☢ test - Í

[276 Ga. 408, 412(2) (577 S.E.2d 570) (2003)]. Where the victim sustains several injuries, convictions for both intentional and negligent crimes are not mutually exclusive. Jackson v. State, supra at 411(2); Carter v. State, [269 Ga. 420 (499 S.E.2d 63) (1998)] (also involving the distinct issue of merger). In this case, the criminal intent required for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and cruelty to children does not logically exclude the criminal negligence element of reckless conduct because the victim sustained numerous injuries. Jackson v. State, supra; Carter v. State, supra. A rational trier of fact could have found that the victim initially suffered non-fatal injuries on October 22, 2002 which resulted from [defendant’s] frequently negligent care.” Accord, Kipp v. State , 294 Ga. 55, 751 S.E.2d 83 (November 4, 2013) (separate acts supported charges of felony murder, involuntary manslaughter of infant). Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791 (November 8, 2006). “A defendant waives any argument that the verdict contains mutually exclusive findings or is otherwise inconsistent, confusing, or irregular if he fails to object to the form of the verdict. Webb v. State, 270 Ga.App. 817, 818(2) (608 S.E.2d 241) (2004). … Smith’s failure to object to the form of the verdict here waived his argument that the jury’s acquittal of him on the first rape count precluded the jury from finding him guilty on the second rape count,” an argument which fails, anyway, as Georgia no longer recognizes the inconsistent verdict rule. Mills v. State, 280 Ga. 232, 626 S.E.2d 495 (February 13, 2006). Convictions for felony murder and first degree vehicular homicide were not mutually exclusive where predicated upon separate acts, one intentional (driving at the defendant’s vehicle and striking it), one reckless (improper lane change). Accord, Waits (April 24, 2007), above. Shepherd v. State, 280 Ga. 245, 626 S.E.2d 96 (January 30, 2006). “Shepherd contends that the jury’s verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill of the remaining offenses cannot be logically reconciled and, therefore, the verdicts are mutually exclusive. [fn] ‘Verdicts are mutually exclusive “where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 410(2), 577 S.E.2d 570 (2003), citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 fn. 8 (105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461) (1984). Thus, the rule against mutually exclusive verdicts applies to multiple guilty verdicts which cannot be logically reconciled; the rule is not implicated where, as here, verdicts of guilty and not guilty are returned. Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797(2), 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996).” Jones v. State, 276 Ga.App. 66, 622 S.E.2d 425 (October 24, 2005). Verdict of acquittal for felony obstruction is neither mutually exclusive nor inconsistent with conviction of misdemeanor obstruction. Campbell v. State, 275 Ga.App. 8, 619 S.E.2d 720 (August 8, 2005). Convictions for theft by taking and theft by retaining of same motor vehicle were mutually exclusive, requiring reversal and new trial. Accord, Ingram v. State , 268 Ga.App. 149, 601 S.E.2d 736 (2004). Flores v. State, 277 Ga. 780, 596 S.E.2d 114 (April 27, 2004). Convictions for both involuntary manslaughter and felony murder based on aggravated assault must be reversed and remanded for new trial. Involuntary manslaughter and felony murder are not mutually exclusive as a matter of law, but may be as a matter of fact. “An assault may be committed in two ways, that is, when a person ‘[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another,’ OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1), or when a person ‘[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.’ OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2).” The former requires a showing of intent to injure; the latter does not. Since the trial court here charged the jury on both definitions, and the evidence would have authorized either finding, there is a “‘reasonable probability’ that the jury found that Flores acted with both criminal intent and criminal negligence in the same fatal conduct.” Overruled, Springer (June 29, 2015), above. Easley v. State, 262 Ga.App. 144, 584 S.E.2d 629 (June 24, 2003). A verdict may be inconsistent, but it may not be mutually exclusive. Jury may, inconsistently, convict on one count and not another; this “may reflect a compromise or lenity by the jury rather than inconsistent factual conclusions, and Georgia courts generally will not look behind the jury’s decision to convict on certain counts and acquit on other counts.” But jury may not render two convictions which are mutually exclusive – here, finding the same act to be both negligent and intentional. After reading and publishing a mutually exclusive verdict, trial court rejected the verdict and returned it to the jury to continue deliberating. The jury then returned a verdict which made no finding on those charges; the court returned this second verdict without publishing it; the third time, the verdict was in proper form and the court received it. Held, the court properly returned the mutually exclusive first verdict; the second was no verdict at all because “verdicts acquire their legality from return and publication, [thus] there was no verdict in this case until it was received and published in open court.”