☢ test - Í

Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed. 1. “A defendant's right to inquire into the ability of prospective jurors to consider mitigating evidence is not improperly limited by this Court's direction that prospective jurors should not be asked to prejudge a given case based on hypothetical evidence. See Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 646(9) (555 S.E.2d 440) (2001); King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 267(18)(e) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000). The right to have jurors consider mitigating evidence is also not improperly limited by the expansive definition of mitigating evidence given to juries in Georgia. See Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 384(15) (552 S.E.2d 855) (2001); Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4 th ed.), § 2.15.30.” 2. “ The trial court did not err by refusing to allow Ledford to question Juror Bailey regarding what weight she might give in her sentencing deliberations to several specific hypothetical factors. See Lucas v. State, supra at 646(9); King v. State, supra at 267(18)(e). The trial court also did not err by refusing to allow Ledford to ask Juror Bailey the largely irrelevant question of whether she would want a juror like herself to serve as a juror but, instead, itself asking the juror the more relevant question of whether she believed she could be fair and could consider all three sentencing options.” 3. “After the State objected to a vague, hypothetical question to Juror Hurtado about whether ‘someone [who] has done something wrong’ is entitled to mercy, the trial court asked a related, proper question about whether the juror would consider all of the mitigating evidence. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.” 4. “Juror Berg stated that she opposed the death penalty because it foreclosed the possibility that a defendant could change in the future. The trial court disallowed a question by Ledford to Juror Berg regarding whether her views on the death penalty might change if she could be assured that there would be a sufficient gap in time between sentencing and the execution of any death sentence. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of voir dire by disallowing this question, which would have been meaningful only if combined with improper speculation about the length of any appeal process .” Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). 1. “We have held under Georgia statutory law that a death penalty defendant may voir dire prospective jurors on their willingness to impose a sentence of life with the possibility of parole but that ‘[e]xposure to the complexities of the future role of the Board of Pardons and Paroles ... is not an appropriate matter for voir dire.’ Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735, 736(1) (534 S.E.2d 802) (2000). We disagree with Stinski's argument that constitutional law requires any modification of this holding.” 2. At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court properly declined mid-trial voir dire who “stood and looked at [defendant] while the juror was being polled on his vote for a verdict of guilt.” “Although Stinski was entitled to jurors who would consider in the sentencing phase all of the evidence from both phases of the trial, he was not entitled to jurors who would be unmoved by the evidence that had been proven in the guilt/innocence phase. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny Stinski's request to conduct further voir dire in the middle of the trial. See Reynolds v. State, 271 Ga. 174, 175(2) (517 S.E.2d 51) (1999) (noting the interplay between the statutes governing pretrial voir dire and the authority of trial courts to replace jurors with alternates); Washington v. State, 253 Ga. 173, 173-174(2) (318 S.E.2d 55) (1984) (whether to conduct mid-trial voir dire in response to newly-obtained information about a juror is a matter within the discretion of the trial court).” Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 678 S.E.2d 471 (November 23, 2009). At defendant’s murder trial, “the trial court did not err in permitting the State to run a criminal background check on a prospective juror who gave his permission for the check because he was unsure whether he remained a convicted felon based on a plea of guilty to kidnapping 22 years earlier or whether his record was ‘washed away’ or ‘expunged.’ Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805, 808 (426 S.E.2d 553) (1993) (no prohibition on prosecution running criminal background checks on prospective jurors).” Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga. 653, 670 S.E.2d 411 (November 17, 2008). Trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from asking questions on voir dire that “dealt with the ‘burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence which are properly the subjects of instruction by the court at the end of the trial.’ Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 509-510 (578 S.E.2d 444) (2003); Ledbetter v. State, 262 Ga. 370, 372 (418 S.E.2d 57) (1992); Chastain v. State, 255 Ga. 723, 724 (342 S.E.2d 678) (1986).” Winfrey v. State, 286 Ga.App. 718, 650 S.E.2d 262 (June 20, 2007). Trial court did not err in limiting defendant’s voir dire as to whether potential jurors “believed that a person’s body language speaks louder than words and whether they had heard of the phrase, ‘[Hell] hath no fury like a woman scorn[ed].’ We discern no error. ‘The single purpose for voir dire is the ascertainment of the impartiality of jurors, their ability to treat the cause on the merits with objectivity and freedom from bias and prior inclination. [Winfrey’s] proposed questions, however, sought not to ferret out bias or impartiality, but to find jurors amenable to the defense his lawyer would attempt to argue .’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Meeks v. State, 216 Ga.App. 630, 632(3) (455 S.E.2d 350) (1995). The trial court did not abuse its