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matter being appealed. See generally Cohran v. Carlin, 249 Ga. 510, 512, 291 S.E.2d 538 (1982) ; Chambers v. State, supra; Griffin v. State [266 Ga. 115, 464 S.E.2d 371 (1995)]. It is not the case, however, that a trial court's hands are tied as to other matters not affecting those issues on appeal, during the pendency of such appeal.” Isaac v. State, 237 Ga.App. 723, 516 S.E.2d 575 (April 22, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, filed after notice of appeal. “In criminal cases as well as civil cases, the filing of a notice of appeal ‘has the effect of depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to modify or alter its judgment.’ Bryson v. State, 228 Ga.App. 84, 85(1), 491 S.E.2d 184 (1997); Holt v. State, 205 Ga.App. 40(1), 421 S.E.2d 131 (1992); D.P. v. State, 129 Ga.App. 680, 681(1), 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973). Since the grant of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentence has been imposed is, in effect, a modification of the judgment of conviction and sentence, the filing of the notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant Isaac’s motion to withdraw his plea.” B. COLLEGE POLICE/UNIVERSITY POLICE State v. Zilke, 333 Ga.App. 344, 773 S.E.2d 489 (July 8, 2015). Physical precedent only. In DUI prosecution, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, “POST-certified campus police officers fall within the scope of OCGA § 17–4–23 and may arrest for moving traffic offenses committed in their presence more than 500 yards from campus.” Kennesaw State University officer here could pull over and arrest driver away from campus. OCGA § 20-3-72 otherwise limits campus officers’ arrest powers to “offenses committed upon any property under the jurisdiction of the board of regents and for offenses committed upon any public or private property within 500 yards of any property under the jurisdiction of the board [of regents].” Cert. granted, case no. S15G1303, November 2, 2015. Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga.App. 114, 706 S.E.2d 618 (February 28, 2011). DUI conviction affirmed; University of Georgia police officer had power to make traffic stop beyond grounds of the university. “Pursuant to OCGA § 17-4- 23, ‘an officer has authority to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle where the offense is committed in his presence, regardless of territorial limitations.’ State v. Gehris, 242 Ga.App. 384, 386 (528 S.E.2d 300) (2000) (footnote and punctuation omitted); see Page [ v. State, 250 Ga.App. 795, 797 (553 S.E.2d 176) (2001)]; Edge v. State, 226 Ga.App. 559, 562(2) (487 S.E.2d 117) (1997). Indeed, ‘[t]his court has held that two statutes, OCGA §§ 17-4-23 and 40-13-30(a), ... authorize police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions.’ State v. Heredia, 252 Ga.App. 89, 90(1) (555 S.E.2d 91) (2001) (citations omitted); see Weldon [ v. State, 291 Ga.App. 309, 311 (661 S.E.2d 672)]; Hawkins v. State, 281 Ga.App. 852, 853(1) (637 S.E.2d 422) (2006). Pursuant to the latter, ‘[o]fficers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state ... having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under [Article 2, Chapter 13, of the Georgia Code].’ OCGA 40-13-30. Hawkins v. State, 281 Ga.App. 852, 637 S.E.2d 422 (August 24, 2006). University police officer had jurisdiction to write traffic citation for offense committed on state highway “adjacent” to campus. “Campus policemen of the State university system ‘have the power to make arrests for offenses committed upon any property under the jurisdiction of the board of regents and for offenses committed upon any public or private property within 500 yards of any property under the jurisdiction of the board.’ OCGA § 20-3-72.” “Officer Washington’s unrebutted testimony at trial indicated that the collision occurred at an intersection that directly bordered Kennesaw State University’s campus.” This testimony was sufficient to prove that the offense was within his jurisdiction pursuant to the code section. Accord, Sullivan v. State , 308 Ga.App. 114, 706 S.E.2d 618 (February 28, 2011). In re: M.P., 279 Ga.App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (April 13, 2006). Evidence established that officer was in lawful discharge of his duties, and thus sufficed to prove that juvenile obstructed officer. Officer went to “house adjacent to the school parking lot” to find juvenile, who was skipping school and planning a fight after school. Although officer “was unable to confirm that he remained within 1,000 feet of school property [the limits of a school security officer’s jurisdiction under OCGA § 20-2-1180(a)] during the entire period in which he approached and gave chase to M.P.,” he was on school property when told that M.P. and his companion had gone to the adjacent property in flight from another officer. “Therefore, even if [officer] left his jurisdiction in his attempt to detain M.P. and return him to school, he did so in hot pursuit of a suspected offender of OCGA § 16-10-24. As an officer certified pursuant to the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, Officer Partridge was entitled to leave his jurisdiction to detain M.P. See Hastings v. State, 211 Ga.App. 873, 874(1) (441 S.E.2d 83) (1994) (authority to arrest extends beyond jurisdiction where officer in hot pursuit of suspect); see also State v. Durr, 274 Ga.App. 438, 442(2)(b) (618 S.E.2d 117) (2005) (physical precedent only) (campus police officer entitled to follow car beyond jurisdiction of campus where driver was suspected to be in violation of traffic laws). As a result, M.P.’s claim that Officer Partridge was outside his jurisdiction is without merit.”