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Jackson, supra at 412(2). A verdict of guilt predicated on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2), does not. Id. at 412 (n. 5). Accordingly, a verdict of guilt as to aggravated assault is mutually exclusive with a verdict of guilt as to serious injury by vehicle predicated on reckless driving, if the aggravated assault is based on ‘[a]ttempt[ing] to commit a violent injury to the person of another’ under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1).” Since indictment didn’t specify which prong of aggravated assault was intended, trial court charged jury on both definitions. “Under these circumstances, we cannot eliminate the reasonable probability that the jury concluded that Dryden intentionally attempted to commit a violent injury to Thomason and found him guilty of aggravated assault by applying OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1).” Overruled, Springer (June 29, 2015), above. Louis v. State, 290 Ga.App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (March 7, 2008). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and criminal trespass, stemming from shots fired into an occupied car, were not mutually exclusive. “Louis specifically argues that, with respect to the conduct being punished-discharging gunshots upon an occupied car, the jury found that he acted both with intent to injure (regarding the aggravated assault offenses) and with criminal negligence (regarding the property crime).” While this is true, at least as to aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) (intent to injure), evidence here authorized multiple convictions based on different shots fired in succession. “Louis’s contention fails because ‘[t]he rule against mutually exclusive verdicts applies only where the convictions result from the same act involving the same victim at the same instant, ’” quoting Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 2(2) (644 S.E.2d 127) (2007). “The contested verdicts stemmed from evidence that approximately 18 gunshots were fired within a brief time span in the direction of the Pontiac, striking two of the three occupants and damaging the car. This evidence authorized the jury to find that certain of the gunshots were fired with the intent to injure the car occupants (which conduct completed three counts of aggravated assault) and that other gunshots were fired to damage or disable the backwardly speeding car (which conduct showed the offense of first degree criminal damage to property).” Clark v. State, 289 Ga.App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190 (February 14, 2008). Defendants’ convictions for burglary and for theft by receiving of items taken in the burglary were mutually exclusive. “By convicting the [defendants] of the crime of burglary at the 2365 address, the jury necessarily found that [defendants] were at least accomplices in that crime. The jury also necessarily found that the stolen goods found in the automobile and which were in the defendant’s possession were taken in the burglary. As such, [defendants] were principals in the theft of those items. See Gray v. State, 260 Ga.App. 197, 198(1) (581 S.E.2d 279) (2003) (presence in an area that had been burglarized in conjunction with possession of goods that had been stolen from that area supports a finding of theft by taking); Dunn v. State, 245 Ga.App. 847, 847-848 (539 S.E.2d 198) (2000) (an accomplice in a burglary is guilty as a principal). Yet, one cannot be a principal thief of stolen property and at the same time be convicted of theft by receiving the same property. See Phillips v. State, 269 Ga.App. 619, 631(10) (604 S.E.2d 520) (2004) (noting that the crimes of theft by taking and theft by receiving are so mutually exclusive that the thief and the receiver cannot even be accomplices). See also Ingram v. State, 268 Ga.App. 149, 151-152(5) (601 S.E.2d 736) (2004); Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 855(1) (413 S.E.2d 196) (1992). ‘The essence of the crime of receiving stolen property is that the defendant, with knowledge of the facts and without intent to return it to the owner, bought or obtained property which had been stolen by some person other than the defendant.’ Clark v. State, 144 Ga.App. 69, 70 (240 S.E.2d 270) (1977).” Ramirez v. State, 288 Ga.App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (November 6, 2007). Conviction for involuntary manslaughter, based on simple assault/simple battery, wasn’t mutually exclusive of aggravated assault; both require a showing of intent, not negligence. Thus “the intent element of simple battery or simple assault is not inconsistent with the mens rea required for the greater offense of aggravated assault. See Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1 (644 S.E.2d 127) (2007).” Accord, Griffin v. State , 296 Ga. 415, 768 S.E.2d 515 (January 20, 2015). Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 651 S.E.2d 715 (October 9, 2007). Jury’s verdict of guilty of murder, not guilty by reason of insanity to aggravated assault (same incident, same victim) was not mutually exclusive. “Verdicts are mutually exclusive and cannot stand only if two guilty verdicts are returned and a finding of guilty on one count logically excludes a finding guilty on another count. [Cit.] In Shepherd [ v. State, 280 Ga. 245, 248-249, 626 S.E.2d 96 (2006)] , we held that the mutually exclusive verdict rule does not apply “where a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and a guilty verdict [a]re returned with respect to offenses against the same victim occurring simultaneously. Id. at 249, 626 S.E.2d 96.” Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (April 24, 2007). Convictions for felony murder, involuntary manslaughter weren’t mutually exclusive. “ The rule against mutually exclusive verdicts applies only where the convictions result from the same act involving the same victim at the same instant. Mills (February 13, 2006), below ]; Jackson v. State,