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not under consideration. Therefore, we hold that the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction to grant Porter's motion.” Scroggins v. State, 288 Ga. 346, 703 S.E.2d 622 (November 8, 2010). After revocation of his probation, defendant improperly filed with the trial court a notice of direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. “No action was taken on this notice of appeal by the trial court clerk, and no direct appeal was ever docketed in the Court of Appeals based upon the September 2, 2008 notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was never addressed by either the Court of Appeals or the trial court.” Almost a year later, defendant “moved in the trial court for an out-of-time discretionary appeal, and the trial court granted that motion.” The Court of Appeals dismissed defendant’s subsequent application for discretionary appeal as untimely. Held, Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the application; “[b]ecause of the pending first appeal, the application for discretionary appeal, and the order authorizing it, were nullities. Elrod v. State, 222 Ga.App. 704(1) (475 S.E.2d 710) (1996).” Filing of notice of direct appeal, even though improper, “acted as supersedeas and deprived the trial court ‘of the power to affect the judgment appealed,’” by, among other things, granting defendant’s application for direct appeal. “However, the State's motion to dismiss cannot be granted. ‘When a trial court enters a judgment where it does not have jurisdiction, such judgment is a mere nullity; but an appeal from such an illegal judgment will not be dismissed but instead, the void judgment will be reversed. [Cits.]’ Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 758(1) (208 S.E.2d 846) (1974). See also Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 738 (524 S.E.2d 452) (1999).” In other words, Court of Appeals, instead of dismissing the application for discretionary appeal, should have reversed the trial court’s order authorizing the application. Moon v. State, 287 Ga. 304, 696 S.E.2d 55 (June 7, 2010). In defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court erred by reconsidering its order for change of venue beyond the term in which the original order was entered. 1. “In civil cases, ‘“an interlocutory ruling does not pass from the control of the court at the end of the term if the cause remains pending.” [Cits.]’ Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, 258 Ga.App. 51, 56(3) (572 S.E.2d 664) (2002). This principle is required by the Civil Practice Act (CPA). OCGA § 9-11-6(c). In criminal cases, however, the pre-CPA rule continues to apply, and a trial court's inherent power to revoke interlocutory rulings still ceases with the end of the term. Pledger v. State, 193 Ga.App. 588, 589(2)(a) (388 S.E.2d 425) (1989). Compare Rooney v. State, 217 Ga.App. 850, 852 (459 S.E.2d 601) (1995) (involving reconsideration of a bond order and distinguishing Pledger ).” 2. “ Contrary to the trial court's order, any supersedeas during the State's appeal from the suppression order did not affect the time for filing a motion for reconsideration.” While State’s appeal acts as supersedeas generally under OCGA § 5-6-45 “in all cases where a sentence of death has been imposed or where the defendant is admitted to bail,” this isn’t one of those cases, and in any event, “‘[f]iling a notice of appeal may deprive a court of its power to execute the sentence but it does not supersede every other activity of a trial court.’ Strickland v. State, 258 Ga. 764, 766(1) (373 S.E.2d 736) (1988).” Nahmias concurs specially to argue for legislative modification of the common-law rule, consistent with the modern practice in use in the federal courts and in civil cases in state courts: giving the court power to reconsider interlocutory rulings at any time. “To avoid fruitless repetition of claims, the trial court must have broad discretion to deny review of its own prior decision. But to hold that the trial court has no authority to do so in a later term is to set in stone some initial rulings that, by the time the case is final and ripe for appeal, are erroneous – perhaps even obviously erroneous. That is contrary both to the interests of justice and judicial economy.” Nahmias also points out “a well-recognized and important exception to that rule, which allows after-term reconsideration, at least of constitutional issues, where the ‘evidentiary posture’ of the issue has changed. This exception is essential to avoid the most obviously unjust, and potentially unconstitutional, results of the general rule, in situations where an interlocutory ruling becomes clearly wrong due to a change in the evidentiary record while the case is in the trial court.” Notes that no new evidence was introduced in this case to obtain the trial court’s reconsideration of the change of venue. Accord, Porter (February 28, 2011), above. Ruffin v. State, 289 Ga. 87, 656 S.E.2d 140 (January 8, 2008). “After two hearings were held on [defendant’s] motion for new trial, the motion was denied and [defendant] timely filed a notice of appeal from that ruling on June 17, 2005. Because the transcription of one of the two hearings was lost, the trial court chose to conduct a hearing to reconstruct the evidence presented. See OCGA § 5-6-41. However, the trial court allowed [defendant] to orally amend his motion for new trial at the hearing in order to raise additional claims of error and subsequently issued another order, filed October 27, 2006, denying [defendant]’s motion for new trial, from which [defendant] timely filed yet another notice of appeal.” Held, trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider matters raised at the hearing after notice of appeal had already been filed. “ While OCGA § 5-6-41(f) allows trial courts to retain some control over the record on appeal in certain instances, its purpose ‘is solely for the purpose of making the record speak the truth, not for adding evidence to the record or supplying fatal deficiencies after the fact. [Cit.]’ Wigley v. State, 194 Ga.App. 7, 9(7), 389 S.E.2d 769 (1989).” State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 655 S.E.2d 575 (January 8, 2008). Trial court had no jurisdiction to enter order on