☢ test - Í

State v. Durr, 274 Ga.App. 438, 618 S.E.2d 117 (July 14, 2005). Physical precedent only. “[C]ounty and municipal officers are allowed to arrest outside their jurisdictional territory if they are in hot pursuit of a suspected offender. Hastings v. State, 211 Ga.App. 873, 874(1) (441 S.E.2d 83) (1994); Poss v. State, 167 Ga.App. 86, 87(1) (305 S.E.2d 884) (1983). [fn] This is true even though the officer has only articulable suspicion of a traffic or criminal violation, rather than probable cause. See Margerum v. State, 260 Ga.App. 398 (579 S.E.2d 825) (2003); Hastings, 211 Ga.App. at 874.” Likewise, campus police may stop vehicles off-campus if they were in hot pursuit when they left campus. Accord, In re: M.P ., 279 Ga.App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (April 13, 2006). C. COUNTY POLICE Nyane v. State, 306 Ga.App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (October 27, 2010). Convictions for attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence seized when Madison County officer arrested defendant in Dekalb County pursuant to an arrest warrant. “It is well settled, however, that ‘[u]nder a warrant issued by a judicial officer, an arresting officer may, in any county without regard to the residence of the arresting officer, arrest any person charged with a crime.’ OCGA § 17-4-25(a). Here, it is undisputed that Captain Benner had an arrest warrant for Nyane when he found him in a Lithonia apartment hiding in a shower.” Murray v. State, 306 Ga.App. 106, 701 S.E.2d 579 (September 16, 2010). “Suppression of evidence obtained during a warrantless arrest by officers acting outside their jurisdiction is not required where the arrest was made with sufficient probable cause (and not in the suspect's home). Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451(4)(b) (689 S.E.2d 293) (2010).” Weldon v. State, 291 Ga.App. 309, 661 S.E.2d 672 (April 25, 2008). County officer had authority to make traffic stop in a different county (here, for suspected DUI) where offense was committed in presence of another officer, regardless of “hot pursuit.” “Ordinarily, as a matter of legal policy, a peace officer has the power to make traffic stops and to arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed. Margerum v. State, 260 Ga.App. 398 (579 S.E.2d 825) (2003). This legal policy stems from Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III(a)(1) and (b)(1) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which provides that ‘ [u]nless otherwise provided by law . . .[n]o county may exercise [police] powers ... inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected....’ (Emphasis added.) See State v. Picot, 255 Ga.App. 513, 514-515(1) (565 S.E.2d 865) (2002) (county officer authorized to arrest where violation committed in officer’s presence regardless of territorial limit). In interpreting this constitutional provision and in conformance with its specific directive allowing for modification via statute, ‘this court has held that two statutes, OCGA § 40-13-30 and OCGA § 17-4-23(a), authorize county police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 515(1). See State v. Heredia, 252 Ga.App. 89, 90(1) (555 S.E.2d 91) (2001) (Cobb County police officer could stop defendant in the city limits of Kennesaw for traffic violation committed in Kennesaw); State v. Gehris, 242 Ga.App. 384, 386 (528 S.E.2d 300) (2000) (officer has authority to arrest a defendant for a traffic violation committed in his presence regardless of territorial limitations).” State v. Picot, 255 Ga.App. 513, 565 S.E.2d 865 (May 23, 2002). Notwithstanding Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. III(a) and (b)(1), a county police officer may make a traffic stop inside a municipality. State v. Heredia, 252 Ga.App. 89, 555 S.E.2d 91 (October 4, 2001). OCGA § 40-13-30 and OCGA § 17-4-23(a) authorize police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions. D. CRIMES IN MULTIPLE STATES Brown v. State, 321 Ga.App. 798, 743 S.E.2d 474 (May 20, 2013). Evidence supported jurisdiction for prosecutions of attempted child molestation and computer child exploitation. Offenses began with defendant’s participation from Tennessee in online chats with Georgia officer posing as child. 1. Attempted child molestation. Defendant “took a substantial step in Georgia toward committing child molestation, namely by traveling to Georgia to meet with 14–year– old ‘Brittany’ for the purpose of engaging in sexual activities with her.” 2. Computer child exploitation. “[OCGA § 16- 12-100.2] subjects a person to prosecution in Georgia under OCGA § 17–2–1 for ‘any conduct made unlawful under [OCGA § 16–12–100.2] which the person engages in while ... [e]ither within or outside of this state if, by such conduct, the person commits a violation of [OCGA § 16–12–100.2] which involves ... another person believed by such person to be a child residing in this state.’ OCGA § 16–12–100.2(h) Here, the evidence showed that, after being told that ‘Brittany’ lived in Georgia, Brown violated OCGA § 16–12–100.2 by utilizing computer on-line services to continue to communicate with her and to entice her to meet him to engage in sexual activities.” “[I]n addressing violations of OCGA