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‘properly admonished’ for asking a question about ‘a particular species of malice murder, namely malice murder where significant premeditation has occurred’); Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829(7) (524 S.E.2d 490) (1999) (holding that ‘[a] prospective juror is not subject to excusal for cause for merely leaning for or against a death sentence’).” Fisher v. State, 317 Ga.App. 761, 732 S.E.2d 821 (October 3, 2012). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper limit to voir dire where trial court asked co-defendants’ counsel “not to ask the same questions that had already been asked and answered.” “The court did not limit the number of questions counsel could ask nor did it curtail further inquiry.” Angulo v. State, 314 Ga.App. 669, 725 S.E.2d 802 (March 9, 2012). Convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, trial court had no obligation to record voir dire in non-death penalty case. “‘[R]eporting of voir dire is not required in felony cases except those in which the death penalty is sought.’ McConnell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 686, 690(5) (589 S.E.2d 271) (2003). Although objections made during voir dire and the rulings thereon should be recorded, see State v. Graham, 246 Ga. 341, 343 (271 S.E.2d 627) (1980), a defendant still must show error in order for a conviction to be reversed upon the failure of a trial court to record voir dire. See Primas v. State, 231 Ga.App. 861, 862–863(2) (501 S.E.2d 28) (1998). … Here, the only harm alleged by Angulo was that he was forced to use his peremptory strikes to remove some jurors because the trial court denied his motion to remove them for cause, but he does not contend that he would have removed other jurors instead. See Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 524, 525(1) (642 S.E.2d 170) (2007); McConnell, 263 Ga.App. at 690(5); Primas, 231 Ga.App. at 862 n. 3 (collecting cases). In fact, a prosecutor's affidavit filed in the trial court in response to Angulo's motion for new trial states that Angulo did not use all of his peremptory strikes during voir dire.” Collins v. State, 310 Ga.App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (July 7, 2011). Convictions for child molestation and aggravated child molestation affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing prosecutor to ask questions on voir dire relating to memory and recall. “‘Since there is often a fine line between asking potential jurors how they would decide the case and questions that merely seek to expose bias or prejudice, the scope of the voir dire examination, of necessity, must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. And this Court does not interfere with such discretion absent manifest abuse.’ [ Stewart v. State, 262 Ga.App. 426, 427(1) (585 S.E.2d 622) (2003)]. … ). The challenged voir dire questions, as set forth above, were properly posed by the State ‘to determine whether [the] prospective jurors had preconceived notions regarding the subject matter of the case[.]’ Davis v. State, 264 Ga.App. 128, 133(3) (589 S.E.2d 700) (2003). The questions did not ask the jurors to prejudge the evidence or the factual issues in the case. Bell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 289, 715 S.E.2d 684 (July 5, 2011). Rape conviction reversed; when prejudicial matter was elicited in voir dire, defendant was “deprived … of his right to begin his trial with a jury free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.” Juror asked if defendant was the same James Bell who had sexually assaulted juror’s grandmother; prosecutor indicated familiarity with her name, but said “I can't go into the past. … We can't talk about what happened in the past, just talking about today.” “Here, although the prospective juror at issue said he was not sure if the defendant was the same James Bell accused of raping of his grandmother, rather than leave the questioned unanswered, and move on to another juror, the State elicited more information from the juror. Specifically, the State asked if the juror's grandmother was ‘[name omitted]’ thereby providing the other prospective jurors with the name of another alleged rape victim in a crime for which Bell was not on trial. Moreover, the trial court did not undertake any measures to ascertain what, if any, impact the remark had on the panel's ability to decide the case. The State elected not to use evidence of that alleged rape as a similar transaction, and thus it is not a circumstance in which the jury would have heard the incriminating evidence during the trial.” Keating v. State, 309 Ga.App. 804, 711 S.E.2d 327 (May 17, 2011). Conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery affirmed; any error in curtailing voir dire on racial bias was harmless. “The question raised is whether the trial court erred by taking over and asking only the single question, thereby preventing defense counsel from posing questions, included those submitted in writing. … Given that the jurors were at least asked one question about racial prejudice and bias, that the jury was one-quarter African American, that the jury appears to have carefully considered the case count-by-count and defendant-by-defendant, and that the evidence strongly shows that Keating was a full participant in the conspiracy to rob the China Wok, we conclude that the State has carried its burden of showing that it is highly probable that any failure to allow the defendants to ask additional questions regarding possible racial prejudice or bias did not contribute to the judgment against Keating.” Sole question propounded by trial court: “Do any of you jurors have any bias or prejudice, based on the age, race, religion, national origin of the accused?”