☢ test - Í

violations occurring inside city corporate limits even where a defendant waives his right to a jury trial. State and superior courts would always have concurrent jurisdiction over any state offenses. In counties without a ‘city, county or state court,’ however, this section would appear to give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction as against probate courts. State v. Fredericks, 256 Ga.App. 401, 568 S.E.2d 489 (May 10, 2002). Following conviction for public indecency, superior cout had jurisdiction to hear motion for new trial filed within same term, though decided after term ended. “[T]he key consideration [in determining whether to keep the regular term of the court open as to that particular case until it is passed upon by the judge] is whether proceedings on the matter are begun during the same term as the judgment.” Thus, not only does an order setting a hearing in the next term of the court extend the term of the court, but a pending motion will do the same. State v. Sterling , 244 Ga.App. 328, 535 S.E.2d 329 (June 5, 2000). State court properly dismissed shoplifting prosecution upon being advised by State that defendant had three prior convictions, making the offense on trial a felony. 1. Out-of- state offenses properly counted as prior offenses leading to felony designation. 2. NCIC printout showing prior offenses, presented by State and not disputed by either party, was sufficient to cause the trial court to inquire into its own jurisdiction. 3. Although jury was then deliberating and announced that it had reached a verdict, trial court properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction, refused to allow the jury to return its verdict, and dismissed the prosecution for want of prosecution. G. HOT PURSUIT Weldon v. State, 291 Ga.App. 309, 661 S.E.2d 672 (April 25, 2008). County officer had authority to make traffic stop in a different county (here, for suspected DUI) where offense was committed in presence of another officer, regardless of “hot pursuit.” “Ordinarily, as a matter of legal policy, a peace officer has the power to make traffic stops and to arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed. Margerum v. State, 260 Ga.App. 398 (579 S.E.2d 825) (2003). This legal policy stems from Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III(a)(1) and (b)(1) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which provides that ‘ [u]nless otherwise provided by law . . .[n]o county may exercise [police] powers ... inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected....’ (Emphasis added.) See State v. Picot, 255 Ga.App. 513, 514-515(1) (565 S.E.2d 865) (2002) (county officer authorized to arrest where violation committed in officer’s presence regardless of territorial limit). In interpreting this constitutional provision and in conformance with its specific directive allowing for modification via statute, ‘this court has held that two statutes, OCGA § 40-13-30 and OCGA § 17-4-23(a), authorize county police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 515(1). See State v. Heredia, 252 Ga.App. 89, 90(1) (555 S.E.2d 91) (2001) (Cobb County police officer could stop defendant in the city limits of Kennesaw for traffic violation committed in Kennesaw); State v. Gehris, 242 Ga.App. 384, 386 (528 S.E.2d 300) (2000) (officer has authority to arrest a defendant for a traffic violation committed in his presence regardless of territorial limitations).” State v. Durr, 274 Ga.App. 438, 618 S.E.2d 117 (July 14, 2005). Physical precedent only. “[C]ounty and municipal officers are allowed to arrest outside their jurisdictional territory if they are in hot pursuit of a suspected offender. Hastings v. State, 211 Ga.App. 873, 874(1) (441 S.E.2d 83) (1994); Poss v. State, 167 Ga.App. 86, 87(1) (305 S.E.2d 884) (1983). [fn] This is true even though the officer has only articulable suspicion of a traffic or criminal violation, rather than probable cause. See Margerum v. State, 260 Ga.App. 398 (579 S.E.2d 825) (2003); Hastings, 211 Ga.App. at 874.” Likewise, campus police may stop vehicles off-campus if they were in hot pursuit when they left campus. Accord, In re: M.P ., 279 Ga.App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (April 13, 2006). Margerum v. State, 260 Ga.App. 398, 579 S.E.2d 825 (March 19, 2003). “It is not necessary for the officer to engage in a high-speed chase of the suspect, nor must the officer turn on his lights and sirens before leaving his jurisdiction in order for the stop to be authorized under the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine. ‘ The critical elements characterizing “hot pursuit” are the continuity and immediacy of the pursuit, rather than merely the rate of speed at which pursuit is made. ’ Moreover, the officer is not required to arrest the suspect at the first opportunity, but may, and should, wait to stop and arrest the suspect at the first opportunity which is safe for all concerned, the officer, the suspect, and other motorists.” Matthews v. State, 258 Ga.App. 813, 575 S.E.2d 725 (December 11, 2002). Traffic stop could be made over county line, even if not involved in high speed chase where “it can be demonstrated that the pursuit was continuous and immediate.” Here, officer admitted he was not in “hot pursuit,” but observed offense in his own jurisdiction but could not effect stop before defendant crossed county line because of need to turn around in heavy traffic.