trial court rejected the verdict and returned it to the jury to continue deliberating. The jury then returned a verdict which made no finding on those charges; the court returned this second verdict without publishing it; the third time, the verdict was in proper form and the court received it. Held, the court properly returned the mutually exclusive first verdict; the second was no verdict at all because “verdicts acquire their legality from return and publication, [thus] there was no verdict in this case until it was received and published in open court.” Floyd v. State, 272 Ga. 65, 525 S.E.2d 683 (January 18, 2000). Murder conviction affirmed; verdict convicting defendant of murdering one victim but not the other, who was killed at the same time, was not improper. Citing Milam . Mincey v. State, 237 Ga.App. 463, 515 S.E.2d 433 (April 1, 1999). “‘[I]n Milam v. State, [255 Ga. 560, 562(2), 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986)], the Supreme Court of Georgia] rejected the inconsistent verdict rule in criminal cases. Milam involved a criminal defendant charged with two murders committed at the same time. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as to one murder, and guilty but mentally ill as to the other murder. [The Supreme Court] affirmed, ruling that there was no error inherent in the inconsistency between the conviction and acquittal. The Milam ruling stands for the proposition that a defendant cannot attack as inconsistent a jury verdict of guilty on one count and not guilty on a different count. Likewise, virtually all other Georgia cases affirming Georgia’s abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule involve jury verdicts of guilty and not guilty that are alleged to be inconsistent. These cases are in accordance with the principle that it is not generally within the trial court’s power to make inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about the reasons for any inconsistency between guilty and not guilty verdicts.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 799(2), 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996).” Accord, Parks v. State , 240 Ga.App. 45, 522 S.E.2d 532 (September 14, 1999); Lowery v. State , 242 Ga.App. 375, 530 S.E.2d 22 (February 15, 2000) (conviction for aggravated assault, acquittal of simple battery arising from same incident not improper). Kimble v. State, 236 Ga.App. 391, 512 S.E.2d 306 (February 10, 1999). Defendant was convicted of armed robbery of two victims in a single incident. Kimble was also convicted of possession of a firearm during one of the armed robberies, but not the other. Held, even though these two results were inconsistent, the inconsistent verdicts are permissible under the rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) and Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-394, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), adopted in Georgia in Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562, 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986). Overrules Strong v. State, 223 Ga.App. 434, 477 S.E.2d 866 (1996), which held that defendant couldn’t be convicted of possession of firearm during felony where acquitted of the underlying felony. Accord, Day v. State, 242 Ga.App. 781, 531 S.E.2d 357 (March 15, 2000) (conviction for possession of firearm during commission of felony affirmed despite hung jury on underlying count of armed robbery). 5. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE VERDICTS