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the ten-question limit. Moreover, Reynolds was allowed to pose as many questions as he liked when each of the potential jurors was questioned individually. And a review of the record shows that the relatively lengthy voir dire which occurred in this case ‘was sufficient to ascertain the fairness and impartiality of the prospective jurors.’ Sallie [ v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 510(3), 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003)] (footnote omitted).” Hurt v. State, 298 Ga. 51, 779 S.E.2d 313 (November 2, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court “disallowed three of Hurt’s proposed voir dire questions. Specifically, Hurt sought to ask prospective jurors if they would fault Hurt if he did not testify, if they believed that Hurt was required to prove his innocence, and if they would believe an individual guilty of a crime simply because he or she was arrested. … Here, the substance of Hurt’s questions was covered when the trial court asked the three statutory questions set forth in OCGA § 15–12–164. The trial court exercised sound discretion here.” Kass v. State, 297 Ga. 153, 771 S.E.2d 873 (April 20, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any objection to trial court’s leading qualifying questions to jurors by failing to object to them during voir dire. “See Walker v. State, 258 Ga.App. 333(1), 574 S.E.2d 400 (2002) (defendant failed to preserve the propriety of the trial court's voir dire question for appellate review when he failed to object to the question); Braswell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 602(5)(a), 538 S.E.2d 492 (2000) (‘“To raise an issue as to error in the conducting of the voir dire, objection must be made in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.”[Cit.]’).” Carver v. State, 331 Ga.App. 120, 769 S.E.2d 722 (February 10, 2015). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no error in ruling out voir dire question: “Do any of you think children lack the worldly knowledge to bring this kind of allegation?” Jurors’ answer “relates directly to their determination of whether the child victim's allegations were believable, and thus, whether the victim was credible.” Thomas v. State, 296 Ga. 485, 769 S.E.2d 82 (February 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing prosecutor to ask in voir dire, “Is there anyone here who believes that a person who assists another person in the commission of a crime—is there anyone who believes a person who assists another should not be prosecuted?” Based on analysis in Ellington (November 19, 2012), below. “ In this case, the question posed by the prosecutor essentially asked whether any prospective juror would automatically conclude that appellant should not be prosecuted if the facts established he merely assisted another person in the commission of the crime. Accordingly, we conclude the question is most reasonably viewed as seeking to determine prejudice in the mind of any prospective juror. We conclude the question did not ask the jurors to prejudge the case based upon hypothetical facts, and we disagree with appellant's assertion that the question improperly suggested he was guilty of assisting in the commission of the crimes involved in the case or could reasonably be viewed as planting prejudgment in the minds of the jurors. We affirm the trial court's exercise of discretion in permitting the question posed.” Nwakanma v. State, 296 Ga. 493, 768 S.E.2d 503 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly limited voir dire by prohibiting this question: ““Given that there are four defendants on trial in this case, do any of you think that you might be unable to consider and apply the evidence separately to each defendant?” “Francis's question about considering and applying the evidence separately to each co-defendant was ‘of a technical legal nature as [it was a] subject[ ] of the instruction by the court at the conclusion of the trial.’ Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 259(2) (282 S.E.2d 325) (1981) (where the court at a trial on a special plea of insanity sustained objections to questions asking each juror ‘whether he would follow a charge of the court as to mental competency and whether the juror could set aside any evidence which might be elicited pertaining to guilt or innocence of the actual charges’).” Evans v. State, 328 Ga.App. 16, 761 S.E.2d 443 (July 8, 2014). Entering an auto and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly limited voir dire about the effect of similar transaction evidence. “[H]ypothetical questions involving evidence, such as the question in this case, that would require a response from a juror that might amount to a prejudgment of the case are improper and should be excluded from voir dire. See [ Stell v. State, 210 Ga.App. 662(1), 436 S.E.2d 806 (1993)]; see also Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 682(3), 513 S.E.2d 235 (1999) (prejudgment questions may not be asked in voir dire). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in prohibiting defense counsel's examination of the prospective jurors regarding their possible reaction to Evans's prior convictions.” Polanco v. State, 328 Ga.App. 513, 759 S.E.2d 640 (July 1, 2014). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from asking “potential jurors whether they would prejudge his case