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herring” and “blowing some smoke up” to get the jury “off the trail.” Arguments were within the wide latitude afforded counsel. Granger v. State, 320 Ga.App. 580, 740 S.E.2d 313 (March 20, 2013). Statutory rape and child molestation convictions affirmed; no improper argument where prosecutor pointed out in closing that defense counsel attacked victim’s credibility after promising not to. “[T]he prosecutor's closing argument regarding inconsistent positions being taken during the trial regarding T.G.'s credibility seems to have been fair.” Coghlan v. State, 319 Ga.App. 551, 737 S.E.2d 332 (January 16, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; State’s closing argument wasn’t improper when it referred to defense closing argument as “smoke and mirrors.” Accord, Brooks v. State , 324 Ga.App. 352, 750 S.E.2d 423 (October 25, 2013) (“smoke and mirrors” argument was “fair oratory.”). Morey v. State, 312 Ga.App. 678, 719 S.E.2d 504 (November 3, 2011). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; no mistrial required by prosecutor’s comment, during closing argument, on defendant’s request for jury charge on lesser-included offenses: “They are offering it as a compromise because they sometimes feel like, I guess, well, the jury goes back there, and if they can't get themselves over that hump, then maybe they will take this lesser one.” Trial court gave curative instruction that “[t]he jury should draw no inference with respect to any request for such offenses to be included by the Court in its charge. The jury will disregard any reference to such request made in the closing argument.” “Based on the prosecutor's statement, this instruction was sufficient to remove a possible implication that the defendants were admitting guilt to the lesser included offenses.” Murray v. State, 297 Ga.App. 571, 677 S.E.2d 745 (April 17, 2009). At defendant’s trial for aggravated sexual battery, prosecutor’s remark in closing argument, commenting on defendant’s demeanor during trial, was not improper: “The prosecutor pointed to Murray's demeanor during the trial and asked the jury to ‘reflect on your observations of him as he was sitting here smiling as the girls were being cross-examined.’” Citing “ Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 198(10) (515 S.E.2d 610) (1999) (prosecutor may argue that defendant ‘had a “smirk” on his face during the trial’); Greene [ v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 447(19)(d) (469 S.E.2d 129), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 145 (117 S.Ct. 578, 136 L.Ed.2d 507) (1996)] (‘prosecutor's comment on [defendant's] demeanor in the courtroom was not improper’).” Accord, Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). Boyle v. State, 241 Ga.App. 883, 528 S.E.2d 303 (January 19, 2000). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; no improper closing argument from prosecutor. In opening statement, defense counsel told jury, in detail, how defendant would describe his activities on the day of the crime; in his testimony, defendant added a detail not mentioned in counsel’s opening: that he witnessed the victim being assaulted by someone else. Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to point out this rather glaring omission in closing argument. “‘Counsel should have ample latitude to argue what has transpired in a case from its inception to its conclusion, and the conduct of the party or his counsel with respect to the case is the subject of legitimate comment, and the range of such comment is necessarily in the discretion of the trial judge; and unless it can be shown that such discretion has been abused and some positive injury done by the remarks of counsel, the discretion of the trial judge will not be controlled.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Findlay v. Griffin, 225 Ga.App. 475, 477(5), 484 S.E.2d 80 (1997).” 10. CONTENT – CONSEQUENCES OF VERDICT Whatley v. State, 296 Ga.App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (January 28, 2009). At defendant’s trial for riot in a penal institution and related offenses, trial court properly denied mistrial based on prosecutor’s argument “that the jury's verdict ‘will be known at the jail.’” Trial court’s immediate instruction that jurors “were ‘not responsible for the result of their verdict’ and that ‘[t]heir job is to determine [Whatley's] guilt or innocence....’” cured any possible prejudice. 11. CONTENT – DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING PHASE see also subheading CONTENT – FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS, below Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument in penalty phase was not improper. 1. Statement “that life without the possibility of parole is not even an option for you,” was not misleading, but “simply urged the jury to conclude that the other options available to them under the law were ‘unacceptable’ in light of the evidence .” 2. Argument that defendant showed no remorse was not improper comment on defendant’s silence, citing LeMay v. State, 265 Ga. 73, 75(4), 453 S.E.2d 737 (1995) (‘Reversal for improper comment by the prosecutor requires a finding either that 1) the prosecutor’s manifest intention was to comment on the accused’s failure to testify, or 2) the remark was of such a character that a jury would