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differentiations between criminal intent and criminal negligence, and because the jury had found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter solely as to the malice murder charge, it was not possible for the jury to have predicated its involuntary manslaughter verdict based on criminal negligence.” Of doubtful authority following Springer (June 29, 2015), above (“multiple guilty verdicts for the same conduct that are based on varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive”; expressly overruling Flores, Walker and Allaben, cited above). State v. Sawyer, 327 Ga.App. 43, 755 S.E.2d 905 (March 26, 2014). Following defendant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, trial court erred by setting aside the aggravated assault conviction on grounds that it was mutually exclusive of the involuntary manslaughter conviction. The verdicts would be mutually exclusive if defendant were convicted of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1), “attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of another,” which “requires a finding of an intentional infliction of injury.” Such intent “precludes the element of criminal negligence in reckless conduct,” which is an essential element of involuntary manslaughter as charged here. But aggravated assault under (a)(2), “committing an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury,” does not involve specific intent to injure and this doesn’t preclude a finding of criminal negligence. “In this case, the indictment charged Sawyer with aggravated assault based on his actions in knowingly shooting the victim with ‘a pistol, a deadly weapon.’” Neither the indictment nor the verdict form specified whether the charge was brought under (a)(1) or (a)(2), but the jury was only charged on (a)(2). “Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that the jury found that Sawyer acted with specific criminal intent in committing the aggravated assault. Moreover, there was no risk that the jury returned verdicts for aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter that were mutually exclusive.” Ray concurs specially, noting that the remedy would have been to grant a new trial on both offenses rather than setting aside one of the verdicts. Wilmott v. State, 326 Ga.App. 1, 755 S.E.2d 818 (March 5, 2014). Physical precedent only. Convictions for operating a chop shop and removing a vehicle identification number (VIN) affirmed; verdicts weren’t mutually exclusive. Defendant was convicted of removing a VIN as a lesser-included offense to possessing a motor vehicle with altered VIN to conceal identity of vehicle (OCGA § 40-4-22(a)). Defendant contends that chop shop conviction is mutually exclusive of acquittal under OCGA § 40-4-22(a), but “‘the rule against mutually exclusive verdicts ... is not implicated where ... verdicts of guilty and not guilty are returned.’ Turner, 283 Ga. at 20(2), 655 S.E.2d 589 (citation omitted).” In any event, “[t]he two guilty verdicts returned by the jury in this case can be logically reconciled—a finding that a person, in violation of OCGA § 40–4–21, wilfully removed or falsified the identification number of a vehicle does not logically exclude a finding that the person, in violation of OCGA § 16–8–83, owned, operated or conducted a premise in which he knowingly altered a vehicle identification number with the intent of misrepresenting the vehicle's identity.” Allaben v. State, 294 Ga. 315, 751 S.E.2d 802 (November 25, 2013). Guilty verdicts for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with intent to murder, battery and simple battery were inconsistent with guilty verdict for reckless conduct as lesser-included offense of aggravated assault where all offenses were based on the same act of choking victim. 1. Rejects State’s argument, based on Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 886, 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010), that reckless conduct and malice murder aren’t inconsistent in this case because reckless disregard for human life can constitute implied malice. “In Parker, this court explained the concept of implied malice. [fn] We said that it is a concept that ‘“has been defined to mean conduct exhibiting a ‘reckless disregard for human life,’”’ id. at 260, 507 S.E.2d 744 (citation omitted), which is consistent with the ‘general rule that extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury to another or to others—though unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury—and which actually causes the death of another, may constitute murder. If a reckless disregard for human life constitutes implied malice and implied malice is, in turn, the equivalent of a specific intent to kill, then it necessarily follows that reckless disregard for human life may be the equivalent of a specific intent to kill. Evidence that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for human life is, for purposes of demonstrating his guilt of the crime of malice murder, as equally probative as evidence that he acted with a specific intent to kill.’ Id. (citations, bracketing, and indentation omitted).” Jury here wasn’t charged on this concept, however, nor did verdict form allow jury to express such a finding. 2. Rejects State’s argument that, since reckless conduct was only entered as lesser-offense of aggravated assault, only that verdict should be deemed mutually exclusive. “This Court, however, has never held that a verdict on an offense included in one count may only be considered mutually exclusive to another offense charged as part of that count. Rather, verdicts are mutually exclusive where a guilty verdict is entered on one offense, no matter in which count, that logically excludes a verdict of guilt on another offense.” Overruled, Springer (June 29, 2015), above.