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judge saw the form before or after deciding to declare a mistrial. [Cits] Likewise, we cannot discern whether, if the judge saw the form after the verdict was read into the record, it was before or after the jury had dispersed. See OCGA § 17–9–40 (“A verdict may be amended in mere matter of form after the jury have dispersed; but, after it has been received, recorded, and the jury dispersed, it may not be amended in matter of substance, either by what the jurors say they intended to find or otherwise.”); Groves [ v. State, 162 Ga. 161, 166, 132 S.E. 769 (1926)] (‘There must be the unanimous assent of the entire twelve jurors before there is a legal verdict. When it develops that such is not the fact, there is no verdict. If the jury has not been dispersed, they should be sent to the jury room, with the direction to consider the case for the purpose of reaching an agreement on a verdict.’); … see also Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga.App. 584, 586(3), 249 S.E.2d 637 (1978) (‘[When] the verdict was erroneous on its face, [it was] not error to determine from the jury before its dispersal what its true intent had been, to give correct instructions on how the various verdicts might be framed under the evidence, and to return them to the jury room to correct the error.’); McGahee v. Samuels, 61 Ga.App. 773, 773, 7 S.E.2d 611 (1940); Brown v. State, 35 Ga.App. 660, 660, 134 S.E. 193 (1926). Additionally, although it appears by the handwritten initials that it was the trial judge who marked through the words written by the jury foreperson on the verdict form as to Count 2, and the State appears to concede this fact in its brief, this too is not entirely clear from the record. Thus, we have no choice but to remand this case to the trial court for another hearing on these issues, [Cit.] which will need to be conducted by a judge other than the one who presided over the trial. See Lewis v. State, 275 Ga. 194, 195(1), 565 S.E.2d 437 (2002) (holding that ‘[i]t is elementary that one may not be a witness and a judge in the same proceeding,’ and remanding for a new hearing with a different judge (punctuation omitted)).” McFadden, joined by Barnes and Phipps, dissents , finding the “not guilty” verdict to be unambiguous, and indulging the presumption that the trial court followed the law by reviewing the verdict before allowing its publication. “[B]ecause the verdict here was legal and contained no ambiguity, ‘[t]he trial court [and its clerk were] without authority to [ignore or alter the jury's final verdict].... [A]ll actions occurring subsequent to the return of the jury's original verdict were nugatory[.]’ Douglas v. State, 206 Ga.App. 740, 742(1), 426 S.E.2d 628 (1992). See also State v. Telenko, 225 Ga.App. 724, 726, 484 S.E.2d 725 (1997) (after trial had ended, court's subsequent declaration of a mistrial was a ‘mere nullity’).” 7. VERDICT NOT UNANIMOUS Muthu v. State, A16A0293, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1635091 (April 26, 2016). DUI and related convictions affirmed; on motion for new trial, trial court properly declined to consider juror’s affidavit and testimony that the verdict was not unanimous. “‘Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall not testify by affidavit or otherwise nor shall a juror’s statements be received in evidence as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the jury deliberations or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith; provided, however, that a juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the juror’s attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.’ OCGA § 24–6–606(b). Here, neither Muthu nor [juror] P.H.’s affidavit alleged that any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to P.H.’s attention, that any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon P.H., or that there was an error in entering the verdict on the verdict form. Instead P.H.’s affidavit addressed the deliberations amongst the jurors. This evidence is explicitly excluded by the plain language of OCGA § 24–6–606(b).” Tate v. State, 278 Ga.App. 324, 628 S.E.2d 730 (March 21, 2006). “Tate contends he should be granted a new trial because [juror] was pressured into returning a guilty verdict. Tate concedes, however, that jurors generally may not impeach their own verdict. See Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 206(9) (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003). Exceptions to this rule are made only when (1) prejudicial, extrajudicial information has been brought to the jury's attention; (2) non-jurors have interfered with deliberations; or (3) there has been irregular jury conduct so prejudicial that the verdict lacks due process. See Harrell v. State, 253 Ga.App. 691, 694(3) (560 S.E.2d 295) (2002). None of these grounds is alleged here. And all the cases cited by Tate in support of granting a new trial involve jurors who stated during a poll of the jury that the verdict was not theirs. See Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 465-466 (602 S.E.2d 631) (2004); Larry v. State, 266 Ga. 284, 287- 288(5) (466 S.E.2d 850) (1996); Miller v. State, 265 Ga.App. 402, 403(2) (593 S.E.2d 943) (2004). Under the circumstances here – where the juror agreed to the verdict during the poll and subsequently affirmed that it was his verdict, but merely expressed reservations about the process – the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Tate a new trial. See Parker v. State, 249 Ga.App. 509, 512(2) (548 S.E.2d 475) (2001).” Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga.App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (March 3, 2006). “‘ The indication of “reservations” does not prevent the verdict from being unanimous. The requirement is that a juror agree to a verdict.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Rouse v. State, 265 Ga. 32, 33(3) (453 S.E.2d 30) (1995). See also Scruggs v. State, 181 Ga.App. 55,