☢ test - Í

Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 751 S.E.2d 408 (November 18, 2013). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court didn’t improperly restrict voir dire. Child victim died by blunt force trauma to the head. “During voir dire, the State inquired whether any member of the venire did not believe in corporal or physical punishment of children. Defense counsel later asked a particular venire member whether ‘the fact that there are allegations in this case of corpor[al] punishment being used towards a child, would that in any way prevent you from being fair and impartial towards my client, Mr. Alexander?’ The venire member answered no, and when defense counsel attempted to ask a more specific question regarding corporal punishment with a belt, the State objected. The trial court sustained the State's objection and appellant argues that by doing so, the trial court improperly restricted voir dire. … After reviewing the record, we conclude the voir dire in this case was sufficient in scope to both comport with appellant's rights under § 15–12–133 and to ascertain the fairness and impartiality of the prospective jurors. The State's theory in this case was that the child died as a result of an extreme blunt force trauma to the head inflicted immediately or almost immediately prior to her incapacitation. Therefore, corporal punishment with a belt was not the cause of death alleged by the State and any potential bias respecting the use of a belt to inflict corporal punishment was not a potentially critical factor which required disclosure. See Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 127, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012) (‘subject matter of an action’ is not understood to include every detail of the case). Additionally, although defense counsel was prohibited from questioning panel members about a specific method of corporal punishment which was likely to come up at trial, the trial court did not preclude questioning about the entire subject matter. Venire members were asked about any potential bias they may have had regarding corporal punishment of a child and defense counsel was permitted to inquire of specific members whether allegations of corporal punishment of a child would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. These inquiries were sufficiently specific to focus panel members on the facts that the victim in this case was a child whom the State alleged died as a result of physical injuries and allowed them to answer the questions with these facts in mind.” Easter v. State, 322 Ga.App. 183, 744 S.E.2d 374 (June 12, 2013). Rape, kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in trial court’s limitations on voir dire. Defendant “first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to ask prospective jurors if they ‘believe[d] that sometimes people are wrongfully accused of a crime.’ He further argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to ask whether the prospective jurors' ‘ability to be fair and impartial [would] be affected by testimony that involves explicit sexual language and acts.’ … ‘Since there is often a fine line between asking potential jurors how they would decide the case and questions that merely seek to expose bias or prejudice, the scope of the voir dire examination, of necessity, must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ (Citations omitted.) Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 880(4)(a), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011). See Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 742(2), 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997) (finding no error in prohibiting questions ‘which required the jurors to prejudge the case’) (citation omitted). Although we note that there is nothing inherently objectionable to the voir dire questions that defense counsel sought to ask, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow them because a review of the record in this case shows that the voir dire examination was ‘broad enough to allow the parties to ascertain the fairness and impartiality of the prospective jurors.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. State, 259 Ga. 412, 414(1), 383 S.E.2d 128 (1989).” Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed; trial court didn’t improperly limit voir dire. “Juror Cooper indicated that his experience as an armored car guard would not substantially impair his ability to serve as a juror in Brockman's case, and defense counsel asked ‘to what degree’ he thought that he might be impaired. After Juror Cooper indicated that he did not know how to answer that question, defense counsel insisted that he needed to ‘have an idea of [Juror Cooper's] best feeling about it, one way or the other.’ While the trial court sustained the State's objection to this line of questioning, the court allowed defense counsel to ask Juror Cooper whether he felt that his employment experience would in fact impair his ability to be impartial to any degree. … The trial court did not abuse its discretion by unduly restricting the scope of Juror Cooper's voir dire or by refusing to excuse him. See Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 709(4) (532 S.E.2d 677) (2000) (finding no error in the trial court's limiting repetitive questions ).” Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed, but death sentence reversed and remanded; 1. trial court “erred in precluding voir dire questioning of prospective jurors as to whether they would automatically impose the death penalty, as opposed to fairly considering all three sentencing options, in a case involving the murder of young children.” Defendant here was convicted of murdering his wife and two-year old twin sons with a hammer. Trial court precluded “ any inquiry into whether jurors might be biased in a case involving child victims,” although this was the primary focus of the prosecution’s case and some jurors volunteered that they would have difficulty after inferring that child victims were at issue. “[W]e hold that the ‘subject matter of the action’ as to which voir dire