☢ test - Í

687(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000). Moreover, even assuming that Cotton had made a proper request to impanel new jurors, he still would not be entitled to that relief unless the remark was inherently prejudicial and deprived him of his right to a trial by an impartial jury. Sharpe v. State, supra at 688(5). Here, the record shows that the trial court specifically cautioned the other prospective jurors that [prospective juror’s] comment did not expressly identify Cotton as a disciplinary problem, but only cited that as the reason why he knew him. The trial court also asked whether anyone on the panel who overheard the remark would be prejudiced by it, and none indicated that it would.” Dunbar v. State, 271 Ga.App. 753, 610 S.E.2d 702 (February 23, 2005). “During jury selection, jurors were asked if they knew ‘Dunbar or any of his family.’ No juror responded affirmatively to the question, and [juror] ultimately was selected as a member of the jury. However, at the hearing on his motion for new trial, Dunbar noted that [juror] had previously served on a grand jury that had indicted him for an unrelated armed robbery. According to Dunbar, [juror]’s failure to reveal her previous grand jury service requires that he be granted a new trial. We disagree. ‘“In order for a defendant to secure a new trial because a juror did not give a correct response to a question posed on voir dire[,] ... the defendant must show that the juror failed to answer the question truthfully and that a correct response would have been a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”’ [Cit.] ‘A juror’s truthfulness is evaluated with due regard for the juror’s understanding of the questions and for the juror’s understanding of his or her own responses.’ [Cit.] Here, [juror] was not asked whether she had previously served on a grand jury involving Dunbar; she was asked if she knew him. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Washington recognized Dunbar’s name from her prior grand jury service, we cannot say that she was not being truthful in her response.” Robinson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 584, 610 S.E.2d 194 (February 10, 2005). Prosecutor’s voir dire question was not unduly prejudicial: “Do you feel the State should not prosecute one criminal for shooting another criminal?” “Referring to Robinson as a ‘criminal’ could be interpreted as referring only to the fact that he was, in fact, then on trial for a criminal offense.” Meeks v. State, 269 Ga.App. 836, 605 S.E.2d 428 (October 4, 2004). “Meeks’ counsel was entitled to ask prospective jurors whether they had such strong feelings about child molestation that it would impair their judgment or make it difficult for them to judge the case, and that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting counsel from doing so. As in Craig [v. State , 165 Ga. App. 156, 299 S.E.2d 745 (1983)], this question concerned a ‘fact or circumstance [which would indicate] any inclination, leaning or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the suit.’ OCGA § 15-12-133. Harmless error, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Patel v. State, 278 Ga. 403, 603 S.E.2d 237 (September 27, 2004). “The trial court did not err by asking potential jurors: ‘Is your mind perfectly impartial between the State and the accused?’ OCGA § 15-12-164(a)(3); Davis v. State, 237 Ga.App. 508(1) (515 S.E.2d 646) (1999).” Accord, Rogers v. State , 298 Ga.App. 895, 681S.E.2d 693 (July 10, 2009) (“According to Rogers, the entire jury panel should have been struck when they failed to answer that they were biased in favor of the defendant based upon the presumption of innocence. We find no merit in this contention.”). Hill v. State, 268 Ga.App. 642, 602 S.E.2d 348 (July 21, 2004). After voir dire commenced, defense counsel alerted trial court to fact that jurors had not been sworn. Court then gave them voir dire, but did not go back and ask the qualifying questions. Held, defendant waived this error by failing to object to this procedure. Lawrence v. State, 267 Ga.App. 515, 600 S.E.2d 444 (May 20, 2004). Trial court did not err in “conducting voir dire of individual jurors on its own, instead of allowing defense counsel to pose questions to each juror.... The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain the impartiality of jurors. [Cit.] The control of the pursuit of such a determination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and only in the event of manifest abuse will it be upset upon review. [Cit.] While a defendant has a right to an individual examination of each juror, the trial court has discretion as to whether a party or the court itself shall propound the questions. [Cit.]” Counsel did not object at the time and “‘didn’t indicate any questions that [the court] could have covered that [it] did not.’” Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 593 S.E.2d 335 (March 1, 2004). “[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting questions regarding legal terms and questions appearing to seek a prejudgment of the case. [Cit.] … Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting inquiries into juror[s’] knowledge of legal terms and procedures when other forms of questioning clearly showed the jurors to be qualified.” Further, “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing questions to jurors … that were unrelated to possible juror bias and that attempted to elicit speculative responses from the jurors about how they might conduct themselves in jury deliberations. [Cit.]”