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Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 577 S.E.2d 570 (February 24, 2003). “Verdicts are mutually exclusive ‘where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other.’ United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69, fn. 8, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Accord Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 800, 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996) (verdicts are mutually exclusive where it is ‘both legally and logically impossible to convict [the accused] of both counts’).” “Mutually exclusive verdicts, which cannot both stand, result in two positive findings of fact which cannot logically mutually exist. Inconsistent verdicts, which do not introduce invalidity, bespeak a positive finding of fact as to one charge and the failure to make a positive finding of fact as to the other. The latter, which results in an acquittal, does not constitute a negative finding of fact but may be explained as compromise, mistake, or lenity. We can neither speculate nor inquire.” Here, jury’s findings of guilt on both malice murder and involuntary manslaughter were inconsistent, because one found actual intent and the other found absence of actual intent but criminal negligence/reckless conduct. Overruled, Springer (June 29, 2015), above. Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 402, 538 S.E.2d 67 (July 28, 2000). Vehicular homicide convictions affirmed. Contrary to defendant’s argument, first degree vehicular homicide convictions as to two passengers, and second degree vehicular homicide convictions as to two other passengers in same incident weren’t mutually exclusive (although possibly inconsistent). OCGA § 40-6-393(b) defines second degree vehicular homicide as causing a death by violating Title 40, Chapter 6, other than committing reckless driving (or certain other provisions). “Given this definition, a finding of second degree vehicular homicide does not mandate a conclusion that a driver did not drive in a reckless manner. A jury could believe that although the driver was reckless, that reckless driving did not cause the particular death. Instead, a jury might conclude that some other traffic offense caused a particular victim's death. … While we cannot know the basis for the jury's decision, we cannot say that the verdicts are mutually exclusive because there is sufficient evidence that another traffic offense occurred (such as speeding or failure to maintain lane) and that this offense could have caused the deaths of Davis' sister and Clark.” Jordan v. State , 272 Ga. 395, 530 S.E.2d 192 (May 8, 2000). Defendant’s convictions for malice murder and hindering the apprehension of a criminal were mutually exclusive. “One guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal is, at common law, an ‘accessory after the fact’ and is not a ‘party to the crime’ under OCGA § 16-2-20. Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210(1), 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977); Martinez v. State, 222 Ga.App. 497(2), 474 S.E.2d 708 (1996). The statutory definition of hindering the apprehension of a criminal eliminates the possibility that one guilty of hindering participated as a party to the crime in the perpetration of the major crime. Ivey v. State, 186 Ga. 216, 197 S.E. 322 (1938); Thaxton v. State, 184 Ga.App. 779(1), 362 S.E.2d 510 (1987). Since one may not be convicted of murder as a party to that crime and also be convicted of not being a party to the crime, but only an accessory after the fact, appellant's conviction for hindering the apprehension of a criminal must be set aside. Id.” Paczko v. State, 271 Ga. 627, 523 S.E.2d 16 (November 1, 1999). Failure to reach verdict on malice murder and related counts was not “mutually exclusive verdict” with convictions for felony murder and related counts. “Since a jury's inability to agree on a verdict is not itself a verdict, Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521(1)(b), 350 S.E.2d 446 (1986), this case does not involve mutually exclusive verdicts, compare Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797(2), 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996), but at best involves inconsistent verdicts. See Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560(2), 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986).” Knight v. State, 271 Ga. 557, 521 S.E.2d 819 (October 18, 1999). Defendant’s murder and other convictions affirmed; convictions for malice murder and felony murder were not mutually exclusive. “Relying on Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996), Knight claims that the guilty verdicts for malice murder and felony murder were mutually exclusive because felony murder is specifically a killing without malice. But, a verdict of guilty for felony murder does not constitute a finding that the murder was committed without malice aforethought, but that the murder was committed while in the commission of another felony offense ‘irrespective of malice.’ OCGA § 16-5-1(c). This is substantially different from Dumas where verdicts of guilty of malice murder and vehicular homicide were determined to be mutually exclusive because vehicular homicide requires finding that the defendant acted without malice aforethought and without the intention to kill. Dumas at 800(2), 471 S.E.2d 508.” Huntley v. State, 271 Ga. 227, 518 S.E.2d 890 (June 14, 1999). Verdicts were not mutually exclusive: conviction for felony murder based on aggravated assault, acquittal for malice murder and felony murder based on armed robbery. Kimble v. State, 236 Ga.App. 391, 512 S.E.2d 306 (February 10, 1999). Defendant was convicted of armed robbery of two victims in a single incident. Kimble was also convicted of possession of a firearm during one of the armed robberies,