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naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the accused’s failure to testify.’).” Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed; in sentencing phase, 1. “the prosecutor's argument that Ledford might present a future danger to others was based on specific evidence supporting that argument, including evidence that Ledford had sexually harassed a pregnant jail guard and had made sexual remarks to a 14-year-old girl over the telephone from the jail. Compare Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617, 619(1) (604 S.E.2d 826) (2004) (‘An argument that a death sentence is necessary to prevent future dangerous behavior by the defendant in prison must be based on evidence suggesting that the defendant will be dangerous in prison.’).” 2. The prosecutor's argument that Ledford had shown a lack of empathy by stating a desire to make money from his crimes was based on a recorded telephone call Ledford had made from the jail. This argument was not improper, because it was a based on a reasonable inference from the evidence. See Payne v. State, [273 Ga. 317, 318(4) (540 S.E.2d 191) (2001)].” 3. “ There is no merit to Ledford's contention that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue that, based on his actions, Ledford had shown that ‘he believes in the death penalty.’ See Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 592(18)(c) (458 S.E.2d 799) (1995).” 4. Lack of remorse. “Ledford contends that the following argument by the prosecutor was improper: ‘You haven't heard any evidence of his taking responsibility....’ The argument, in context, specifically referred to matters actually in evidence and made no reference to Ledford's decision not to testify. We conclude that the argument was not improper. See Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 886(8)(b) (452 S.E.2d 745) (1995) (‘We do not read the prosecutor's remark concerning Hammond's lack of remorse as a comment on Hammond's failure to testify during the sentencing phase.’).” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed, but sentence reversed based on improper victim impact testimony. Dicta: “we remind the State that, while “it is not improper to argue that the defendant himself – and not the police, the prosecutor, or the jury – is responsible for his punishment” ( Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 731(23) (352 S.E.2d 762) (1987) (citation omitted)), any argument urging the jury not to view itself as finally determining the appropriateness of the defendant's punishment is improper. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231) (1985).” Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, “[i]t was not improper for the prosecutor to state during closing argument in the sentencing phase that Stinski caused two dogs to be burned alive in the victims' home. ‘It is well-settled that in a sentencing trial the State may present evidence of a defendant's bad character, including previous convictions and non-adjudicated offenses.’ Lewis [ v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 758-759(2) (620 S.E.2d 778) (2005)]. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by modifying an order it had previously entered so as to allow the argument.” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; 1. prosecutor’s sentencing phase closing argument was not objectionable for including a cartoon which “depicted a jury returning a verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity, ethnic rage, sexual abuse, you name it.’ The prosecutor argued, with regard to the cartoon, that Pace was going to use his upbringing to claim that ‘it's everybody else's fault that he turned into a serial killer but his own.’ The prosecutor told the jury ‘not to go for that.’” “The permissible range of closing argument is wide and counsel's ‘“illustrations may be as various as are the resources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learning can make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit, or wing to his imagination.”’ Conner [ v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 122(6), 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983)], quoting Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 631 (1852). What counsel may not do is inject extrinsic, prejudicial matters that have no basis in the evidence, but Pace did present evidence about his childhood and community. See Conner, supra. We also will not assume that the prosecutor intended his remarks to have their most damaging (and erroneous) meaning. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). After reviewing the use of the cartoon in context, we conclude that the prosecutor did not exceed the permissible range of argument by using it to briefly urge the jury to hold Pace solely responsible for his crimes, and to not be swayed by excuses for his behavior. See Conner, supra.” 2. “The State's argument that Pace should not be spared so he could get free room and board and a television in prison is not improper. See Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281(7), 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988).” 3. Prosecutor’s sentencing phase closing argument was not objectionable comment on defendant’s right to remain silent where he noted that none of defendant’s mitigation witnesses had ever heard defendant repent or say he was sorry. 4. “ It is not improper for the State to argue that the defendant deserves the harshest penalty, see Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547(8)(b), 480 S.E.2d 583 (1997).”