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or cause them to be biased based on the large number of charges in the indictment. … [H]ypothetical questions, such as the question in this case, that would require a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case are improper and should be excluded from voir dire. See [ Stell v. State, 210 Ga.App. 662, 436 S.E.2d 806 (1993)]; see also Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 682(3), 513 S.E.2d 235 (1999) (prejudgment questions may not be asked in voir dire).” Davis v. State, 327 Ga.App. 729, 761 S.E.2d 139 (June 24, 2014). Child molestation convictions affirmed; no error in disallowing defendant’s voir dire question whether “hearing testimony from a child” would impair the jurors’ judgment. Jurors were otherwise asked about their experience with victims of molestation or other sexual offenses, “or who had a problem with the nature of the case (statutory rape and child molestation) ‘such that you question your ability to be fair and impartial.’ Based upon the reading of the indictment and the general voir questions posed to the jury by both the trial court and the State, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by denying Davis' question seeking to expose bias based upon a child testifying, because precluding this question did not create ‘a real risk that juror partiality driven by the fact at issue will not otherwise be identified in voir dire,’ quoting Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 137(7)(e), 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012). Chambers v. State, 327 Ga.App. 663, 760 S.E.2d 664 (June 19, 2014). Robbery and theft convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in limit on voir questions asking if a person could “ever be trusted again” where that person “has admitted to breaking the law in any way.” “At the time of the objection, Chambers's counsel was posing a hypothetical question about the trustworthiness of a person who previously had violated the law or broken a trust. That question could be construed to ask the prospective juror to prejudge the case based on assumed facts not yet proved, namely Chambers's past criminal history, which the state intended to introduce as similar transaction evidence and for impeachment purposes. Moreover, the trial court already had allowed some inquiry into the prospective juror's thoughts on the trustworthiness of a person who had admitted to breaking the law.” Green v. State, 295 Ga. 108, 757 S.E.2d 856 (April 22, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; juror’s inaccurate responses to voir dire didn’t entitle defendant to new trial where juror showed no partiality and wasn’t subject to challenge for cause. Juror failed to disclose that he was on first offender probation for false imprisonment and terroristic threats. Also, neither juror nor Green realized they had been incarcerated together for a time. On motion for new trial, “testified that he did not know Green, did not recall being incarcerated with him, did not consider the incarceration while deliberating on Green's case, and did not share with the other jurors any information gleaned from that incarceration. He also testified that his verdicts were based only on the evidence presented at trial. Green testified that he did not recognize Juror during the trial of his case, and that only after trial did he learn of Juror's service on his case. The trial court concluded that Juror did not act with partiality or manifest injustice toward Green in rendering his verdicts; that despite Juror's failure to appropriately respond during voir dire, he acted properly in his service as a juror on Green's case; that there was no showing that Juror had an “evil motive” or that he acted with other than the required impartiality; that there was no indication that Juror did anything during jury deliberations which was unfair or evidenced that Juror had any ulterior motives in failing to give truthful and accurate responses during voir dire; that there was no evidence indicating that Juror shared inadmissible evidence with the other jurors; and that in fact, another juror testified that Juror did not share any such information.” “A juror's knowledge of, or non-familial relationship with, a witness, attorney, or party provides a basis for disqualification only if it is shown that it has resulted in the juror having a fixed opinion of the accused's guilt or innocence or a bias for or against the accused. Bester v. State, 294 Ga. 195, 196(2)(a), 751 S.E.2d 360 (2013). Compare OCGA § 15–12–135(a).[fn] And, the evidence of record does not demonstrate either Juror's preconception of Green's innocence or guilt or of any bias towards him.[fn] Consequently, Green was not entitled to a new trial based upon his juror challenge.” Walker v. State, 294 Ga. 752, 755 S.E.2d 790 (March 10, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to hypothetical question to juror during voir dire. “As Walker recognizes, there is no per se rule against hypothetical questions during voir dire of prospective jurors. This Court has noted that, under Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.1, ‘[h]ypothetical questions are discouraged, but may be allowed in the discretion of the court. It is improper to ask how a juror would act in certain contingencies or on a certain hypothetical state of facts. No question shall be framed so as to require a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the action. [Cit.]’ Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 127(7)(b), 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012). The question posed by the State did not in any way call for a response amounting to a prejudgment of the State's prosecution of Walker.” Question here asked if jurors could determine guilt/innocence without considering sentence, giving the example of “a very poor young girl who steals some bread out of desperation to feed her hungry child.”