☢ test - Í

56(1) (351 S.E.2d 256) (1986) ( even ‘reluctant agreement’ in a jury verdict is sufficient ).” “Our Supreme Court has held that the minimum requirements of a jury poll are met by asking the questions, ‘Was that your verdict?’ and ‘Is it now your verdict?’” citing Benefield v. State , 278 Ga. 464, 465, 602 S.E.2d 631 (2004). “Here, the trial court went beyond these minimum requirements in order to determine whether the verdict was unanimous. During this poll, [juror] affirmed on two separate occasions that the verdict was hers in the jury room. She also stated that the verdict was still hers and that it was freely and voluntarily given. Thus, the record shows that the verdict in this case was unanimous, and Blackwood’s motion for a mistrial was properly denied. See Hudson v. State, 157 Ga.App. 71, 72-73(3) (276 S.E.2d 122) (1981).” Johnson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 41, 625 S.E.2d 411 (November 15, 2005). Trial court properly found that defendant had waived right to unanimous verdict. “In Georgia, a criminal defendant can waive his right to a unanimous verdict. Copeland v. State, 241 Ga. 370, 371(4), 245 S.E.2d 642 (1978). Before such waiver can become effective, a defendant must give his ‘express and intelligent consent’ and obtain the government’s agreement and the sanction of the trial court. See Glass v. State, 250 Ga. 736, 737(1), 300 S.E.2d 812 (1983). Those requirements were met. After the jury had deliberated for some time, the foreman sent a note to the court indicating that the jury was deadlocked 11 to 1 and that two jurors were experiencing ‘severe conflicts.’ The note did not reveal whether the jury favored conviction or acquittal. After the trial court informed the State and Johnson about this development and asked trial counsel about her client’s inclination, counsel stated that Johnson would accept a verdict of 11. The State likewise agreed to accept a non- unanimous verdict. The trial court questioned Johnson extensively about his decision and ascertained that Johnson understood his right to insist upon a unanimous verdict and also to have the jury continue deliberating. The court explained to Johnson the meaning of a mistrial and his right to elect an Allen, or dynamite, charge and to have the jury resume deliberations. Johnson denied being forced, threatened, or promised anything in exchange for waiving his right. He indicated that he was making the decision freely and voluntarily. Johnson’s counsel confirmed that Johnson understood that she was ‘ready, willing, and able to try this case again should it be necessary.’ After acknowledging that he understood the ‘downside and the upside of going forward,’ Johnson again indicated his willingness to accept a non- unanimous verdict. He denied that his counsel had encouraged him in any way to accept a non-unanimous verdict.” Miller v. State, 265 Ga.App. 402, 593 S.E.2d 943 (February 3, 2004). “When polled by the trial court after the guilty verdict, one juror stated that his verdict ‘was made, but not freely.’” “‘The trial court followed proper established procedure when the jury was ordered to resume deliberations after determining the verdict was not unanimous. [Cits.]’” Boyd v. State, 275 Ga. 772, 573 S.E.2d 52 (November 25, 2002). Felony murder conviction affirmed. “When something other than a unanimous verdict appears [e.g., verdict as to some counts, but no resolution of others and no indication of dead-lock], the correct procedure is to send the jury back to the jury room to arrive at a unanimous verdict, if possible.” Hinton v. State , 223 Ga. 174(4), 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967), does not require that the entire verdict be rewritten. II. VOIR DIRE See also subheading EXCUSAL/STRIKE FOR CAUSE – INACCURATE RESPONSES TO VOIR DIRE , above Reynolds v. State, 334 Ga.App. 496, 779 S.E.2d 712 (November 13, 2015). Convictions for violating oath as a public officer affirmed; no abuse of discretion shown where trial court limited each side to ten general voir dire questions (but no limit on specific questions to each juror). “While a defendant must be ‘permitted to ask sufficient questions to determine the fairness and impartiality of the prospective jurors,’ Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 38(3), 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002), the appropriate scope of voir dire in a particular case is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 338(7), 687 S.E.2d 438 (2009). And absent some showing that the court abused its discretion, we presume its rulings as to the scope of voir dire are correct. Meeks v. State, 269 Ga.App. 836, 836–837(1), 605 S.E.2d 428 (2004), citing Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707, 708(2), 225 S.E.2d 224 (1976). See also Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 127(7)(b), 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012) (‘appellate courts should give substantial deference to the decisions made by trial judges, who oversee voir dire on a regular basis, are more familiar with the details and nuances of their cases, and can observe the parties’ and the prospective jurors’ demeanor’). Accordingly, a criminal defendant alleging that the trial court erred in limiting his voir dire bears the burden of demonstrating that an abuse of discretion occurred-i.e., the defendant must show that the trial court prevented him from asking one or more questions that would have allowed him to explore a potential juror’s bias. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga.App. 361, 362(2), 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007) (‘[i]n criminal appeals, as in civil ones, the burden is on the appellant’ to show his asserted error ‘affirmatively by the record’) (citation and punctuation omitted); Sanders v. State, 204 Ga.App. 37, 38(1), 419 S.E.2d 24 (1992). If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the State to ‘show that it is “highly probable” that the limitation of voir dire did not contribute to the verdict.’ Hunt v. State, 215 Ga.App. 677, 677, 451 S.E.2d 797 (1994).” Defendant here “did not identify for the trial court any questions he wished to ask during general voir dire that would have put him over