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State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (June 29, 2015). Reversing 328 Ga.App. 654, 762 S.E.2d 433 (2014). Following defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct, trial court declined to merge the convictions; “multiple guilty verdicts for the same conduct that are based on varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive.” Overruling Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 577 S.E.2d 570 (2003) “and its progeny” as misconstruing Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). “ Dunagan, which simply holds that the lesser mental culpability of criminal negligence is not interchangeable with the greater intentional mental culpability to support a conviction under subsection (a)(1), was mistakenly cited in Jackson for the proposition that a finding of an intentional infliction of injury precludes the element of criminal negligence in reckless conduct and, therefore, convictions for both (a)(1) assault and reckless conduct based on the same act against the same victim are mutually exclusive. That was not our holding in Dunagan. Read properly, Dunagan stands only for the well-established proposition that proof of criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent for those offenses where the only difference between the offenses is a greater or lesser mental culpability. See Dunagan, supra, 269 Ga. at 592, 502 S.E.2d 726.” “[W]here the evidence authorizes a finding that a defendant's reckless conduct is an included crime in an aggravated assault, verdicts finding him guilty of both of those offenses are not mutually exclusive.” Still considered mutually exclusive: “cases where a jury returns verdicts convicting a defendant of two or more crimes and the existence of an element of one of the crimes negates the existence of a necessary element of another crime. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 855(1), 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992) (guilty verdicts on charges of armed robbery and theft by receiving mutually exclusive because essential element of theft by receiving is that the goods are stolen by someone other than the accused). See also Thomas v. United States, 314 F.2d 936, 939 (5 th Cir., 1963) (verdicts mutually exclusive where jury convicted defendant of smuggling marijuana into the United States and obtaining same marijuana within the United States); United States v. Daigle, 149 F.Supp. 409, 414 (D.C.Dist.Ct., 1957) (verdicts mutually exclusive where guilty verdict on one count negatives a fact essential to a finding of guilt on second count); Allison v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 700, 29 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla., 1947) (where jury convicted defendant of breaking and entering and also of breaking without entering, guilty verdicts are repugnant and cannot be sustained); Cross v. State, 36 Md.App. 502, 374 A.2d 620, 623 (Md.Ct.Spec.App., 1977) (where defendant found guilty of grand larceny and of receiving the same stolen goods, verdicts could not be sustained); Bell v. State, 220 Md. 75, 150 A.2d 908, 912 (Md., 1959) (verdict of guilt on two inconsistent counts, larceny and receiving stolen goods , defective because defendant cannot be both thief and receiver as to same goods); State v. Speckman, 326 N.C. 576, 391 S.E.2d 165, 166–167 (N.C., 1990) (verdicts of guilt for both embezzlement, which requires that a defendant initially obtain property lawfully, and false pretenses, which requires that the property be initially obtained unlawfully, are mutually exclusive).” Benham, joined by Hunstein, dissents. Accord, Williams v. State , 298 Ga. 208, 779 S.E.2d 304 (November 2, 2015) (felony murder convictions based on specific intent crimes not inconsistent with felony murder convictions based on criminal negligence offense). Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 771 S.E.2d 879 (April 20, 2015). Verdicts of guilty to malice murder and not guilty on voluntary manslaughter were possibly inconsistent, but not mutually exclusive. State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 766 S.E.2d 66 (November 17, 2014). Following mutually exclusive verdicts of guilty to both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter, trial court erred by sentencing defendant on the involuntary manslaughter. Verdict of guilty on charges was mutually exclusive, meaning that the sentence was void. “Verdicts on felony murder and involuntary manslaughter are not mutually exclusive as a matter of law. Id. Such verdicts are mutually exclusive, however, when the felony murder verdict requires a finding of criminal intent to commit the underlying felony and the involuntary manslaughter verdict requires a finding of criminal negligence (i.e., reckless conduct). Id. at 411–412; Flores v. State, 277 Ga. 780(3) (596 S.E.2d 114) (2004) (verdicts of guilty for felony murder and involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct were mutually exclusive). See also Walker v. State, 293 Ga. 709(2)(a)-(e) (749 S.E.2d 663) (2013) (convictions for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault under OCGA § 16–5–20(a)(1) and homicide by vehicle based on reckless driving were mutually exclusive). Here, appellee was charged on counts of felony murder which required a showing that the underlying felony was committed with intent.[fn] When the jury was instructed on felony involuntary manslaughter, it was given the option to choose the underlying predicate of simple battery, which requires criminal intent, or reckless conduct, which requires criminal negligence. See Allaben v. State, [294 Ga. 315, 322 (751 S.E.2d 802) (2013)]. None of these instructions were in error. However, after the verdict form was returned and the jury was dismissed, it was impossible to determine whether the jury found appellee guilty of felony involuntary murder based on simple battery or based on reckless conduct. This lack of specificity created a reasonable possibility that the jury found appellee guilty of felony involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct.” Distinguishing Drake v. State, 288 Ga. 131 (702 S.E.2d 161) (2010), where the “jury was given the option of finding the defendant guilty of misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the felony murder count, but it declined to do so. Id. at 134. On those facts, this Court held that because the jury had been properly charged as to the