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Walker v. State, 271 Ga. 328, 519 S.E.2d 670 (July 9, 1999). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “Although a defendant has a right to individualized responses from each member of the panel, he is not entitled to question each juror individually. State v. Hutter, 251 Ga. 615, 307 S.E.2d 910 (1983) (holding that OCGA § 15-12-133 gives a right to individual responses, not individual questions). Thus, a trial court can, as in this case, require a defendant to address general questions to the entire panel rather than allowing him to question each juror seriatim. Id.; Shadix v. State, 179 Ga.App. 644, 645, 347 S.E.2d 298 (1986) (trial court did not err in refusing to permit individual questions and in limiting the scope of the questions). This practice complies with Rule 10.1 of the Uniform Rules of the Superior Court.” Accord, Eason v. State , 331 Ga.App. 59, 769 S.E.2d 772 (March 10, 2015). Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 513 S.E.2d 235 (February 26, 1999). “ The trial court did not err in limiting defendant’s voir dire. ‘Voir dire should allow both parties an opportunity to ascertain the ability of the prospective jurors to decide the case on its merits, with objectivity and freedom from bias and prior inclination. Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700, 198 S.E.2d 865 (1973). However, no question should require a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case. Jones v. Parrott, 111 Ga.App. 750(2), 143 S.E.2d 393 (1965). Since the distinction between questions which ask jurors how they would decide issues of a case if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether jurors can start the case without bias or prior inclination is not always crystal clear, the “control of the voir dire examination is vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial judge and will not be interfered with by this court unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion.” Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 12, 243 S.E.2d 59 (1978).’ Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 363(3), 283 S.E.2d 238. See also OCGA § 15-12-133; Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 37, 165 S.E.2d 708; Stell v. State, 210 Ga.App. 662(1), 436 S.E.2d 806. In the case sub judice, defendant was not permitted to ask ‘[i]s there anyone who believes that just because he’s charged with two different offenses he must, therefore, be guilty’ or ‘is there anyone who believes because he was involved in [trouble three years ago as shown by similar transaction evidence] that he must be guilty?’ We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow these questions which ask the jurors to prejudge the case.” Leon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 99, 513 S.E.2d 227 (February 24, 1999). Approves jury selection method where “panels of 12 jurors each are brought into the courtroom and juries are selected for the first case on the trial calendar of that week. Jurors who are not chosen for the first case are included in subsequent panels. Therefore, in Leon’s case, 11 of the 12 jurors on the panel challenged in this appeal had been questioned earlier in the day by the State and Leon’s trial counsel in other cases. ” Trial counsel here was not required to re-ask jurors the same questions he had already asked them in voir dire in other cases earlier that morning. X. JURISDICTION A. APPEAL, PENDENCY OF Fontaine v. State, 334 Ga.App. 219, 779 S.E.2d 664 (September 25, 2015). Drug convictions affirmed, but sentences vacated and remanded for merger. Trial court’s effort to correct sentence during pendency of appeal was “a nullity.” “A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence after the filing of a notice of appeal, and any such modification is a nullity. Brock v. State, 166 Ga.App. 649(1), 305 S.E.2d 180 (1983); see also Scroggins v. State, 288 Ga. 346, 347, 703 S.E.2d 622 (2010) (filing of notice of appeal deprives trial court ‘of the power to affect the judgment appealed, so that subsequent proceedings purporting to supplement, amend, alter or modify the judgment ... are without effect’) (citation and punctuation omitted).” State v. Brown, 333 Ga.App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (July 30, 2015). In prosecution for cocaine trafficking and related offenses, directed verdict of acquittal reversed; trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial where State had filed appeal from grant of motion to suppress. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(5)(B) only requires prosecutor’s certification to be filed with the “trial court,” not the trial judge; filing with the clerk of court was sufficient. “When the General Assembly has intended that certain communications be made personally to a judge—as compared to matters that are to be submitted to a trial court as a governmental entity and made part of the official court records by filing in the office of the clerk of court—it has so provided,” citing OCGA §§ 17–7–170 (speedy trial demands to be served on judge) and other examples. Harvey v. State, 296 Ga. 823, 770 S.E.2d 840 (March 27, 2015). In murder prosecution, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on double jeopardy; no abuse of discretion in granting mistrial where defense counsel put prejudicial matter before the jury in opening statement. Trial court then denied defendant’s plea in bar and retried case, finding that “her double jeopardy plea was frivolous and therefore allowing her retrial to proceed despite her notice of appeal from the