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Geiger v. State, 258 Ga.App. 57, 573 S.E.2d 85 (September 19, 2002). Trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for sequestered voir dire of each juror. “Although a defendant has a right to individualized responses from each member of the panel, he is not entitled to question each juror individually. The granting of sequestered voir dire is within the discretion of the trial court, and a showing of prejudice from denial is necessary to show an abuse of discretion.” Callahan v. State, 256 Ga.App. 482, 568 S.E.2d 780 (July 11, 2002). “The trial court refused to allow the question: ‘Do [you] believe children ever fabricate allegations of molestation or sexual abuse?’ Callahan alleges that the question was permissible and designed to reveal the jurors' biases and inclinations, as permitted by OCGA §§ 15-12-133 and 15-12- 164. We do not agree. This court has held that questions that seek to test whether jurors are willing to accept specific defenses may be disallowed. Meeks v. State , 216 Ga.App. 630, 632-633(4) (455 S.E.2d 350) (1995). Here, as in Meeks , Callahan's proposed question ‘sought not to ferret out bias or impartiality, but to find jurors amenable to the defense his lawyer would attempt to argue.’” Foster v. State, 254 Ga.App. 255, 562 S.E.2d 191 (February 19, 2002). Held, trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant, accused of child molestation, to question prospective jurors about their prior jury service. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). 1. “The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying King’s motion seeking to have a questionnaire sent to prospective jurors in advance of their in-court voir dire. Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 904, 907(9)(b), 440 S.E.2d 161 (1994).” 2. “The trial court did not err by sustaining the State’s objections to King’s apparent effort to have jurors … enumerate the mitigating circumstances they would give weight to. Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 554(6)(a), 480 S.E.2d 583 (1997) (‘[I]t is improper to require [a] juror to enumerate hypothetical circumstances in which she [or he] might or might not vote to impose the death penalty.’ ).” Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (July 5, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed; 1. defense counsel “was properly admonished” for asking juror “juror to enumerate hypothetical circumstances in which she might or might not vote to impose the death penalty,” citing Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 554(6)(a), 480 S.E.2d 583 (1997). 2. “The trial court did not err in restricting counsel's questions concerning the perceived credibility of law enforcement officers as compared with ordinary citizens. Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 400(1), 306 S.E.2d 645 (1983).” Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 528 S.E.2d 250 (March 27, 2000). OCGA § 15-12-133, the statute providing for the individual examination of prospective jurors, has as its substance the right to an individual response, not to an individual question. The statute does not mandate sequestered voir dire, but leaves such to the discretion of the court. Accord, Kerdpoka v. State , 314 Ga.App. 400, 724 S.E.2d 419 (February 28, 2012). Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit Pace to question prospective jurors about bumper stickers they had on their cars. Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206(3), 327 S.E.2d 168 (1985).” Allen v. State, 239 Ga.App. 899, 522 S.E.2d 502 (September 10, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, trial court was not required to allow defendant “to use a written questionnaire to discern whether any potential jurors (or their family members or close friends) had been sexually molested as a child.” Contrary to defendant’s assertion, nothing in either OCGA § 15-12-133 or Cowan v. State, 156 Ga.App. 650, 651, 275 S.E.2d 665 (1980) allows the defendant to demand written voir dire. “These authorities simply establish a defendant's right to question jurors individually, but control of that examination ‘is normally within the discretion of the court. Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700, 706(5), 198 S.E.2d 865 (1973).’ Id.” Brumelow v. State, 239 Ga.App. 119, 520 S.E.2d 776 (July 14, 1999). No abuse of discretion where trial court directed defendant to conduct voir dire before co-defendant, despite the co-defendants’ agreement to the contrary. “ The sole purpose of voir dire is to determine the impartiality of jurors; the control of that determination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, which will be upset only in the event of manifest abuse. Green v. State, 266 Ga. 237, 240(4), 466 S.E.2d 577 (1996); Baker v. State, 230 Ga.App. 813, 815(1)(b), 498 S.E.2d 290 (1998). The order in which Brumelow and Baxter questioned jurors was a matter fully within the court's control , and the court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by having Brumelow's questioning precede that of Baxter.”