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Taylor v. State, 264 Ga.App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (December 1, 2003). Defendant moved for new trial based on juror’s failure to reveal during voir dire “that she had been arrested ten other times for misdemeanor offenses and been sentenced to various terms of probation. When asked why she did not tell the court about the other offenses, the juror responded: ‘I did not know that I had to advise her – you know, let them know of all of the charges because I just only assumed it was for the felony.’” Trial court apparently found that juror’s response was truthful, but mistaken. Held, where a juror gives an answer that is “mistaken, though honest,” no new trial is required unless “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause,” quoting Isaacs v. State , 259 Ga. 717, 741, 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989). A correct response by this juror would have, at most, been grounds for a peremptory strike; trial court thus properly denied the motion for new trial. Taylor v. State, 264 Ga.App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (December 1, 2003). Failure to give jurors the proper oath prior to voir dire pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-132 is not reversible error where defendant fails to object. “‘[A] defendant may forfeit his right to a voir dire conducted under oath by failing to timely assert that right.’” Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (November 26, 2003). After allowing several questions about jurors’ attitudes, experiences and relationships with Hispanics, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the issue of bias had been sufficiently explored, and that further questions would be redundant.” Accord, Alexander v. State , 276 Ga.App. 288, 623 S.E.2d 160 (November 8, 2005). Davis v. State, 263 Ga.App. 230, 587 S.E.2d 398 (September 16, 2003). “‘It is not error to refuse to allow defense counsel to ask whether a prospective juror would tend to believe or prefer the testimony of a police officer over other testimony. ’” Accord, Simmons v. State , 282 Ga. 183, 646 S.E.2d 55 (June 4, 2007); Foster v. State , 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (November 1, 2010). Whitner v. State, 276 Ga. 742, 584 S.E.2d 247 (July 10 2003). “After extensive colloquy, the court ruled that Whitner would be permitted to ask whether the jurors could consider an insanity defense and the possible verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, if so instructed by the court;” but defense counsel was not allowed to ask “whether the juror believed the insanity defense to be a ‘cop-out,’ whether it is abused and should be abolished, and whether the juror would reject such a defense based on their personal beliefs.” Supreme Court “admonished trial courts to be cautious in allowing counsel to pose questions which ask jurors to assume that certain facts will be proven.” Thrasher v. State, 261 Ga.App. 650, 583 S.E.2d 504 (June 13, 2003). Trial court did not err in limiting defendant’s voir dire on questions of integration, affirmative action, interracial dating, etc., where defendant was allowed “to ask a number of similar questions exploring the issue of racial bias.” “‘The scope of voir dire is largely left to the trial court’s discretion, and the voir dire in this case was broad enough to ascertain the fairness and impartiality of the prospective jurors.’” Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 581 S.E.2d 522 (June 2, 2003). Trial court properly did not allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors “whether a prior conviction of the defendant that would be presented as a similar transaction would affect their deliberations,” as “it involved an impermissible prejudgment of the case.” However, trial court erred in disallowing the question, “whether the extended period of time between the alleged murder and the trial would affect their deliberations,” because it merely sought to determine whether the delay “would in any manner bias or prejudice the prospective juror’s consideration of the case.” “There is not always a clear distinction between questions which ask prospective jurors how they would decide issues of a case if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether they can start the case without bias or prior inclination.” Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga.App. 198, 582 S.E.2d 173 (May 9, 2003). “[A]lthough a defendant has a right to individualized responses from each member of the panel, he is not entitled to question each juror individually.” Thus, no error where trial judge dismissed jurors who said they were related to defendant, without giving defendant opportunity to question them. Martinez v. State, 259 Ga.App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82 (January 31, 2003). No error in refusing to allow counsel “to question a potential juror about his opinion on the country's ‘ongoing war against drugs.’” “The trial court still ‘retains the discretion to limit the examination [of prospective jurors] to questions dealing directly with the specific case and to prohibit general questions ’” (emphasis in original).