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§ 16–12–100.2, Georgia courts have held that a defendant utilizes computer on-line services in the county of the recipient of the computer messages, even when the defendant sent the messages from elsewhere. See Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 412–413(1) (651 S.E.2d 55) (2007) (defendant alleged to have violated OCGA § 16–12–100.2 by sending explicit Internet messages to a law enforcement officer posing as an underage girl ‘utilized computer on-line services in [the recipient's] [c]ounty,’ even though he sent the messages from a different county); Selfe v. State, 290 Ga.App. 857, 861–862(2) (660 S.E.2d 727) (2008) (in case involving violation of OCGA § 16–12–100.2, citing Patel to find venue in county where law enforcement officer posing as underage girl received sexually explicit messages, even though defendant sent them from a different county).” Hunsberger v. State, 299 Ga.App. 593, 683 S.E.2d 150 (August 6, 2009). Georgia court had jurisdiction over charge of kidnapping with bodily injury charge where victim was kidnapped in Georgia and taken to South Carolina, where he was shot and killed. “‘[A] person shall be subject to prosecution in this state for a crime which he commits, while either within or outside the state, ... if ... [t]he crime is committed either wholly or partly within the state.’ OCGA § 17-2-1(b)(1). Since the victim was abducted in Georgia, the kidnapping occurred within the state. See generally Martin v. State, 281 Ga.App. 64, 65(1) (635 S.E.2d 358) (2006) (kidnapping ‘is consummated in the county where the victim was seized and asported to some degree’). When the victim was later injured in South Carolina, it was nevertheless a bodily injury for purposes of the Georgia kidnapping.” Based on Sears v. State, 268 Ga. 759 (493 S.E.2d 180) (1997) (affirming “a defendant's conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury where the victim was abducted in Georgia and later stabbed to death in Kentucky.”). E. FEDERAL PROPERTY Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293 (February 1, 2010). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; evidence obtained upon warrantless arrest of defendant by Georgia officers on federal military base (here, Dobbins Air Force Base) is not subject to suppression on that basis. “With regard to the arrest occurring on Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Devega cites OCGA § 50-2-23, under which ‘the state retains criminal jurisdiction over persons for state offenses committed on property that has been acquired by the United States, except for property used by the Department of Defense and by the Department of Justice. Even where the latter type of federal property is involved, the state retains jurisdiction unless the criminal defendant shows that the United States has accepted such jurisdiction by its filing a notice with the governor of the state in which the land is situated. [Cit.]’ Jackson v. State, 183 Ga.App. 594, 595 (359 S.E.2d 457) (1987). … [I]t has previously been held that the United States has not accepted ‘exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the land known as Dobbins Air Force Base in Cobb County....’ Dobbins v. State, 114 Ga.App. 403 (51 S.E.2d 549) (1966).” F. GENERALLY Anderson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 776, 645 S.E.2d 362 (April 4, 2007). Superior court which entered sentence had jurisdiction to entertain habeas petition (although couched as motion for out-of-time appeal) filed by federal prisoner held out of state, pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-53. State v. Serio, 257 Ga.App. 369, 571 S.E.2d 168 (August 27, 2002). State Court had no power to transfer DUI prosecution to recorder’s court where solicitor elected to file charges in state court. “State was entitled to shift defendant’s prosecution to state court after her arraignment in recorder’s court,” as recorder’s court consented to nolle pros of charges there. Fact that charges were pending simultaneously in both courts for one day in no way makes solicitor’s actions “improper.” “[P]roposition that ‘[w]here courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court to take jurisdiction will retain it’” did not prevent recorder’s court from surrendering jurisdiction via nolle pros. “Serio also complains that the prosecutor engaged in unethical forum and judge shopping, but OCGA § 40-6-376(a) expressly grants the prosecutor the discretion to select the forum.” Accord, State v. West , 258 Ga.App. 269, 574 S.E.2d 365 (November 6, 2002). State v. Johnson, 257 Ga.App. 162, 570 S.E.2d 627 (August 23, 2002). A solicitor has authority to request the traffic charges be transferred from recorder’s court to state court. OCGA § 40-6-376(b), giving a defendant a right to request such a transfer, does not impliedly deny that power to the solicitor. The recorder’s court may also effect such a transfer on its own motion. Govert v. State, 257 Ga.App. 80, 570 S.E.2d 393 (August 20, 2002). Contrary to defendant’s argument, municipal court had power to transfer his DUI charge, arising within city limits, to state court. In counties “having city, county or state courts,” OCGA § 40-13-29 does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in municipal courts over state misdemeanor traffic