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discretion in disallowing the proffered questions. See also Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 400(1) (306 S.E.2d 645) (1983) (‘Questions seeking to test the prospective jurors’ willingness to accept defenses have been disallowed and upheld on appeal.’)” Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 646 S.E.2d 55 (June 4, 2007). 1. No error where the trial court prevented defendant “from asking several potential jurors about any racial bias they might harbor. … The record shows that the trial court, itself, asked the jurors whether they had any ‘racial bias against the defendant or anything of that nature,’ and Simmons was allowed to ask the jurors whether they harbored conscious or unconscious racism. There was no error.” 2. “Simmons contends that the trial court erred by preventing him from asking a potential juror what effect his decision not to testify would have on that potential juror. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the use of such a question during voir dire. Anderson v. State, 161 Ga.App. 816(1) (289 S.E.2d 22) (1982). See also McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 636 (187 S.E.2d 271) (1972).” Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 521, 640 S.E.2d 274 (January 22, 2007). 1. Trial court did not abuse its discretion “by ruling it improper for [defendant] to ask the jury pool whether they would ‘give [defendant’s] testimony less weight. ’ See Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713(3) (285 S.E.2d 687) (1982) (proper to disallow question that invades province of jury to determine individual credibility in context of entire case); Ganas v. State, 245 Ga.App. 645(2) (537 S.E.2d 758) (2000) (proper to disallow question regarding credibility of witnesses who are parties).” 2. “We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion over the scope of voir dire when it declined to allow [defendant] to question a proposed juror regarding the irrelevant issue whether the juror had children of the same ages as [defendant] and the victim.” Buttram v. State, 280 Ga. 595, 631 S.E.2d 642 (June 12, 2006). In death penalty trial, “[a]s a general rule, a criminal defendant and the State are entitled to examine potential jurors on their inclinations and biases regarding parole, but the examination should be limited to the potential juror’s willingness to consider a life sentence with, or a life sentence without, the possibility of parole. Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735(1) (534 S.E.2d 802) (2000).” Trial court thus did not err in “limiting questions on whether a prospective juror believed that life without parole was an ‘adequate’ punishment for murder.” Alexander v. State, 276 Ga.App. 288, 623 S.E.2d 160 (November 8, 2005). “Contrary to Alexander’s contention, the trial court correctly refused to allow Alexander to question prospective jurors if anyone had reached a conclusion as to his guilt. Such questions are improper,” citing Cherry v. State , 230 Ga.App. 443, 496 S.E.2d 764 (1998). Withrow v. State, 275 Ga.App. 110, 619 S.E.2d 714 (August 3, 2005). “Generally, defense counsel has ‘the right to inquire of the individual juror examined touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the case, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail ... [or] any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action[.]’ OCGA § 15-12-133. However, no question should require a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case. Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 423(3), 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986). As Withrow acknowledges, there is not always a clear distinction between questions that ask prospective jurors how they would decide a case ‘if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether they can start the case without bias or prior inclination.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 647(2), 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003). Consequently, the control of the examination of prospective jurors is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be interfered with absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.” Here, similar question was asked by district attorney, so harmless error, if any. Hubbard v. State, 274 Ga.App. 184, 617 S.E.2d 167 (July 6, 2005). “‘Since there is often a fine line between asking potential jurors how they would decide the case and questions that merely seek to expose bias or prejudice, the scope of the voir dire examination, of necessity, must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ (Footnote omitted.) Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 510(3) (578 S.E.2d 444) (2003). We do not interfere with such discretion in the absence of manifest abuse. Williams v. State, 259 Ga.App. 742, 744(2) (578 S.E.2d 128) (2003). Here, defense counsel’s questions were designed to explore the legal import of presence at the scene of a crime or association with a co-defendant – one of the subjects on which the trial court later instructed the jury. Such subjects are not appropriate topics for voir dire examination, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ended this particular line of questioning. See Stewart v. State, 262 Ga.App. 426, 427-428(1) (585 S.E.2d 622) (2003).” Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 613 S.E.2d 628 (May 23, 2005). “A motion for mistrial is not the ‘proper procedural tool’ when an allegedly prejudicial comment is made during voir dire of prospective jurors. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684,