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motion for reconsideration where the order was not filed until after the notice of appeal was filed. “Here, the order denying the motion for reconsideration was signed by the trial court on the same day that the State filed the notice of appeal, but it was not filed with the clerk until the following day. Even though an order may be signed, it is not considered to have been entered and, thus, does not become effective until it is filed with the clerk. Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461 (591 S.E.2d 774) (2003). Therefore, at the time the order denying the motion for reconsideration would otherwise have become effective, the trial court had already been divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the State’s previously filed notice of appeal. See Heard v. State, 280 Ga. 348, 349(2) (627 S.E.2d 12) (2006). Because the notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction and thereby established the permissible parameters of the case on appeal, the order denying the motion for reconsideration is ineffective and does not constitute a ‘judgment[ ], ruling[ ], or order[ ] rendered in the case’ within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34(d).” Hood v. State, 282 Ga. 462, 651 S.E.2d 88 (September 24, 2007). Trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for new trial, filed with his notice of appeal. “The filing of Hood’s pro se notice of appeal on the same day as the motion for new trial did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction since ‘such divestiture does not become effective during the period of time in which a motion for new trial may be filed. In the event a motion for new trial is timely filed as provided in OCGA § 5-5-40, the effectiveness of the divestiture is then delayed until the motion for new trial is ruled upon and a notice of appeal to the ruling has been filed or the period for appealing the ruling has expired.’ Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 197 (312 S.E.2d 309) (1984); Brown v. State, 208 Ga.App. 726 (431 S.E.2d 726) (1993).” Rocha v. State, 287 Ga.App. 446, 651 S.E.2d 781 (September 7, 2007). Defendant appealed trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Three days after filing his notice of appeal, Defendant filed his motion asking the trial court to reconsider his motion; noting the pending appeal, the trial court declined to consider the merits of the motion to reconsider. Held, trial court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for reconsideration, made after filing notice of appeal . “[O]nce Rocha filed his notice of appeal, the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order denying Rocha’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. [Cit.] Indeed, because the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to modify or vacate the [ ] order when Rocha filed his motion to vacate, any order considering the motion to vacate on the merits would have been a nullity.” In re: Jefferson, 284 Ga.App. 877, 645 S.E.2d 349 (March 30, 2007). “The trial court’s discretionary grant of supersedeas in its original order of May 1 did not result in a divestment of its jurisdiction; that event occurred only when Jefferson filed a notice of appeal. OCGA § 5-6-38(a); Couch v. United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 224 Ga.App. 721 (482 S.E.2d 704) (1997) (proper and timely filing of notice of appeal is ‘an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court’).” Williams v. State, 278 Ga.App. 42, 628 S.E.2d 128 (March 7, 2006). Trial court’s ruling on motion for new trial was a nullity where defendant had already filed notice of appeal. Citing Peterson v. State , 274 Ga. 165, 171(6), 549 S.E.2d 387 (2001). Heard v. State, 280 Ga. 348, 627 S.E.2d 12 (February 27, 2006). Trial court properly “did not rule on [defendant’s] motion for reconsideration. The trial court lost jurisdiction of the case when the notice of appeal was filed. Cherokee County v. Hause, 229 Ga.App. 578, 494 S.E.2d 234 (1997); State v. Ganong, 221 Ga.App. 250, 251, 470 S.E.2d 794 (1996).” Styles v. State, 245 Ga.App. 90, 537 S.E.2d 377 (July 13, 2000). Whole court opinion. Following revocation of defendant’s probation (for an unstated offense), superior court’s orders vacating and re-entering the probation revocation were “null and void” while defendant’s appeal to Court of Appeals was pending. This is so even though the appeal had been dismissed by the Court of Appeals days earlier for failure to comply with discretionary appeal procedures – because the remittitur hadn’t yet been issued and filed in superior court, the appeal was still technically pending. Overruling Gillis v. Goodgame, 199 Ga.App. 413, 404 S.E.2d 815 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 262 Ga. 117, 414 S.E.2d 197 (1992), and Kent v. Brown, 238 Ga.App. 607, 518 S.E.2d 737 (1999). “Under ordinary circumstances, a trial court does not have ‘jurisdiction to take any action in a case prior to receiving the remittitur from the appellate court,’” quoting Chambers v. State, 262 Ga. 200, 415 S.E.2d 643 (1992). Blackburn, writing for three others, concurs specially, to note that not all action by the trial court is stayed by an appeal. “It is the law that a trial court may not alter a judgment or order while an appeal as to the validity of that particular judgment or order is still pending before the appellate court. Neither may a trial court initiate proceedings which, one way or another, require a ruling on the exact